Post-quantum security of encrypted key exchange protocol

Li Yang, Rui-Rui Zhou

We investigate the post-quantum security of the encrypted key exchange(EKE) protocols based on some basic physical parameters of ion-trap quantum computer, and show that the EKE protocol with a 40-bit password will be secure against a quantum adversary with several ion-trap quantum computers. We present a password encrypted no-key protocol to resist middle-man attack, and prove that it is also with the post-quantum security. The analysis presented here is probably of general meaning for the security evaluation of various hybrid cryptosystems.

D.Yu. Guryanov, Костина Анна Александровна, Nikolay Andreevich Moldovyan

Atsushi Taniguchi, Yasuhiro Mochida, Chikara Sakae +7 more

The advent of quantum computers has raised the risk of eavesdropping and made it essential to apply post-quantum security to most communication services. Encryption processing is not a single function as it includes key exchange functions (e.g., PQC and QKD) and encryption protocols (e.g., IPsec, MACsec, and L1 encryption), and it is necessary to combine these functions to suit the requirements of each service. However, the encryption protocols of existing optical & packet transport equipment are vertically integrated and cannot be altered easily. In this paper, we propose a disaggregation architecture of post-quantum security for optical and packet transport equipment. By separating key management functions from their implementation, the architecture enables more secure encrypted communication by using more secure key exchange methods and implemented encryption protocols. In addition, we also propose a key splitting method that eliminates the impact on communication in the event of a failure due to the functional separation provided by the method; it supports various encryption ciphers. By using this method, key update can be continued even after a communication break interrupts key exchange. We show that 96 Gbps traffic can be encrypted without error.

Nguyễn Thị Phượng Hằng, Lưu Hồng Dũng

Mao Mao, Shaowu, Zhang +9 more

Narn-Yih Lee, Tsai Yuan-Ting

Post-quantum group key exchange protocols have become an increasingly critical area of research due to the potential threat quantum computers pose to classical cryptographic schemes. Traditional group key exchange protocols, often based on Diffie-Hellman and other number-theoretic assumptions, are vulnerable to quantum attacks. To address this challenge, we propose a novel group key exchange protocol that leverages lattice-based cryptography. Specifically, our approach utilizes lattice trapdoors and a re-encryption mechanism based on the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem. This design not only achieves post-quantum security but also enhances efficiency and flexibility in dynamic group settings. A common challenge in most protocols is the computational cost of deriving new keys as group members join and leave. Our approach effectively reduces this cost, making key updates more efficient and practical. Our protocol is proven secure under standard lattice assumptions, providing a promising solution for quantum-resistant group key exchange.