In this thesis, I erect a generalized interpretation- scheme, called a Realist Kinematics, that mathematically describes a number of extant interpretations of quantum mechanics, from Orthodoxy, at one extreme, to Naive Realism, at the other. A particular value of this approach is that conclusions reached within the scheme apply at once to all of the member interpretations. As an illustration of the framework, I establish that interpretations based on Realist Kinematics can never simultaneously attribute definite values to observables that are represented within the theory by irreducible operators. An important application of this result is to the case of canonically conjugate observables. Here I obtain a supra-Orthodox statement of the Uncertainty Principle, according to which one cannot simultaneously ascribe definite values to position and momentum, even if one is willing to give up the eigenstate- eigenvalue rule. The Realist Kinematics (RK) framework is very powerful for proving statements about a wide array of interpretations. However, its generality becomes a weakness when one wishes to understand why certain RK interpretations are viable while others are not. Therefore, I present here a characterization theorem that goes part of the way towards classifying those mathematical structures that form the basis for viable interpretations; and in a section on open problems, I describe what a full solution to this problem might look like.
In this thesis, I erect a generalized interpretation- scheme, called a Realist Kinematics, that mathematically describes a number of extant interpretations of quantum mechanics, from Orthodoxy, at one extreme, to Naive Realism, at the other. A particular value of this approach is that conclusions reached within the scheme apply at once to all of the member interpretations. As an illustration of the framework, I establish that interpretations based on Realist Kinematics can never simultaneously attribute definite values to observables that are represented within the theory by irreducible operators. An important application of this result is to the case of canonically conjugate observables. Here I obtain a supra-Orthodox statement of the Uncertainty Principle, according to which one cannot simultaneously ascribe definite values to position and momentum, even if one is willing to give up the eigenstate- eigenvalue rule. The Realist Kinematics (RK) framework is very powerful for proving statements about a wide array of interpretations. However, its generality becomes a weakness when one wishes to understand why certain RK interpretations are viable while others are not. Therefore, I present here a characterization theorem that goes part of the way towards classifying those mathematical structures that form the basis for viable interpretations; and in a section on open problems, I describe what a full solution to this problem might look like.
At the quantum scale, objects such as fundamental particles, atoms, and molecules are modeled as localized wavepackets rather than concrete objects. As such, some quantities that are well-defined at our human scale physics instead become uncertain. For instance, quantum objects do not have a precise position, and instead their position is understood probabilistically and we look to the expected, or average, value of the position. Another quirk of quantum mechanics is that quantities such as position and momentum become operators that act on functions, similar to matrices acting on vectors. As such, quantities that may have commuted classically may not at the quantum level. For instance, position (x) and momentum (p) commute in classical physics (xp = px), but they do not commute at the quantum level (xp ≠ px). For noncommuting operators A and B, the uncertainty principle qualitatively describes how well one can know A and B simultaneously: the more certain one is of the value of A, the less one knows the value B and vice versa. The standard example is that of position and momentum: the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that the more certain one is of the position of a quantum object, the more uncertain one is about its momentum. The classic uncertainty principles between noncommuting operators are those of position and momentum, the z and x or y components of angular momentum, and number and phase operators. These operators are very rigid and do not provide easy generalization to more general operators. In this project, we used an infinite matrix representation to analyze the uncertainty principle underlying position and momentum which allows for broader generalization. The biggest component of this project was determining eigenvalues of infinite banded matrices which was aided by the use of the mathematical software Mathematica.
The paper proves that quantum mechanics is compatible with the constructive realism of modern philosophy of science. The proof is based on the observation that properties of quantum systems that are uniquely determined by their preparations can be assumed objective without the difficulties that are encountered by the same assumption about values of observables. The resulting realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is made rigorous by studying the space of quantum states—the convex set of state operators. Prepared states are classified according to their statistical structure into indecomposable and decomposable instead of pure and mixed. Simple objective properties are defined and showed to form a Boolean lattice.
