The paper proves that quantum mechanics is compatible with the constructive realism of modern philosophy of science. The proof is based on the observation that properties of quantum systems that are uniquely determined by their preparations can be assumed objective without the difficulties that are encountered by the same assumption about values of observables. The resulting realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is made rigorous by studying the space of quantum states—the convex set of state operators. Prepared states are classified according to their statistical structure into indecomposable and decomposable instead of pure and mixed. Simple objective properties are defined and showed to form a Boolean lattice.
The paper proves that quantum mechanics is compatible with the constructive realism of modern philosophy of science. The proof is based on the observation that properties of quantum systems that are uniquely determined by their preparations can be assumed objective without the difficulties that are encountered by the same assumption about values of observables. The resulting realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is made rigorous by studying the space of quantum states—the convex set of state operators. Prepared states are classified according to their statistical structure into indecomposable and decomposable instead of pure and mixed. Simple objective properties are defined and showed to form a Boolean lattice.
The paper reviews and discusses four ideas scattered in previous papers of the author. First, objective properties of quantum systems are not associated with observables but are defined by preparations. Second, measurable results of classical theories are not sharp. All such results can be obtained as high-entropy limits of quantum mechanics. Third, a careful study of exchange symmetry requires a modification of the theory of measurement. Fourth, screens and detectors are closely associated with state reduction. A new, rather improved understanding of quantum mechanics is achieved without any deep changes of the theory itself. In the framework of a model approach to the philosophy of science, the RCU interpretation is developed step by step by adding specific supplementary hypotheses to the Minimum Interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The belief that quantum mechanics (QM) does not admit a realistic interpretation is widespread. According to some scholars concerned with the foundations of QM all existing interpretations of this theory (except for the statistical interpretation) presuppose instead a form of realism which consists in assuming that QM deals with individual objects and their properties. We uphold in the present paper that the arguments supporting the contextuality and the nonlocality of QM are a significant clue to the implicit adoption of stronger forms of realism (realism of theoretical entities and realism of theories). If these kinds of realism are substituted by a simpler and more intuitive semantic realism one can contrive a noncontextual and local interpretation of the formalism of QM (SR interpretation). Moreover one can provide a model for such an interpretation (ESR model) in which local realism and QM do not conflict and some fundamental problems of the standard interpretation of QM are avoided.
I argue for a realist interpretation of the quantum state. I begin by reviewing and critically evaluating two arguments for an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, the first derived from the so-called ‘measurement problem’, and the second from the concept of local causality. I argue that existing antirealist interpretations do not solve the measurement problem. Furthermore, I argue that it is possible to construct a local, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, using methods borrowed from quantum field theory and based on John S. Bell’s concept of ‘local beables’.\nIf the quantum state is interpreted subjectively, then the probabilities it associates with experimental outcomes are themselves subjective. I address the prospects for developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities based on the Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem. Epistemic interpretations of the quantum state can be divided into those that are epistemic with respect to underlying ontic states, and those that are epistemic with respect to measurement outcomes. The Pusey Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places serious constraints on the former family of interpretations. I identify an important explanatory gap in the latter sort of interpretation. In particular, if the quantum state is a subjective representation of beliefs about future experimental outcomes, then it is not clear why those experimenters who use quantum mechanics should be better able to negotiate the world than those who do not.\nI then turn to the task of articulating a positive argument for the thesis of quantum state realism. I begin by articulating a minimal set of conditions that any realist interpretation must meet. One assumption built into the PBR result is that systems prepared in a given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties, which may be completely or incompletely described by the quantum state. Antirealist interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with the PBR result. A compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be made on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of phenomena described by quantum mechanics that strongly suggest that the quantum state is genuinely representational in character.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
In quantum physics the tests of most properties do not have predetermined outcomes. The latter have nevertheless well-defined probabilities of being realized during a test. Following Popper we interpret these probabilities as physical propensities. A first purpose of the present article is to formalize the propensity interpretation in the framework of state-property structures. Next, Gleason’s theorem asserts that in the Hilbert space there exists a unique propensity function (i.e., one probability measure for each state vector); the propensities are thus uniquely determined by the state vector. Conversely, we prove that if the state-property structure admits one and only one propensity function, then the set ℒ of all properties is a complete atomic orthomodular lattice. We point out that according to our assumption the probabilistic aspect of the system is entirely determined by its deterministic aspect. Assuming furthermore that each property can be ideally tested, it follows that ℒ is isomorphic to the direct union of Hilbertian space lattices. We recover thus the purely classical and purely quantum frameworks as the two extreme cases. The intermediate cases correspond to quantum mechanics with—possibly continuous—superselection variables. Finally, we prove that a system is classical, i.e., all properties are mutually compatible, if and only if the propensity function is dispersion free. In our approach the quantum probabilities appear thus as a generalization of classical determinism rather than a generalization of classical probabilities.
The best mathematical arguments against a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics - that gives definite but partially unknown values to all observables - are analysed and shown to be based on reasoning that is not compelling. This opens the door for an interpretation that, while respecting the indeterministic nature of quantum mechanics, allows to speak of definite values for all observables at any time that are, however, only partially measurable. The analysis also suggests new ways to test the foundations of quantum theory.