Abstract This paper reviews arguments for the claim that all probabilities arising in quantum mechanics are Bayesian degrees of belief. The starting point is the observation that there is a one-to-one map from quantum states to points on the probability simplex. Bayes’s rule remains valid in quantum theory, provided it is kept in mind that the outcomes of quantum measurements have no preassigned values. The probabilities of quantum measurement outcomes depend explicitly on a quantum prior whose general form will be discussed. Similar to the classical case, the quantum de Finetti theorem simplifies the analysis of repeated quantum trials if the prior is exchangeable. The Bayesian approach to quantum theory described here solves the problem of the ‘collapse of the wave function’. It also provides almost trivial explanations of a number of phenomena in quantum information theory, including the no-cloning theorem and quantum teleportation.
Abstract This paper reviews arguments for the claim that all probabilities arising in quantum mechanics are Bayesian degrees of belief. The starting point is the observation that there is a one-to-one map from quantum states to points on the probability simplex. Bayes’s rule remains valid in quantum theory, provided it is kept in mind that the outcomes of quantum measurements have no preassigned values. The probabilities of quantum measurement outcomes depend explicitly on a quantum prior whose general form will be discussed. Similar to the classical case, the quantum de Finetti theorem simplifies the analysis of repeated quantum trials if the prior is exchangeable. The Bayesian approach to quantum theory described here solves the problem of the ‘collapse of the wave function’. It also provides almost trivial explanations of a number of phenomena in quantum information theory, including the no-cloning theorem and quantum teleportation.
The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of nature. In this paper, we motivate and review two results that generalize de Finetti's theorem to the quantum mechanical setting: Namely a de Finetti theorem for quantum states and a de Finetti theorem for quantum operations. The quantum-state theorem, in a closely analogous fashion to the original de Finetti theorem, deals with exchangeable density-operator assignments and provides an operational definition of the concept of an "unknown quantum state" in quantum-state tomography. Similarly, the quantum-operation theorem gives an operational definition of an "unknown quantum operation" in quantum-process tomography. These results are especially important for a Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics, where quantum states and (at least some) quantum operations are taken to be states of belief rather than states of nature.
In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probability quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any a priori connection to limiting frequencies. In this paper, we show that, despite being prescribed by a fundamental law, probabilities for individual quantum systems can be understood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the distinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not in their definition, but in the nature of the information they encode. In the classical world, maximal information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing definite answers for all possible questions that can be asked of the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is not complete and cannot be completed. Using this distinction, we show that any Bayesian probability assignment in quantum mechanics must have the form of the quantum probability rule, that maximal information about a quantum system leads to a unique quantum-state assignment, and that quantum theory provides a stronger connection between probability and measured frequency than can be justified classically. Finally, we give a Bayesian formulation of quantum-state tomography.
We consider the problem of gambling on a quantum experiment and enforce rational behavior by a few rules. These rules yield, in the classical case, the Bayesian theory of probability via duality theorems. In our quantum setting, they yield the Bayesian theory generalized to the space of Hermitian matrices. This very theory is quantum mechanics: in fact, we derive all its four postulates from the generalized Bayesian theory. This implies that quantum mechanics is self-consistent. It also leads us to reinterpret the main operations in quantum mechanics as probability rules: Bayes' rule (measurement), marginalization (partial tracing), independence (tensor product). To say it with a slogan, we obtain that quantum mechanics is the Bayesian theory in the complex numbers.
We consider the problem of gambling on a quantum experiment and enforce rational behaviour by a few rules. These rules yield, in the classical case, the Bayesian theory of probability via duality theorems. In our quantum setting, they yield the Bayesian theory generalised to the space of Hermitian matrices. This very theory is quantum mechanics: in fact, we derive all its four postulates from the generalised Bayesian theory. This implies that quantum mechanics is self-consistent. It also leads us to reinterpret the main operations in quantum mechanics as probability rules: Bayes' rule (measurement), marginalisation (partial tracing), independence (tensor product). To say it with a slogan, we obtain that quantum mechanics is the Bayesian theory in the complex numbers.
In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probability quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any a priori connection to limiting frequencies. Despite being prescribed by a fundamental law, probabilities for individual quantum systems can be understood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the distinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not in their definition, but in the nature of the information they encode. In the classical world, maximal information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing definite predictions for all possible questions that can be asked of the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is not complete and cannot be completed. Using this distinction, we show that any Bayesian probability assignment in quantum mechanics must have the form of the quantum probability rule, that maximal information about a quantum system leads to a unique quantum-state assignment, and that quantum theory provides a stronger connection between probability and measured frequency than can be justified classically. Finally we give a Bayesian formulation of quantum-state tomography. There are excellent reasons for interpreting quantum states as states of knowledge. A classic
Quantum theory can be viewed as a generalization of classical probability theory, but the analogy as it has been developed so far is not complete. Whereas the manner in which inferences are made in classical probability theory is independent of the causal relation that holds between the conditioned variable and the conditioning variable, in the conventional quantum formalism, there is a significant difference between how one treats experiments involving two systems at a single time and those involving a single system at two times. In this article, we develop the formalism of quantum conditional states, which provides a unified description of these two sorts of experiment. In addition, concepts that are distinct in the conventional formalism become unified: Channels, sets of states, and positive operator valued measures are all seen to be instances of conditional states; the action of a channel on a state, ensemble averaging, the Born rule, the composition of channels, and nonselective state-update rules are all seen to be instances of belief propagation. Using a quantum generalization of Bayes' theorem and the associated notion of Bayesian conditioning, we also show that the remote steering of quantum states can be described within our formalism as a mere updating of beliefs about one system given new information about another, and retrodictive inferences can be expressed using the same belief propagation rule as is used for predictive inferences. Finally, we show that previous arguments for interpreting the projection postulate as a quantum generalization of Bayesian conditioning are based on a misleading analogy and that it is best understood as a combination of belief propagation (corresponding to the nonselective state-update map) and conditioning on the measurement outcome.