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Revisiting the Genesis of ‘Many-Worlds'

Matthias Ackermann

Published Jan 1, 2020• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

It is often claimed that Wheeler insisted on a revision and consequently shortening of Everett’s PhD thesis, partly because of his anticipation to reconcile the theory with Bohr’s approach. In this paper, I want to propose a reading of the historiography that renders Wheeler’s tenacity as admittedly benevolent but ultimately condemned to failure from the start. To this end I focus on the time of the genesis of Everett’s thesis, his associated dissatisfaction with the ‘Standard’ and ‘Copenhagen’ formulation of Quantum Mechanics and Wheeler as the driving force in denying his doctoral student to be part of the debate about measurement that happened in the second half of the 1950's. If it hadn’t been for a lack of knowledge and miscommunication (philosophical failure) we would presumably find ourselves in a different ‘branch' of history.

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In April of 1956, Hugh Everett III’s draft doctoral thesis, tentatively titled “Wave Mechanics without Probability”, was circulated by his thesis advisor at Princeton University John Wheeler to several leading physicists in the West, including the godfather of quantum mechanics Niels Bohr. Everett aimed at resolving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Everett’s solution to the mystery of how, when, where and why the wave function collapses in the measurement process was straightforward: it does not. Due to the opposition of Bohr and other adherents to the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, an objection by Feynman and Wheeler’s growing ambivalence, Everett was required to abridge his thesis, resulting in the publication of “’Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics” in July 1957. Everett’s machinery of interpretation, including his information and measure theoretic interpretation of the wave function, his concept of correlation within the superposition, as well as his philosophy of science which provides important context for his theory, are largely absent from the latter “Short Thesis”. Perhaps due to the unusual publication history of his works, many critics of Everett and even many of his supporters have overlooked the significance of the arguments made in the “Long Thesis”, which was published only in 1973. Everett’s fuller exposition there answers often cited criticisms such as Adrian Kent’s “Against Many Worlds Interpretations”. Other popular misconceptions about Everett, that he was driven out of academia or that his thesis was redacted due solely or primarily to the opposition from Copenhagen, do not stand up to careful scrutiny of the historical evidence.

