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Quanta

Holism and Time Symmetry

Peter J. Lewis

Published Nov 16, 2016• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum mechanics is often taken to entail holism. I examine the arguments for this claim, and find that although there is no general argument from the structure of quantum mechanics to holism, there are specific arguments for holism available within the three main realist interpretations (Bohm, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and many-worlds). However, Evans, Price and Wharton's sideways Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell example challenges the holistic conclusion. I show how the symmetry between the sideways and standard Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell set-ups can be used to argue against holism. I evaluate the prospects for extending this insight to more general quantum systems, with a view to producing a genuinely time-symmetric hidden variable theory. I conclude that, although this extension undermines the analogy between the sideways and standard cases, quantum mechanics without holism remains a live possibility. Quanta 2016; 5: 85–92.

DOI
10.12743/quanta.v5i1.51

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1 History of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox.- 2 Are Faster-Than-Light Influences Necessary?.- 3 All the Inequalities of Einstein Locality.- 4 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Experiments Using the Decays of ?c or J/? into ??? ? ?-?p?+p?.- Chapter5 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox for the K0-K?0 and B0-B?0 Systems.- 6 Even Local Probabilities Lead to the Paradox.- 7 The Experimental Investigation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Question and Bell's Inequality.- 8 Rapisarda's Experiment: Testing Quantum Mechanics versus Local Hidden-Variable Theories with Dichotomic Analyzers.- 9 Nonlocality and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Experiment as Understood through the Quantum-Potential Approach.- 10 Interpretation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Effect in Terms of a Generalized Causality.- 11 Quantum Action-at-a-Distance: The Mystery of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Correlations.- 12 Particle Trajectories and Quantum Correlations.- 13 Bell's Inequality and the Nonergodic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.- 14 An Extended-Probability Response to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument.- 15 The Search for Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics.- 16 Variable Detection Probability Models for Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Type Experiments.- 17 Stochastic Electrodynamics and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument.- 18 Explicit Calculations with a Hidden-Variable Spin Model.- 19 Symmetric and Asymmetric Models for Atomic Cascade Experiments.

Plenum Press eBooks•Jan 1, 1988•64 citations
Quantum mechanics is often taken to entail holism. I examine the arguments for this claim, and find that although there is no general argument from the structure of quantum mechanics to holism, there are specific arguments for holism available within the three main realist interpretations (Bohm, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and many-worlds). However, Evans, Price and Wharton's sideways Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell example challenges the holistic conclusion. I show how the symmetry between the sideways and standard Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell set-ups can be used to argue against holism. I evaluate the prospects for extending this insight to more general quantum systems, with a view to producing a genuinely time-symmetric hidden variable theory. I conclude that, although this extension undermines the analogy between the sideways and standard cases, quantum mechanics without holism remains a live possibility. Quanta 2016; 5: 85–92.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is often said to entail holism—that wholes are more than just the sum of their parts—and hence violate Humean supervenience. Certainly an entangled state cannot readily be interpreted in terms of the properties of the individual particles involved. But there is no clear general argument from quantum mechanics to holism. Still, each of the three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—embodies some form of holism. One might try to rescue Humean supervenience by moving to high-dimensional representation of physical systems, or by constructing a theory with backward-in-time causation, but it is unclear if such strategies will succeed. If holism is accepted, some argue further that there are no individuals at the fundamental physical level: Either relations are fundamental, or the whole universe is fundamental. The arguments for these positions are assessed and found to be wanting.
Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by ‘holism’. I propose an operational criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if some determination (measurement) of the global properties in the theory which can be determined by global measurements, can not be implemented by local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. I will argue that the latter have a limited scope and need to be extended using the criterion for holism proposed here in order to satisfactory address the issue for physical theories. I formalize this criterion for classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a Cartesian phase and configuration space, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.
Abstract This chapter examines probabilities in views that take a realist stance on quantum mechanics, i.e., the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory, the Bohm theory and the Everett interpretation. The GRW theory is found to claim a world that is chancy at a fundamental level at which ‘hits’ occur following an objective probability distribution. Although the Bohm theory gives up indeterminism, it is shown to allow for objective probabilities, this time ranging over initial conditions. However, the theory has difficulties in explaining the validity of the Born Rule. The Everett interpretation is found to be more satisfying in this respect. As Wallace and Deutsch have shown, rational agents in a many-world scenario should set their credences following the Born Rule if they choose among quantum games.
It has often been suggested that retrocausality offers a solution to some of the puzzles of quantum mechanics: e.g., that it allows a Lorentz-invariant explanation of Bell correlations, and other manifestations of quantum nonlocality, without action-at-a-distance. Some writers have argued that time-symmetry counts in favour of such a view, in the sense that retrocausality would be a natural consequence of a truly time-symmetric theory of the quantum world. Critics object that there is complete time-symmetry in classical physics, and yet no apparent retrocausality. Why should the quantum world be any different? This note throws some new light on these matters. I call attention to a respect in which quantum mechanics is different, under some assumptions about quantum ontology. Under these assumptions, the combination of time-symmetry without retrocausality is unavailable in quantum mechanics, for reasons intimately connected with the differences between classical and quantum physics (especially the role of discreteness in the latter). Not all interpretations of quantum mechanics share these assumptions, however, and in those that do not, time-symmetry does not entail retrocausality.
It has been suggested that some of the puzzles of QM are resolved if we allow that there is retrocausality in the quantum world. In particular, it has been claimed that this approach offers a path to a Lorentz-invariant explanation of Bell correlations, and other manifestations of quantum "nonlocality", without action-at-a-distance. Some writers have suggested that this proposal can be supported by an appeal to time-symmetry, claiming that if QM were made "more time-symmetric", retrocausality would be a natural consequence. Critics object that there is complete time-symmetry in classical physics, and yet no apparent retrocausality. Why should QM be any different? In this note I call attention to a respect in which QM is different, under some assumptions about quantum ontology. Under these assumptions, the option of time-symmetry without retrocausality is not available in QM, for reasons intimately connected with the fundamental differences between classical and quantum physics (especially the role of discreteness in the latter).
1 History of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox.- 2 Are Faster-Than-Light Influences Necessary?.- 3 All the Inequalities of Einstein Locality.- 4 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Experiments Using the Decays of ?c or J/? into ??? ? ?-?p?+p?.- Chapter5 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox for the K0-K?0 and B0-B?0 Systems.- 6 Even Local Probabilities Lead to the Paradox.- 7 The Experimental Investigation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Question and Bell's Inequality.- 8 Rapisarda's Experiment: Testing Quantum Mechanics versus Local Hidden-Variable Theories with Dichotomic Analyzers.- 9 Nonlocality and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Experiment as Understood through the Quantum-Potential Approach.- 10 Interpretation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Effect in Terms of a Generalized Causality.- 11 Quantum Action-at-a-Distance: The Mystery of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Correlations.- 12 Particle Trajectories and Quantum Correlations.- 13 Bell's Inequality and the Nonergodic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.- 14 An Extended-Probability Response to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument.- 15 The Search for Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics.- 16 Variable Detection Probability Models for Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Type Experiments.- 17 Stochastic Electrodynamics and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument.- 18 Explicit Calculations with a Hidden-Variable Spin Model.- 19 Symmetric and Asymmetric Models for Atomic Cascade Experiments.