An Epistemological Critique of Bohmian Mechanics

Arthur I. Fine

Iguiniz Agesta, Gabriel

Quantum mechanics exhibits a singular contrast: it is the most precise and technologically potent physical theory ever constructed, yet it continues to generate the most profound interpretative controversy in the history of science. This article argues that this persistent tension does not reveal a deficiency in the theory, but a profound categorial error in our epistemological expectations: the demand for a classical ontological narrative that translates quantum formalism into intuitive, spatiotemporal images. We trace this demand to a contingent historical isomorphism between classical physics, our mesoscopic cognition, and a mechanistic ideal of explanation. Evaluating leading narrative interpretations (Bohmian mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation) through the Lakatosian criterion of integrated scientific fruitfulness, we demonstrate that while logically consistent, they exhibit marginal theoretical productivity and engage in non-binding ontological inflation. In contrast, we identify and champion the structural-operative understanding already driving progress in fields like quantum information and decoherence. This program—prefigured in the works of Fine, Mermin, and Bitbol, and aligned with ontological structuralism—redefines “understanding” as: (1) architectural mastery of the formalism, (2) predictive-technological competence, and (3) the investigation of constitutive phenomena (e.g., entanglement) as guides to structure. We conclude that quantum mechanics demands epistemological maturity: deep scientific comprehension can be non-narrative, residing in our successful interaction with the theory’s formal architecture and its empirical prowess.

James T. Cushing

Iguiniz, Gabriel

Quantum mechanics exhibits a singular contrast: it is the most precise and technologically potent physical theory ever constructed, yet it continues to generate the most profound interpretative controversy in the history of science. This article argues that this persistent tension does not reveal a deficiency in the theory, but a profound categorial error in our epistemological expectations: the demand for a classical ontological narrative that translates quantum formalism into intuitive, spatiotemporal images. We trace this demand to a contingent historical isomorphism between classical physics, our mesoscopic cognition, and a mechanistic ideal of explanation. Evaluating leading narrative interpretations (Bohmian mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation) through the Lakatosian criterion of integrated scientific fruitfulness, we demonstrate that while logically consistent, they exhibit marginal theoretical productivity and engage in non-binding ontological inflation. In contrast, we identify and champion the structural-operative understanding already driving progress in fields like quantum information and decoherence. This program—prefigured in the works of Fine, Mermin, and Bitbol, and aligned with ontological structuralism—redefines “understanding” as: (1) architectural mastery of the formalism, (2) predictive-technological competence, and (3) the investigation of constitutive phenomena (e.g., entanglement) as guides to structure. We conclude that quantum mechanics demands epistemological maturity: deep scientific comprehension can be non-narrative, residing in our successful interaction with the theory’s formal architecture and its empirical prowess.

de Stefano, Francesco

We discuss the epistemological features of the Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber proposal to modify quantum mechanics in order to overcome the objectification problem, that means the transition between the quantum and the classical level of description of natural phenomena. We shall show that the GRW is a realistic theory, but in a way quite different from Einstein realism or other kinds of realism proposed in the past, such as the Many World Interpretation or the Bohmian Mechanics.

E. Deotto, G. C. Ghirardi