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arXiv:1311.0249 · Physical Review A

Solution to the Lorentzian quantum reality problem

Adrian Kent

Published Jul 14, 2014• 53 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The quantum reality problem is that of finding a mathematically precise definition of a sample space of configurations of beables, events, histories, paths, or other mathematical objects, and a corresponding probability distribution, for any given closed quantum system. Given a solution, we can postulate that physical reality is described by one randomly chosen configuration drawn from the sample space. For a physically sensible solution, this postulate should imply quasiclassical physics in realistic models. In particular, it should imply the validity of Copenhagen quantum theory and classical dynamics in their respective domains. A Lorentzian solution applies to relativistic quantum theory or quantum field theory in Minkowski space and is defined in a way that respects Lorentz symmetry. We outline a solution to the nonrelativistic and Lorentzian quantum reality problems and associated generalizations of quantum theory.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.90.012107

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The quantum reality problem is that of finding a mathematically precise definition of a sample space of configurations of beables, events, histories, paths, or other mathematical objects, and a corresponding probability distribution, for any given closed quantum system. Given a solution, we can postulate that physical reality is described by one randomly chosen configuration drawn from the sample space. For a physically sensible solution, this postulate should imply quasiclassical physics in realistic models. In particular, it should imply the validity of Copenhagen quantum theory and classical dynamics in their respective domains. A Lorentzian solution applies to relativistic quantum theory or quantum field theory in Minkowski space and is defined in a way that respects Lorentz symmetry. We outline a solution to the nonrelativistic and Lorentzian quantum reality problems and associated generalizations of quantum theory.
At present, quantum theory leaves unsettled which quantities ontologically, physically exist in a quantum system. Do observables such as energy and position have meaningful values only at the precise moment of measurement, as in the Copenhagen interpretation? Or is position always definite and guided by the wave function, as in de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory? In the language of Bell, what are the "beables" of quantum theory and what values may they take in space and time? This is the quantum reality problem. A definitive answer requires not just describing which physical quantities exist in a quantum system, but describing what configurations of those quantities in space and time are allowed, and with what probability those configurations occur. Adrian Kent sets out a new vision of quantum theory along these lines. His interpretation supplements quantum theory to infer the value of physical quantities in spacetime from the asymptotic late-time behavior of the quantum system. In doing so, a Lorentz-covariant and single-world solution to the quantum reality problem is achieved. In this paper, the framework of Kent's interpretation is presented from the ground up. After a broad overview, a derivation of the generalized Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule is provided before applying Kent's interpretation to toy model systems, in both relativistic and non-relativistic settings. By adding figures and discussion, a broad introduction is provided to Kent's proposed interpretation of quantum theory.
Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is conceptually and mathematically simpler, and does, after all, work very well in a low-energy regime. Any solution of the measurement problem, or any account of the ontology of quantum theory, must yield sensible results in this regime, and so nonrelativistic quantum mechanics can serve as a testing ground for the viability of interpretations. On any approach, empirical adequacy requires recovery of at least an approximation to the quantum probabilities for outcomes of experiments, insofar as these have been verified by experiment. A quantum-mechanical theory is what results when one subjects a classical theory of a system with finitely many degrees of freedom to quantization. The task of extending additional beables theories to the context of quantum field theories remains a work in progress. A dynamical collapse theory modifies the evolution of the quantum state. Standard quantum theory predicts correlations between outcomes of spacelike separated experiments that violate Bell inequalities.
There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted – such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it – depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.
A pedagogical introduction is given to the quantum mechanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as a whole. Quantum mechanics aims at predicting the probabilities of alternative coarse-grained time histories of a closed system. Not every set of alternative coarse-grained histories that can be described may be consistently assigned probabilities because of quantum mechanical interference between individual histories of the set. In “Copenhagen ” quantum mechanics, probabilities can be assigned to histories of a subsystem that have been “measured”. In the quantum mechanics of closed systems, containing both observer and observed, probabilities are assigned to those sets of alternative histories for which there is negligible interference between individual histories as a consequence of the system’s initial condition and dynamics. Such sets of histories are said to decohere. We define decoherence for closed systems in the simplified case when quantum gravity can be neglected and the initial state is pure. Typical mechanisms of decoherence that are widespread in our universe are illustrated. Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the more general quantum framework of closed subsystems. It is appropriate when there is an approximately isolated subsystem that is a participant in a measurement situation in which (among other things) the decoherence of alternative registrations of the apparatus can be idealized as exact. Since the quantum mechanics of closed systems does not posit the existence of the quasiclassical domain of everyday experience, the domain of the approximate aplicability of classical physics must be explained. We describe how a quasiclassical domain described by averages of densities of approximately conserved quantities could be an emergent feature of an initial condition of the universe that implies the approximate classical behavior of spacetime on accessible scales.