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arXiv:2604.11830

A skepticism on the concept of quantum state related to quantum field theory on curved spacetime

Hideyasu Yamashita

quant-phgr-qcSubmitted Apr 11, 2026• Announced Apr 14, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Some skeptical arguments on the physical reality of quantum states are given. First, I argue that the algebraic formalism of quantum field theory in curved spacetime (algebraic QFTCS, AQFTCS) leads to such a skepticism. Of course we have the purely mathematical notion of states on a $C^{*}$-algebra $\mathfrak{A}$, but usually in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in Minkowski spacetime (QFTM), not all of them are considered to be physically real; Some of them are physically real (or realizable) states, but others are non-physical ``fictional'' states. Only the states which can be expressed as a density matrix on a fixed ``physical Hilbert space'' (the GNS representation space of $\mathfrak{A}$ w.r.t. the vacuum) are viewed to be physically real. On the other hand, in QFTCS, there is no distinguished physical Hilbert space; no distinguished vacuum state. Thus we cannot distinguish physically real states from fictional states. The second part of my argument is a counterargument to what I call ``pragmatic realism on quantum states'', which insists as follows: ``We are permitted to regard a quantum state as a physical reality, because the concept of quantum state is indispensable in quantum physics.'' I argue that the concept of quantum state is indeed dispensable in non-relativistic QM, and hence this pragmatic realist thesis is vacuous there. I give a conjecture that it is also dispensable in QFTM and QFTCS, and some preliminary considerations on it.

