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arXiv:2001.03771

Are there really many worlds in the "Many-worlds interpretation" of Quantum Mechanics?

Daniel Parrochia

Published Jan 11, 2020• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Since the 1970s, the Everett-Wheeler many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of Quantum Mechanics (1955) has been much in the news. One wonders about the worlds in question, their branches, their splittings, their number. It is most often ignored that this language is not that of Everett, whom Wheeler very quickly stopped supporting. Moreover, for some interpreters, the real meaning of Everett ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but the existence of a single quantum one. In this context, what should we think of attempts to verify Everett thesis? What about the connexion between MWI and the cosmological multiverse? How to understand the links between the quantum world and the classical one? This article tries to answer some of these questions.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2001.03771

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Since the 1970s, the Everett-Wheeler many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of Quantum Mechanics (1955) has been much in the news. One wonders about the worlds in question, their branches, their splittings, their number. It is most often ignored that this language is not that of Everett, whom Wheeler very quickly stopped supporting. Moreover, for some interpreters, the real meaning of Everett ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but the existence of a single quantum one. In this context, what should we think of attempts to verify Everett thesis? What about the connexion between MWI and the cosmological multiverse? How to understand the links between the quantum world and the classical one? This article tries to answer some of these questions.
The Many-worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics has captivated physicists and philosophers alike since its inception in the mid-20th century. This paper explores the historical roots, evolution, and implications of the MWI within the context of quantum theory. Beginning with an overview of early developments in quantum mechanics and the emergence of foundational interpretations, we delve into the origins of the MWI through the groundbreaking work of physicist Hugh Everett III. Everett's doctoral thesis proposed a radical solution to the measurement problem, positing the existence of multiple branching universes to account for quantum phenomenon. We trace the evolution of the MWI, examining its refinement and elaboration by subsequent physicists such as John Wheeler. Furthermore, we discuss the MWI's impact on contemporary physics, including its connections to quantum information theory and ongoing experimental tests. By providing a comprehensive analysis of the MWI's historical development and current relevance, this paper offers insights into one of the most provocative interpretations of quantum mechanics and its implications for our understanding of the universe.
abstract: This thesis attempts to explain Everettian quantum mechanics from the ground up, such that those with little to no experience in quantum physics can understand it. First, we introduce the history of quantum theory, and some concepts that make up the framework of quantum physics. Through these concepts, we reveal why interpretations are necessary to map the quantum world onto our classical world. We then introduce the Copenhagen interpretation, and how many-worlds differs from it. From there, we dive into the concepts of entanglement and decoherence, explaining how worlds branch in an Everettian universe, and how an Everettian universe can appear as our classical observed world. From there, we attempt to answer common questions about many-worlds and discuss whether there are philosophical ramifications to believing such a theory. Finally, we look at whether the many-worlds interpretation can be proven, and why one might choose to believe it. (abstract)
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n their contribution to this book, McQueen and Vaidman argue that common sense requires that explanations in physics be not only causal1 but also local. Their main claim is that the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (originally due to Everett) provides local explanations of the outcomes of experiments that in other interpretations of quantum mechanics seem to require (some sort of) nonlocality. Particles in the MWI leave traces both in the world where they exist but also in other worlds in which they do not exist. So the explanation is said to be local because spacetime splits together with the particles so that there is no influence at space-like separation within a world, but the causal influence literally travels across ‘parallel’ worlds. This seems to stretch the concept of locality beyond common sense, if not beyond breaking point, even if one understands causation weakly in terms of counterfactual dependence rather than by straightforward physical interaction.