Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by ‘holism’. I propose an operational criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if some determination (measurement) of the global properties in the theory which can be determined by global measurements, can not be implemented by local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. I will argue that the latter have a limited scope and need to be extended using the criterion for holism proposed here in order to satisfactory address the issue for physical theories. I formalize this criterion for classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a Cartesian phase and configuration space, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.
Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by ‘holism’. I propose an operational criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if some determination (measurement) of the global properties in the theory which can be determined by global measurements, can not be implemented by local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. I will argue that the latter have a limited scope and need to be extended using the criterion for holism proposed here in order to satisfactory address the issue for physical theories. I formalize this criterion for classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a Cartesian phase and configuration space, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.
This paper attempts to build a bridge between the interpretation of quantum theory and the philosophy of mind. In contrast to other such attempts, the bridge which this paper suggests does not consist in extending features of quantum theory to the philosophy of mind. The argument of this paper is that the discussion about a revision of the Cartesian tradition in current philosophy of mind is relevant to the interpretation of quantum theory: taking this discussion into account sharpens up the task for the interpretation of quantum physics as far as the scope of what is known as quantum holism is concerned. In particular, considering this discussion makes out a strong case against the interpretation that considers quantum holism to be universal in the physical realm. I: Introduction There are a number of suggestions for a connection between on the one hand the interpretation of quantum theory and on the other hand the enquiry into the nature of consciousness and the philosophy of mind. Some scientists, notably Penrose (1994), chapters 7‐8, propose that quantum theory is important to brain research. Furthermore, since the advent of quantum theory, the process of quantum state reduction, which is presumed indeterministic, has been employed for a solution to the problem how free will can have physical effects (the most elaborate proposal in this respect is Eccles (1994, chapter 9)). This paper also seeks to build a bridge between the interpretation of quantum theory and the philosophy of mind. However, the bridge which this paper suggests does not consist in extending features of quantum theory to the philosophy of mind. The thesis of this paper is that the discussion about a revision of the Cartesian tradition in today’s philosophy of mind along the lines of direct realism and externalism is pertinent to the interpretation of quantum physics when it comes to the question of the extension of what is known as quantum holism . The scope of quantum theory including the superposition principle and the Schrodinger dynamics is a subject of much debate: Do the features which are peculiar to quantum theory concern only more or less the microphysical realm, i.e., the realm of atoms and their constituents? Or do these features extend to macroscopic systems and common sense objects, such as measuring instruments, trees, and cats, so that they concern the whole physical realm? I show that if one endorses the latter position, one is committed to certain consequences in the philosophy of mind. I relate these consequences to the discussion on Cartesianism and its revision in today’s philosophy of mind. I argue the following: (a) Taking this discussion into
A composite quantum system has properties that are incompatible with every property of its parts. The existence of such global properties incompatible with all local properties constitutes what I call "mereological holism"--the distinctive holism of Quantum Theory. Mereological holism has the dramatic conceptual consequence of making untenable the usual understanding of the "quantum system" as being a "physical object", since composed objects have properties compatible with those of its parts. The notion of "property" can be extended in a unique way to the whole class of operational probabilistic theories (shortly OPTs), of which the most relevant cases are Quantum Theory and Classical Theory. Whereas Classical Theory is not mereologically holistic, we can now search for other OPTs that are so. Within the OPT framework the role of the "system" is that of an input-output connection between two objective events. In non holistic theories, such as Classical Theory, the system can still be regarded as an "object". On the contrary, in holistic theories interpreting "system" as "object" constitutes an hypostatization of a theoretical notion.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is often said to entail holism—that wholes are more than just the sum of their parts—and hence violate Humean supervenience. Certainly an entangled state cannot readily be interpreted in terms of the properties of the individual particles involved. But there is no clear general argument from quantum mechanics to holism. Still, each of the three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—embodies some form of holism. One might try to rescue Humean supervenience by moving to high-dimensional representation of physical systems, or by constructing a theory with backward-in-time causation, but it is unclear if such strategies will succeed. If holism is accepted, some argue further that there are no individuals at the fundamental physical level: Either relations are fundamental, or the whole universe is fundamental. The arguments for these positions are assessed and found to be wanting.
In slogan form, holism is the obscure thesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Physics has been taken to exhibit holism of various kinds, associated with different ways of trying to make this thesis clear. On a more metaphysical approach, holism is the view that the existence or features of some physical whole are not determined by the existence and features of its constituent parts. This chapter discusses methodological holism in physics and considers whether the physical theories imply such metaphysical holism. While some form of ontological holism has occasionally been considered, the variety of metaphysical holism most clearly at issue in quantum mechanics is property holism. One may try to avoid the conclusion that experimental violations of Bell inequalities manifest a failure of Local Action by invoking ontological holism for events.
Abstract Quantum mechanics allegedly supports a holistic metaphysical moral: it is not the case that the intrinsic characters of all entangled wholes supervene on intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal arrangements of proper parts. According to one influential line of reasoning, such holistic supervenience failure follows more or less directly from quantum theory itself. One advertised consequence is the defeat of a natural, broadly reductive worldview commonly linked to Lewis's philosophical doctrine of Humean supervenience. However, the situation is more complicated, in both this and other respects, than it may first appear. This article is an opinionated overview of some especially interesting complications.
Quantum mechanics is often taken to entail holism. I examine the arguments for this claim, and find that although there is no general argument from the structure of quantum mechanics to holism, there are specific arguments for holism available within the three main realist interpretations (Bohm, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and many-worlds). However, Evans, Price and Wharton's sideways Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell example challenges the holistic conclusion. I show how the symmetry between the sideways and standard Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell set-ups can be used to argue against holism. I evaluate the prospects for extending this insight to more general quantum systems, with a view to producing a genuinely time-symmetric hidden variable theory. I conclude that, although this extension undermines the analogy between the sideways and standard cases, quantum mechanics without holism remains a live possibility. Quanta 2016; 5: 85–92.