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Chinese Physics Letters

A Novel Basis Splitting Eavesdropping Scheme in Quantum Cryptography Based on the BB84 Protocol

Nan Zhao, Changhua Zhu, Dongxiao Quan

Published Aug 1, 2015• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

We propose a novel strategy named basis-splitting scheme to split the intercepted quanta into several portions based on different bases, for eavesdropping in the process of quantum cryptography. Compared with intercept-resend strategy, our simulation results of the basis-splitting scheme under the non-ideal condition show a greater performance, especially with the increase of the length of shifted bits. Consequently our scheme can aid eavesdropper to gather much more useful information.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/32/8/080306

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We propose a novel strategy named basis-splitting scheme to split the intercepted quanta into several portions based on different bases, for eavesdropping in the process of quantum cryptography. Compared with intercept-resend strategy, our simulation results of the basis-splitting scheme under the non-ideal condition show a greater performance, especially with the increase of the length of shifted bits. Consequently our scheme can aid eavesdropper to gather much more useful information.
Quantum communication network is a new type of secure communication technique and has drawn a lot of attentions in recent years, it has absolute safety in theory. However, quantum communication networks can still be attacked in different ways, among which the intermediate basis attack based on intercept-resend is a typical eavesdropping strategy. With this method, The probability of the eavesdropper correctly guessing the sender's code value can reach up to 0.854, resulting in the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 0.25. To improve the security performance of quantum communication networks, we propose a strategy based on attack basis detection for beating the intermediate basis attack named “WN19”. In WN19, we can reduce QBER and the probability of the eavesdropper obtaining information correctly by adjusting the initial state of the quantum state of the sender according to the result of attack basis detection. The simulation results show that if the polarization angle θ\thetaθ of the attack basis is π/8\pi/8π/8, the QBER reduces from 0.25 to 0.1367 and the probability of eavesdropper correctly obtaining information decreases from 0.854 to 0.5811. It effectively improves the security of quantum cryptography under intermediate basis attack and provides a theoretical basis for the healthy development of quantum communication system.
We discuss the Breidbart eavesdropping scheme of the extended BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. Calculation of the effective average Alice/Eve mutual information after performing a standard error-correction under various intercept/resend strategies shows that the Breidbart eavesdropping/Breidbart resend strategy (B/B strategy) is the most effective one. Sine Alice and Bob can test openly whether there is the B/B eavesdropping by making use of the rejected data, we suggest an amendment of the BB84 protocol to reduce the requirements of the privacy amplification algorithm and hence reduce the quantum key loss. Finally, we present a quantum key regeneration method for error-correction which may be more secure than the standard error-correction process.
The quantum key distribution protocol BB84, published by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984, describes how two spatially separated parties can generate a random bit string fully known only to them by transmission of single-qubit quantum states. Any attempt to eavesdrop on the protocol introduces disturbance which can be detected by the legitimate parties. In this Master's Thesis a novel modification to the BB84 protocol is analyzed. Instead of sending single particles one-by-one as in BB84, they are grouped and a non-local transformation is applied to each group before transmission. Each particle is sent to the intended receiver, always delaying the transmission until the receiver has acknowledged the previous particle on an authenticated classical channel, restricting eavesdropping to accessing the quantum transmission one particle at a time. Hence, an eavesdropper cannot undo the non-local transformation perfectly. Even if perfect cloning of quantum states was possible the state of the group could not be cloned. We calculate the maximal information on the established key provided by an intercept-resend attack and the induced disturbance for different transformations. We observe that it is possible to significantly reduce the eavesdropper's maximal information on the key--to one eighth of that in BB84 for a fixed, reasonable amount of disturbance. We also show that the individual access to the particles poses a fundamental restriction to the eavesdropper, and discuss a novel attack type against the proposed protocol.