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arXiv:2001.03771•Jan 11, 2020•0 citations
It is often claimed that Wheeler insisted on a revision and consequently shortening of Everett’s PhD thesis, partly because of his anticipation to reconcile the theory with Bohr’s approach. In this paper, I want to propose a reading of the historiography that renders Wheeler’s tenacity as admittedly benevolent but ultimately condemned to failure from the start. To this end I focus on the time of the genesis of Everett’s thesis, his associated dissatisfaction with the ‘Standard’ and ‘Copenhagen’ formulation of Quantum Mechanics and Wheeler as the driving force in denying his doctoral student to be part of the debate about measurement that happened in the second half of the 1950's. If it hadn’t been for a lack of knowledge and miscommunication (philosophical failure) we would presumably find ourselves in a different ‘branch' of history.
In April of 1956, Hugh Everett III’s draft doctoral thesis, tentatively titled “Wave Mechanics without Probability”, was circulated by his thesis advisor at Princeton University John Wheeler to several leading physicists in the West, including the godfather of quantum mechanics Niels Bohr. Everett aimed at resolving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Everett’s solution to the mystery of how, when, where and why the wave function collapses in the measurement process was straightforward: it does not. Due to the opposition of Bohr and other adherents to the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, an objection by Feynman and Wheeler’s growing ambivalence, Everett was required to abridge his thesis, resulting in the publication of “’Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics” in July 1957. Everett’s machinery of interpretation, including his information and measure theoretic interpretation of the wave function, his concept of correlation within the superposition, as well as his philosophy of science which provides important context for his theory, are largely absent from the latter “Short Thesis”. Perhaps due to the unusual publication history of his works, many critics of Everett and even many of his supporters have overlooked the significance of the arguments made in the “Long Thesis”, which was published only in 1973. Everett’s fuller exposition there answers often cited criticisms such as Adrian Kent’s “Against Many Worlds Interpretations”. Other popular misconceptions about Everett, that he was driven out of academia or that his thesis was redacted due solely or primarily to the opposition from Copenhagen, do not stand up to careful scrutiny of the historical evidence.
The doctoral dissertation of Hugh Everett, III-written under the direction of J. A. Wheeler-was principally motivated by the wish to obtain a reasonable basis for the quantization of general relativity (see Everett [1], pp. 454, 455, 462; Wheeler [2], p. 465). To accomplish this aim, it seemed (and still does seem) necessary to eliminate from the formulation of the quantum theory the dualism of what von Neumann ([4], p. 351) called 1 2' -the former associated with of the system from outside, the latter consisting in the evolution of an isolated quantum system; for general relativity deals essentially with the universe as a whole, there no such thing as of the universe from outside. Thus Everett proposed to state the theory in such a way that all processes, including those of observation (or measurement), are of von Neumann's second type, governed uniformly by the quantum-dynamical law, the (timedependent) Schr6dinger equation. Now, it had been emphasized by von Neumann that, in distinguishing between object system apparatus-plus-observer -and, correlatively, between process 1 2 -there considerable latitude as to where to draw the line: in the direction of including more in the object system, according to von Neumann, one can go far into the body of the acual observer, can include within 2 the neural cerebral processes of sensation, as long as one does not trespass beyond the point where a result is perceived by the observer (see [4], pp. 351-2 pp. 418-420). Indeed, it not quite clear whether von Neumann intended even the last-mentioned restriction: he may have meant to allow the inclusion of arbitrary physiological occurrences within observers in process 2, to have insisted only that at some point a line must be drawn one must say and suchand-such perceived by the observer. In any case, it already implicit in Schr6dinger's famous example ([5]) of the (possibly)
abstract: This thesis attempts to explain Everettian quantum mechanics from the ground up, such that those with little to no experience in quantum physics can understand it. First, we introduce the history of quantum theory, and some concepts that make up the framework of quantum physics. Through these concepts, we reveal why interpretations are necessary to map the quantum world onto our classical world. We then introduce the Copenhagen interpretation, and how many-worlds differs from it. From there, we dive into the concepts of entanglement and decoherence, explaining how worlds branch in an Everettian universe, and how an Everettian universe can appear as our classical observed world. From there, we attempt to answer common questions about many-worlds and discuss whether there are philosophical ramifications to believing such a theory. Finally, we look at whether the many-worlds interpretation can be proven, and why one might choose to believe it. (abstract)
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
Abstract Hugh Everett III’s attention turned to foundational questions in quantum mechanics sometime in 1954 under the indirect influence of Bohr, aided by a ‘slosh or two of sherry’. He took quantum measurement for his thesis, in which he proposed to dispense entirely with von Neumann’s discontinuous, indeterministic, and irreversible ‘collapse’. Instead, the observer ‘splits’ between states, experiencing different outcomes in each. This would later become known as the ‘many worlds’ interpretation. Attempts to bring Everett’s ideas to Copenhagen met with a barrage of criticism (‘hopelessly wrong ideas’). Everett had already left academia for the Pentagon’s Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. But death was now at work among the founders, just as the ‘Sources for History of Quantum Physics’ project sought to immortalize their struggles. Two gatherings either side of 1960 confirmed that the debate was unresolved, and reopened old hostilities with voices both familiar and refreshingly new. The torch passed on.
Since the 1970s, the Everett-Wheeler many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of Quantum Mechanics (1955) has been much in the news. One wonders about the worlds in question, their branches, their splittings, their number. It is most often ignored that this language is not that of Everett, whom Wheeler very quickly stopped supporting. Moreover, for some interpreters, the real meaning of Everett ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but the existence of a single quantum one. In this context, what should we think of attempts to verify Everett thesis? What about the connexion between MWI and the cosmological multiverse? How to understand the links between the quantum world and the classical one? This article tries to answer some of these questions.