aqora

Post-quantum security of encrypted key exchange protocol

Yang Li, Rui-Rui Zhou

May 24, 20130 citations

On the post-quantum security of encrypted key exchange protocols

Li Yang, Rui-Rui Zhou

We investigate the post-quantum security of the encrypted key exchange(EKE) protocols based on some basic physical parameters of ion-trap quantum computer, and show that the EKE protocol with a 40-bit password will be secure against a quantum adversary with several ion-trap quantum computers. We present a password encrypted no-key protocol to resist middle-man attack, and prove that it is also with the post-quantum security. The analysis presented here is probably of general meaning for the security evaluation of various hybrid cryptosystems.We investigate the post-quantum security of the encrypted key exchange(EKE) protocols based on some basic physical parameters of ion-trap quantum computer, and show that the EKE protocol with a 40-bit password will be secure against a quantum adversary with several ion-trap quantum computers. We present a password encrypted no-key protocol to resist middle-man attack, and prove that it is also with the post-quantum security. The analysis presented here is probably of general meaning for the security evaluation of various hybrid cryptosystems.

arXiv:1305.5640May 24, 20133 citations

Post-Quantum Cryptography

Magali Bardet, Ruben Niederhagen

Lecture notes in computer scienceJan 1, 20260 citations

Post-Quantum Cryptography

Raman S. Patil Patil, Kanika N. Deshmukh Deshmukh

Jan 1, 20260 citations

Disaggregated Architecture of Post-Quantum Security for Optical and Packet Transport Equipment

Atsushi Taniguchi, Yasuhiro Mochida, Chikara Sakae +7 more

The advent of quantum computers has raised the risk of eavesdropping and made it essential to apply post-quantum security to most communication services. Encryption processing is not a single function as it includes key exchange functions (e.g., PQC and QKD) and encryption protocols (e.g., IPsec, MACsec, and L1 encryption), and it is necessary to combine these functions to suit the requirements of each service. However, the encryption protocols of existing optical & packet transport equipment are vertically integrated and cannot be altered easily. In this paper, we propose a disaggregation architecture of post-quantum security for optical and packet transport equipment. By separating key management functions from their implementation, the architecture enables more secure encrypted communication by using more secure key exchange methods and implemented encryption protocols. In addition, we also propose a key splitting method that eliminates the impact on communication in the event of a failure due to the functional separation provided by the method; it supports various encryption ciphers. By using this method, key update can be continued even after a communication break interrupts key exchange. We show that 96 Gbps traffic can be encrypted without error.The advent of quantum computers has raised the risk of eavesdropping and made it essential to apply post-quantum security to most communication services. Encryption processing is not a single function as it includes key exchange functions (e.g., PQC and QKD) and encryption protocols (e.g., IPsec, MACsec, and L1 encryption), and it is necessary to combine these functions to suit the requirements of each service. However, the encryption protocols of existing optical & packet transport equipment are vertically integrated and cannot be altered easily. In this paper, we propose a disaggregation architecture of post-quantum security for optical and packet transport equipment. By separating key management functions from their implementation, the architecture enables more secure encrypted communication by using more secure key exchange methods and implemented encryption protocols. In addition, we also propose a key splitting method that eliminates the impact on communication in the event of a failure due to the functional separation provided by the method; it supports various encryption ciphers. By using this method, key update can be continued even after a communication break interrupts key exchange. We show that 96 Gbps traffic can be encrypted without error.

IEICE Transactions on CommunicationsAug 22, 20240 citations

Seamless Transition to Post-Quantum TLS 1.3: A Hybrid Approach Using Identity-Based Encryption

Thiago Leucz Astrizi, Ricardo Felipe Custódio

This paper proposes a novel approach to transitioning the classical TLS 1.3 protocol to a post-quantum version with minimal changes to the existing infrastructure. By integrating a hybrid KEMTLS protocol with Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), the solution achieves post-quantum security without incorporating post-quantum keys into TLS certificates. This enables the protocol to function with Certificate Authorities that do not support post-quantum keys, ensuring its security while simplifying the transition. The main challenge addressed is the immediate need for support of post-quantum algorithms by Certificate Authorities and servers. The proposed solution leverages existing certificates and keys, facilitating a smoother transition.This paper proposes a novel approach to transitioning the classical TLS 1.3 protocol to a post-quantum version with minimal changes to the existing infrastructure. By integrating a hybrid KEMTLS protocol with Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), the solution achieves post-quantum security without incorporating post-quantum keys into TLS certificates. This enables the protocol to function with Certificate Authorities that do not support post-quantum keys, ensuring its security while simplifying the transition. The main challenge addressed is the immediate need for support of post-quantum algorithms by Certificate Authorities and servers. The proposed solution leverages existing certificates and keys, facilitating a smoother transition.

SensorsNov 15, 202412 citations

Post-Quantum Protocol for No-Key Encryption

Related papers

Post-Quantum Protocol for No-Key Encryption

Related papers