Lorentzian Quantum Reality: Postulates and Toy Models

Adrian Kent

Published Jan 1, 2014• 9 citations

Abstract

We describe postulates for a novel realist version of relativistic quantum theory or quantum field theory in Minkowski space and other background space-times, and illustrate their application with toy models.

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OpenAlex

Abstract

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We further investigate postulates for realist versions of relativistic quantum theory and quantum field theory in Minkowski space and other background spacetimes. According to these postulates, quantum theory is supplemented by local variables that depend on possible outcomes of hypothetical measurements on the late-time electromagnetic field in spacelike separated regions. We illustrate the implications in simple examples by using photon wave mechanics and discuss possible extensions to quantum field theory.We further investigate postulates for realist versions of relativistic quantum theory and quantum field theory in Minkowski space and other background spacetimes. According to these postulates, quantum theory is supplemented by local variables that depend on possible outcomes of hypothetical measurements on the late-time electromagnetic field in spacelike separated regions. We illustrate the implications in simple examples by using photon wave mechanics and discuss possible extensions to quantum field theory.

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The quantum reality problem is that of finding a mathematically precise definition of a sample space of configurations of beables, events, histories, paths, or other mathematical objects, and a corresponding probability distribution, for any given closed quantum system. Given a solution, we can postulate that physical reality is described by one randomly chosen configuration drawn from the sample space. For a physically sensible solution, this postulate should imply quasiclassical physics in realistic models. In particular, it should imply the validity of Copenhagen quantum theory and classical dynamics in their respective domains. A Lorentzian solution applies to relativistic quantum theory or quantum field theory in Minkowski space and is defined in a way that respects Lorentz symmetry. We outline a solution to the nonrelativistic and Lorentzian quantum reality problems and associated generalizations of quantum theory.The quantum reality problem is that of finding a mathematically precise definition of a sample space of configurations of beables, events, histories, paths, or other mathematical objects, and a corresponding probability distribution, for any given closed quantum system. Given a solution, we can postulate that physical reality is described by one randomly chosen configuration drawn from the sample space. For a physically sensible solution, this postulate should imply quasiclassical physics in realistic models. In particular, it should imply the validity of Copenhagen quantum theory and classical dynamics in their respective domains. A Lorentzian solution applies to relativistic quantum theory or quantum field theory in Minkowski space and is defined in a way that respects Lorentz symmetry. We outline a solution to the nonrelativistic and Lorentzian quantum reality problems and associated generalizations of quantum theory.

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quant-pharXiv:2604.11830Apr 14, 20260 citations

C^{*}

-algebra

\mathfrak{A}

, but usually in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in Minkowski spacetime (QFTM), not all of them are considered to be physically real; Some of them are physically real (or realizable) states, but others are non-physical ``fictional'' states. Only the states which can be expressed as a density matrix on a fixed ``physical Hilbert space'' (the GNS representation space of

\mathfrak{A}

w.r.t. the vacuum) are viewed to be physically real. On the other hand, in QFTCS, there is no distinguished physical Hilbert space; no distinguished vacuum state. Thus we cannot distinguish physically real states from fictional states. The second part of my argument is a counterargument to what I call ``pragmatic realism on quantum states'', which insists as follows: ``We are permitted to regard a quantum state as a physical reality, because the concept of quantum state is indispensable in quantum physics.'' I argue that the concept of quantum state is indeed dispensable in non-relativistic QM, and hence this pragmatic realist thesis is vacuous there. I give a conjecture that it is also dispensable in QFTM and QFTCS, and some preliminary considerations on it.