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arXiv:2102.01438

Quantum Holism

Giacomo Mauro D’Ariano

Published Feb 2, 2021• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A composite quantum system has properties that are incompatible with every property of its parts. The existence of such global properties incompatible with all local properties constitutes what I call "mereological holism"--the distinctive holism of Quantum Theory. Mereological holism has the dramatic conceptual consequence of making untenable the usual understanding of the "quantum system" as being a "physical object", since composed objects have properties compatible with those of its parts. The notion of "property" can be extended in a unique way to the whole class of operational probabilistic theories (shortly OPTs), of which the most relevant cases are Quantum Theory and Classical Theory. Whereas Classical Theory is not mereologically holistic, we can now search for other OPTs that are so. Within the OPT framework the role of the "system" is that of an input-output connection between two objective events. In non holistic theories, such as Classical Theory, the system can still be regarded as an "object". On the contrary, in holistic theories interpreting "system" as "object" constitutes an hypostatization of a theoretical notion.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2102.01438

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A composite quantum system has properties that are incompatible with every property of its parts. The existence of such global properties incompatible with all local properties constitutes what I call "mereological holism"--the distinctive holism of Quantum Theory. Mereological holism has the dramatic conceptual consequence of making untenable the usual understanding of the "quantum system" as being a "physical object", since composed objects have properties compatible with those of its parts. The notion of "property" can be extended in a unique way to the whole class of operational probabilistic theories (shortly OPTs), of which the most relevant cases are Quantum Theory and Classical Theory. Whereas Classical Theory is not mereologically holistic, we can now search for other OPTs that are so. Within the OPT framework the role of the "system" is that of an input-output connection between two objective events. In non holistic theories, such as Classical Theory, the system can still be regarded as an "object". On the contrary, in holistic theories interpreting "system" as "object" constitutes an hypostatization of a theoretical notion.
Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by ‘holism’. I propose an operational criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if some determination (measurement) of the global properties in the theory which can be determined by global measurements, can not be implemented by local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. I will argue that the latter have a limited scope and need to be extended using the criterion for holism proposed here in order to satisfactory address the issue for physical theories. I formalize this criterion for classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a Cartesian phase and configuration space, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.
Quantum mechanics is often credited for having clearly shown that the whole is something over and above the sum of its parts. We want to assess whether this is really the case, and if so, in what sense. We argue that there is indeed a sense in which this is true. Our argument is that even a weak realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics renders a particular metaphysical principle about property instantiation, that we label Property Compositional Determinateness, untenable. Yet there is another metaphysical principle about composition that is usually maintained to imply that composition of parts exhausts the whole they are part of, namely Mereological Extensionalism. In this case, contrary to widespread agreement, we argue that quantum mechanics does not provide any reason, either direct or indirect, to abandon such principle.
In quantum mechanics the properties of a composite system can be divided into properties which are reducible to the properties of the subsystems of the composite and properties which are irreducible to those subsystem properties. The irreducible properties are called holistic and emerge when one describes the system as a whole. In this chapter I show that the bi and spectral modal interpretations can ascribe the holistic properties to composites but, in general, fail to reproduce the relations between the reducible properties of a composite and the properties of the subsystems. The atomic modal interpretation, on the other hand, fails to ascribe the holistic properties but is much more successful in reproducing the relations between the reducible properties and the subsystem properties. I discuss whether these failures harm the empirical adequacy and the metaphysical tenability of modal interpretations. Holistic properties of composite systems The basic principle of reductionism, that all the properties of composite systems are amalgamates of the properties of the subsystems of these composites, has triumphed so much in classical physics that I find it difficult to come up with a clear example of a classical property that cannot be taken as a complex of the subsystem properties. So, in order to make a case for the idea that composites can also possess, in addition to reducible properties, so-called holistic properties which cannot be reduced to the properties of the subsystems, one has to move outside physics or to draw upon some counterfactual development of physics.
Abstract The emerging field of quantum mereology considers part-whole relations in quantum systems. Entangled quantum systems pose a peculiar problem in the field, since their total states are not reducible to that of their parts. While there exist several established proposals for modelling entangled systems, like monistic holism or relational holism, there is considerable unclarity, which further positions are available. Using the lambda operator and plural logic as formal tools, we review and develop conceivable models and evaluate their consistency and distinctness. The main result is an exhaustive taxonomy of six distinct and precise models that both provide information about the mereological features as well as about the entangled property. The taxonomy is well-suited to serve as the basis for future systematic investigations.
In slogan form, holism is the obscure thesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Physics has been taken to exhibit holism of various kinds, associated with different ways of trying to make this thesis clear. On a more metaphysical approach, holism is the view that the existence or features of some physical whole are not determined by the existence and features of its constituent parts. This chapter discusses methodological holism in physics and considers whether the physical theories imply such metaphysical holism. While some form of ontological holism has occasionally been considered, the variety of metaphysical holism most clearly at issue in quantum mechanics is property holism. One may try to avoid the conclusion that experimental violations of Bell inequalities manifest a failure of Local Action by invoking ontological holism for events.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is often said to entail holism—that wholes are more than just the sum of their parts—and hence violate Humean supervenience. Certainly an entangled state cannot readily be interpreted in terms of the properties of the individual particles involved. But there is no clear general argument from quantum mechanics to holism. Still, each of the three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—embodies some form of holism. One might try to rescue Humean supervenience by moving to high-dimensional representation of physical systems, or by constructing a theory with backward-in-time causation, but it is unclear if such strategies will succeed. If holism is accepted, some argue further that there are no individuals at the fundamental physical level: Either relations are fundamental, or the whole universe is fundamental. The arguments for these positions are assessed and found to be wanting.