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PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

Kochen’s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Frank Arntzenius

Published Jan 1, 1990• 16 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is well-known that developments of quantum mechanical states according to the Schrödinger equation during a measurement seem to prevent measurements from having definite results. For, the usually assumed (idealized) Schrödinger development of the measured object and the measuring apparatus during a measurement typically results in a state of the entire system which is a superposition of the eigenstates of the measured observable and measuring observable. And the most common interpretations of quantum mechanics state that an observable does not have a definite value if the quantum mechanical state is a superposition of the eigenstates of the observable. Many ways out of this problem have been suggested. I want to discuss an interpretation suggested by S. Kochen (Kochen 1985), and suggest similar interpretations, each of which accept the universal validity of the Schrödinger equation, and yet yield definite results for measurements.

DOI
10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1990.1.192707

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It is well-known that developments of quantum mechanical states according to the Schrödinger equation during a measurement seem to prevent measurements from having definite results. For, the usually assumed (idealized) Schrödinger development of the measured object and the measuring apparatus during a measurement typically results in a state of the entire system which is a superposition of the eigenstates of the measured observable and measuring observable. And the most common interpretations of quantum mechanics state that an observable does not have a definite value if the quantum mechanical state is a superposition of the eigenstates of the observable. Many ways out of this problem have been suggested. I want to discuss an interpretation suggested by S. Kochen (Kochen 1985), and suggest similar interpretations, each of which accept the universal validity of the Schrödinger equation, and yet yield definite results for measurements.
There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory. Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, orobservables(position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know thestateof the system.
Consider the general form of the state of a quantum system, (eq. 1), where the are (non-degenerate) eigenvectors of an operator, A, corresponding to an observable, A. According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (the precise details of which do not concern me here), A does not have a definite value on the system in the state . But now suppose we measure A by coupling the system to a measuring apparatus. The composite system is then (eq. 2) where the are the indicator-states of the apparatus. Again, the standard interpretation tells us that the apparatus is not in a definite indicator-state. But how can this be? Measurements do have definite results. The apparatus is always in a definite state. I have just reviewed one version of the measurement problem. The modal interpretation of quantum mechanics proposes a solution.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
Introduction Cosmologists, even more than laboratory physicists, must find the usual interpretive rules of quantum mechanics a bit frustrating: ‘… any result of a measurement of a real dynamical variable is one of its eigenvalues …’ ‘… if the measurement of the observable … is made a large number of times the average of all the results obtained will be …’ ‘… a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured …’ It would seem that the theory is exclusively concerned with ‘results of measurement’ and has nothing to say about anything else. When the ‘system’ in question is the whole world where is the ‘measurer’ to be found? Inside, rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies some subsystems to play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer – with a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but idealized laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less ‘measurement-like’ processes are going on more or less all the time more or less everywhere? Is there ever then a moment when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger equation applies?