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28 pages

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Some skeptical arguments on the physical reality of quantum states are given. First, I argue that the algebraic formalism of quantum field theory in curved spacetime (algebraic QFTCS, AQFTCS) leads to such a skepticism. Of course we have the purely mathematical notion of states on a C∗C^{*}C∗-algebra A\mathfrak{A}A, but usually in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in Minkowski spacetime (QFTM), not all of them are considered to be physically real; Some of them are physically real (or realizable) states, but others are non-physical fictional'' states. Only the states which can be expressed as a density matrix on a fixed physical Hilbert space'' (the GNS representation space of A\mathfrak{A}A w.r.t. the vacuum) are viewed to be physically real. On the other hand, in QFTCS, there is no distinguished physical Hilbert space; no distinguished vacuum state. Thus we cannot distinguish physically real states from fictional states. The second part of my argument is a counterargument to what I call pragmatic realism on quantum states'', which insists as follows: We are permitted to regard a quantum state as a physical reality, because the concept of quantum state is indispensable in quantum physics.'' I argue that the concept of quantum state is indeed dispensable in non-relativistic QM, and hence this pragmatic realist thesis is vacuous there. I give a conjecture that it is also dispensable in QFTM and QFTCS, and some preliminary considerations on it.
According to spacetime state realism (SSR), the fundamental ontology of a quantum mechanical world consists of a state-valued field evolving in four-dimensional spacetime. One chief advantage it claims over rival wave-function realist views is its natural compatibility with relativistic quantum field theory (QFT). I argue that the original density operator formulation of SSR cannot be extended to QFTs where the local observables form type III von Neumann algebras. Instead, I propose a new formulation of SSR in terms of a presheaf of local state spaces dual to the net of local observables studied by algebraic QFT. 1. Introduction 2. Spacetime State Realism in Quantum Field Theory 2.1. Equivalence thesis 3. Entanglement and the Type III Property 3.1. No-Go Lemma 1 3.2. No-Go Lemma 2 4. State Space Axioms for Quantum Field Theory 4.1. Revised equivalence thesis 5. Discussion
Philosophical reflection on quantum field theory has tended to focus on how it revises our conception of what a particle is. However, there has been relatively little discussion of the threat to the ‘reality’ of particles posed by the possibility of inequivalent quantizations of a classical field theory, i.e. inequivalent representations of the algebra of observables of the field in terms of operators on a Hilbert space. The threat is that each representation embodies its own distinctive conception of what a particle is, and how a ‘particle’ will respond to a suitably operated detector. Our main goal is to clarify the subtle relationship between inequivalent representations of a field theory and their associated particle concepts. We also have a particular interest in the Minkowski versus Rindler quantizations of a free Boson field, because they respectively entail two radically different descriptions of the particle content of the field in the very same region of spacetime. We shall defend the idea that these representations provide complementary descriptions of the same state of the field against the claim that they embody completely incommensurable theories of the field.
Unlike QFT in Minkowski spacetime (QFTM), QFT in curved spacetime (QFTCS) suffers from a conceptual obscurity on the empirical (experimentally verifiable/falsifiable) laws. We propose to employ the notion of prior conditional probabilities to describe a part of the empirical laws of QFTCS. This is interpreted as a quantum conditional probability without no information on the initial state. Hence this notion is expected to be free from the inevitable vagueness of the empirical meaning of quantum states in QFTCS. More generally in quantum physics, this notion seems free from the conceptual problems on state reductions. We confine ourselves to the probabilistic laws of the free scalar fields (Klein-Gordon fields) in curved spacetime, which require some reconsideration on the empirical meaning of the canonical commutation relation (CCR). We give some examples of empirical laws in terms of prior conditional probabilities, concerning the CCR and the free scalar QFTCS.
This article is a sequel to our previous paper (arXiv:2511.12311), where we considered the conceptual problem on the empirical laws for the Klein\textendash Gordon quantum field theory in curved spacetime (QFTCS), and we will consider the similar problems for the Majorana field on curved spacetime here. A ``law'' in theoretical physics is said to be observable or empirical only if it can be verified/falsified by some experimental procedure. The notion of empiricality/observability becomes far more unclear in QFTCS, than in QFT in Minkowski (flat) spacetime (QFTM), mainly because QFTCS lacks the notion of vacuum. This could potentially undermine the status of QFTCS as a physical (not only mathematical) theory. We consider this problem for the Majorana field in curved spacetime, and examine some examples of the empirical laws.
Philosophical reflection on quantum field theory has tended to focus on how it revises our conception of what a particle is. However, there has been relatively little discussion of the threat to the "reality" of particles posed by the possibility of inequivalent quantizations of a classical field theory, i.e., inequivalent representations of the algebra of observables of the field in terms of operators on a Hilbert space. The threat is that each representation embodies its own distinctive conception of what a particle is, and how a "particle" will respond to a suitably operated detector. Our main goal is to clarify the subtle relationship between inequivalent representations of a field theory and their associated particle concepts. We also have a particular interest in the Minkowski versus Rindler quantizations of a free Boson field, because they respectively entail two radically different descriptions of the particle content of the field in the very same region of spacetime. We shall defend the idea that these representations provide complementary descriptions of the same state of the field against the claim that they embody completely incommensurable theories of the field.
Abstract One can consider the developments in quantum field theory from the point of view of foundational problems posed about physical reality at both the epistemological and ontological levels, or as a ‘laboratory’ to study the actual methodology of the scientific enterprise. I shall address both of these issues in this paper. My contention is that at the foundational level there is essentially nothing new in quantum field theory that is not already present in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This is quite different in emphasis from the view expressed by Redhead (1983a). Even in quantum mechanics most of the difficulties which arise are generated by the realist’s inclination to take the formalism too literally as representing physical reality, often in a modified or distorted classical view. More serious consideration of Bohr’s philosophical framework of complementarity may prove fruitful for coping with this problem, which is not new to quantum field theory, being already the central interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, as a source to illustrate how theories arc constructed and established in actual scientific practice, quantum field theory does provide a wide range of useful examples. Here too, although there are many technically fascinating topics (such as renormalization), quantum field theory is pretty much (meth odological) business as usual. Much more interesting, essentially new, methodological departures are seriously proposed (with varying degrees of credibility) by some rival or alternative developments in modern theoretical physics, such as the S-matrix programme, with its bootstrap conjecture, or cosmology, with various forms of the anthropic principle (Gale 1983) and with the inflationary universe scenario (Guth 1981 ).