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International Conference on Computer Engineering and Application (ICCEA)

The Strategy of Beating the Intermediate Basis Attack in Quantum Communication Networks

Rongyu Wei, Min Nie, Guang Yang

Published Mar 1, 2020• 1 citation

Abstract

Quantum communication network is a new type of secure communication technique and has drawn a lot of attentions in recent years, it has absolute safety in theory. However, quantum communication networks can still be attacked in different ways, among which the intermediate basis attack based on intercept-resend is a typical eavesdropping strategy. With this method, The probability of the eavesdropper correctly guessing the sender's code value can reach up to 0.854, resulting in the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 0.25. To improve the security performance of quantum communication networks, we propose a strategy based on attack basis detection for beating the intermediate basis attack named “WN19”. In WN19, we can reduce QBER and the probability of the eavesdropper obtaining information correctly by adjusting the initial state of the quantum state of the sender according to the result of attack basis detection. The simulation results show that if the polarization angle $\theta$ of the attack basis is $\pi/8$, the QBER reduces from 0.25 to 0.1367 and the probability of eavesdropper correctly obtaining information decreases from 0.854 to 0.5811. It effectively improves the security of quantum cryptography under intermediate basis attack and provides a theoretical basis for the healthy development of quantum communication system.

DOI: 10.1109/iccea50009.2020.00019

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Quantum communication network is a new type of secure communication technique and has drawn a lot of attentions in recent years, it has absolute safety in theory. However, quantum communication networks can still be attacked in different ways, among which the intermediate basis attack based on intercept-resend is a typical eavesdropping strategy. With this method, The probability of the eavesdropper correctly guessing the sender's code value can reach up to 0.854, resulting in the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 0.25. To improve the security performance of quantum communication networks, we propose a strategy based on attack basis detection for beating the intermediate basis attack named “WN19”. In WN19, we can reduce QBER and the probability of the eavesdropper obtaining information correctly by adjusting the initial state of the quantum state of the sender according to the result of attack basis detection. The simulation results show that if the polarization angle

\theta

of the attack basis is

\pi/8

, the QBER reduces from 0.25 to 0.1367 and the probability of eavesdropper correctly obtaining information decreases from 0.854 to 0.5811. It effectively improves the security of quantum cryptography under intermediate basis attack and provides a theoretical basis for the healthy development of quantum communication system.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides an innovative approach for secure communication by utilizing the principles of quantum mechanics. Among various QKD protocols, the BB84 protocol remains the most widely studied and implemented due to its simplicity and theoretical security guarantees. However, practical implementations of BB84 are vulnerable to several eavesdropping attacks and channel imperfections. This paper presents a comprehensive study on the detection and analysis of eavesdropping attacks in the BB84 protocol. The work focuses on common attacks such as intercept-resend attack, photon-number splitting attack, Trojan horse attack, and phase-covariant cloning attack. The effect of these attacks on Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is analyzed in detail. Simulation-based observations are discussed to demonstrate how QBER increases under malicious interference. The study further explores statistical methods for detecting eavesdropping and examines practical countermeasures including decoy states, privacy amplification, and error correction techniques. The paper concludes that BB84 remains robust against eavesdropping when proper detection and mitigation mechanisms are employed.

Ping-Pong quantum communication protocol may be employed to transmit deterministically information, so it has instrigued mang researchers. However, there are drawbacks on the security due to the symmetry of the employed two-way quantum channel. In this paper we propose a new attack strategy to eavesdrop the initially transmitted information based on the techniques of quantum error correction code (QECC). In addition, an attack strategy of Ping-Pong scheme based either entanglement state or nonorthogonal state is proofed and demonstrated, respectively. Furthermore, information obtained by Eve and the possible probability detected by the legitimate communicators are analyzed by employing information theorems. Detail proofs and analysis illustrate all previous Ping-Pong quantum communication schemes are insecure, i.e., the eavesdropper may obtain all available information without being detected.

Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is a method of communication that transmits secret information directly through a quantum channel. This paper proposes a two-step QSDC scheme based on intermediate-basis, in which the intermediate-basis Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) pairs can assist to detect channel security and help encode information. Specifically, the intermediate-basis EPR pairs reduce the probability of Eve choosing the correct measurement basis in the first step, enhancing the security of the system. Moreover, they encode information together with information EPR pairs to improve the transmission efficiency in the second step. We consider the security of the protocol under coherent attack when Eve takes different dimensions of the auxiliary system. The simulation results show that intermediate-basis EPR pairs can lower the upper limit of the amount of information that Eve can steal in both attack scenarios. Therefore, the proposed protocol can ensure that the legitimate parties get more confidential information and improve the transmission efficiency.

Three-particle W state decoy is introduced in controlled quantum secure direct communication to improve the eavesdropping detection probability and prevent the double-CNOT attack. Each particle of three-particle W state decoy is inserted into sending particles to detect eavesdroppers. The decoy particles inserted randomly can prevent the receiver from obtaining the correct correlation between particle 1 and particle 2 before sender coding on them, so that he can not get any secret information without controller's permission. In the security analysis, the maximum amount of information in a qubit is obtained by introducing the entropy theory method, and two decoy strategies are compared quantitatively. If eavesdroppers intend to eavesdrop on secret information, the per qubit detection rate can reach 64% by using three-particle W state as decoy, but 58% by using extended three-particle GHZ state as decoy.