My aim in this dissertation is to defend a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.Firstly, I present considerations based on certain general features of theories in the natural sciences which indicate that realism affords a better account of those theories than instrumentalism.In particular, I consider certain issues surrounding the cognitive status of theories, including the role of models, the status of scientific explanation, and the referential character of theoretical terms.Secondly, I develop a detailed realist theory of measurement based on the notion of quantity terms as designators of objective properties of, and relations among, existing entities.I contrast this with the leading instrumentalist theories of measurement, and I argue that the realist theory is the better account of both the logic and practice of scientific measurement.Finally, I consider a number of objections to realism that arise because of certain theoretical features peculiar to quantum mechanics.In the course of this discussion, I consider crucial experimental evidence for the "dual" nature of microentities, various criteria of reality proposed by philosophers of science, the peculiar features of quantum mechanical measurement, and the status of causality in quantum mechanics.I argue that while certain realist viii ix interpretations of the quantum theory, namely the wave and wavicle interpretations, are unsatisfactory, an interpreta tion which construes micro-entities as existing particles is a tenable account.CHAPTER I ignored the considerations which arise at those more general levels of inquiry, but one can not adequately assess the status of quantum mechanics with respect to both realism and instrumentalism apart from those considerations.In the second two chapters of the dissertation, I shall argue that realist interpretations of quantitative theories in the natural sciences are preferable to instrumentalist interpretations.Then in the remainder of the dissertation, I shall go on to argue that realism is tenable at the quantum mechanical level despite the features peculiar to that theory.CHAPTER II THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THEORIES transitions from one set of experiential statements to another.This view is in marked contrast to that of the realist who regards such terms as referential.This divergence in opinion between realists and instrumentalists about the referential character of theoretical terms leads to a related dispute over the role of models in the inter pretation of scientific theories.Before contrasting the various philosophical positions on this issue, it will be necessary to sort out different senses of the term "model."Upon inspecting the literature surrounding this dispute, it seems that much of the controversy about the role of models stems from a failure to make such distinctions.I will begin this task by distinguishing between 13 model-structures and model-objects.A model-structure is a definitely specifiable schema of mathematical-logical relationships which is exhibited by and can be abstracted from a set of objects.Any set of objects which exhibits a model-structure constitutes a set of model-objects.With respect to any particular scientific theory, there may be a variety of model-objects that scientists employ for various purposes.For example, in the kinetic theory of gases, one can distinguish the following.Firstly, there is the set of molecules themselves, the theoretical entities which we shall 13.For further detail in this regard, see Henry C. Byerly, "Model-Structures and Model-Objects," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Vol. 20, 1969, pp.135-144.i In fact, if one were to make that claim, I do not see how it could be supported without again falling prey to Maxwell's criticism cited above.And if one is simply troubled by the "ontological risk" involved in asserting the existence of theoretical entities because of the tentativeness of the corresponding theories, it should be noted that the risk of being wrong is a small price to pay for the potentially deeper understanding of nature that scientific theories afford us in the light of realist commitments.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been a problem since its founding days. A large contribution to the discussion of possible interpretations of quantum mechanics is given by the so-called impossibility proofs for hidden variable models; models that allow a realist interpretation. In this thesis some of these proofs are discussed, like von Neumann's Theorem, the Kochen-Specker Theorem and the Bell-inequalities. Some more recent developments are also investigated, like Meyer's nullification of the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the MKC-models and Conway and Kochen's Free Will Theorem. This last one is taken to suggest that the problems that arise for certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are not limited to realist interpretations only, but also affect certain instrumentalist interpretations. It is argued that one may arrive at a more satisfying interpretation of quantum mechanics if one adopts a logic that seems more compatible with the instrumentalist viewpoint namely, intuitionistic logic. The motivations for adopting this form of logic rather than classical logic or quantum logic are linked to some of the philosophical ideas of Bohr. In particular a new interpretation of Bohr's notion of complementarity is proposed. Finally some possibilities are explored for linking the intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics to the mathematical formalism of the theory.
The best mathematical arguments against a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics - that gives definite but partially unknown values to all observables - are analysed and shown to be based on reasoning that is not compelling. This opens the door for an interpretation that, while respecting the indeterministic nature of quantum mechanics, allows to speak of definite values for all observables at any time that are, however, only partially measurable. The analysis also suggests new ways to test the foundations of quantum theory.
The standard Bloch sphere representation has been recently generalized to describe not only systems of arbitrary dimension, but also their measurements, in what has been called the extended Bloch representation of quantum mechanics . This model, which offers a solution to the longstanding measurement problem, is based on the hidden-measurement interpretation of quantum mechanics , according to which the Born rule results from our lack of knowledge of the measurement interaction that each time is actualized between the measuring apparatus and the measured entity. In this article, we present the extended Bloch model and use it to investigate, more specifically, the nature of the quantum spin entities and of their relation to our three-dimensional Euclidean theater. Our analysis shows that spin eigenstates cannot generally be associated with directions in the Euclidean space, but only with generalized directions in the Blochean space, which apart from the special case of spin one-half entities, is a space of higher dimensionality. Accordingly, spin entities have to be considered as genuine non-spatial entities. We also show, however, that specific vectors can be identified in the Blochean theater that are isomorphic to the Euclidean space directions, and therefore representative of them, and that spin eigenstates always have a predetermined orientation with respect to them. We use the details of our results to put forward a new view of realism, that we call multiplex realism , providing a specific framework with which to interpret the human observations and understanding of the component parts of the world. Elements of reality can be represented in different theaters, one being our customary Euclidean space, and another one the quantum realm, revealed to us through our sophisticated experiments, whose elements of reality, in the quantum jargon, are the eigenvalues and eigenstates. Our understanding of the component parts of the world can then be guided by looking for the possible connections, in the form of partial morphisms, between the different representations, which is precisely what we do in this article with regard to spin entities.