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arXiv:quant-ph/9908071

On a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics

Arnold Neumaier

Published Aug 22, 1999• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The best mathematical arguments against a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics - that gives definite but partially unknown values to all observables - are analysed and shown to be based on reasoning that is not compelling. This opens the door for an interpretation that, while respecting the indeterministic nature of quantum mechanics, allows to speak of definite values for all observables at any time that are, however, only partially measurable. The analysis also suggests new ways to test the foundations of quantum theory.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9908071

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The best mathematical arguments against a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics - that gives definite but partially unknown values to all observables - are analysed and shown to be based on reasoning that is not compelling. This opens the door for an interpretation that, while respecting the indeterministic nature of quantum mechanics, allows to speak of definite values for all observables at any time that are, however, only partially measurable. The analysis also suggests new ways to test the foundations of quantum theory.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
In this paper we propose a new realist, non-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics, which moves away from the prevailing trend in the subject by paying special attention to the physical relevance of the interpretation. In particular, our proposal endows the Hamiltonian of the system, systematically ignored in the traditional interpretations, with a central role: it distinguishes between systems and subsystems and is the main ingredient in the selection of the definite-valued observables. We show how this interpretation solves the measurement problem, both in the ideal and in the non-ideal version, and we argue for the physical relevance of the new definite-value assignment.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
It is well-known that developments of quantum mechanical states according to the Schrödinger equation during a measurement seem to prevent measurements from having definite results. For, the usually assumed (idealized) Schrödinger development of the measured object and the measuring apparatus during a measurement typically results in a state of the entire system which is a superposition of the eigenstates of the measured observable and measuring observable. And the most common interpretations of quantum mechanics state that an observable does not have a definite value if the quantum mechanical state is a superposition of the eigenstates of the observable. Many ways out of this problem have been suggested. I want to discuss an interpretation suggested by S. Kochen (Kochen 1985), and suggest similar interpretations, each of which accept the universal validity of the Schrödinger equation, and yet yield definite results for measurements.