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Foundations of Science

Bohmian Mechanics: Realism and the “Box” Experiment

Chunling Yan

Published Apr 1, 2020• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10699-020-09661-5

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Abstract Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), thereby proposing a structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account about the relation between structures and objects, and entails a different kind of ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and sui generis kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework of metaphysical coherentism.
The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics (BM) has been favored as the preferred alternative to standard quantum mechanics on the ground that it allows a realist construal of the quantum world. We examine in the present work whether BM is consistent with scientific realism. Indeed, Bohmian mechanics makes strong ontological claims but accepts in principle the impossibility of generating epistemic warrants in support of its assumptions. We will argue that such a situation gives rise, at best, to an unsolvable underdetermination dilemma. This leads in turn to the following paradox: although Bohmian mechanics has frequently been invoked to reconcile quantum mechanics with realism, its status as a valid interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges nonetheless on nonevidential epistemological arguments traditionally associated with antirealism.
Bohmian Mechanics (BM) posits a deterministic quantum framework where particle trajectories are guided by a wave function within a preferred Lorentz frame, a dependence starkly revealed by a novel EPR-Bohm experiment with reversible measurements. Unlike Bell tests, where BM’s predictions align with standard quantum mechanics regardless of frame, this experiment demonstrates that the Born rule’s application in the preferred frame determines whether Alice’s intermediate measurement statistics are random or deterministic. This reliance on a preferred frame—a measure-zero set in the continuum of Lorentz frames—exposes BM’s fundamental deficiency, as it is experimentally undetectable, lacks physical justification, and violates special relativity’s frame equivalence. Collapse theories, such as GRW and CSL, face analogous issues, requiring a preferred frame for non-local collapse events. This analysis highlights the inherent tension between single-world quantum theories and relativistic constraints, raising significant doubts about their viability as alternative quantum theories. The findings underscore the need for quantum interpretations that reconcile realism with relativity, suggesting that the Many-Worlds Interpretation, which provides a Lorentz-invariant framework without requiring a preferred frame, may offer a more robust and consistent foundation for quantum mechanics.