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IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Data Acquisition and Advanced Computing Systems: Technology and Applications (IDAACS)

Side Channel Attack on a Quantum Random Number Generator

Alexandr Alexandrovich Kuznetsov, Олексій Нарєжній, Igor Stelnyk, Tetiana Kokhanovska, Oleksii A. Smirnov, Тетяна Кузнецова

Published Sep 1, 2019• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The paper presents the results of applying an advanced attack on an external channel to an extractor of a quantum random number generator (QRNG). The attack is based on the verification of mathematical models of the interception channel and the EM signal of the extractor. Numerical simulation of the electromagnetic (EM) signal and the master key interception channel was performed based on the implementation of the DEMA algorithm of the attack on the AES-128 cipher. Measurements of the parameters of the EM signal and the interception channel were carried out on an experimental setup using a modern reference base in the field of electromagnetic compatibility.

DOI
10.1109/idaacs.2019.8924447

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The paper presents the results of applying an advanced attack on an external channel to an extractor of a quantum random number generator (QRNG). The attack is based on the verification of mathematical models of the interception channel and the EM signal of the extractor. Numerical simulation of the electromagnetic (EM) signal and the master key interception channel was performed based on the implementation of the DEMA algorithm of the attack on the AES-128 cipher. Measurements of the parameters of the EM signal and the interception channel were carried out on an experimental setup using a modern reference base in the field of electromagnetic compatibility.
This paper describes a differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) attack that is performed on a software implementation of the AES-128 in cryptographic modulo (extractor) of quantum random number generator (QRNG). A DEMA attack on an improved extractor implementation demonstrates that for correlation analysis it is required series of measurements to find the key bits. The metric of attack success is determined by the number of measurements needed to intercept the round keys. An efficient way to perform the correlation between theoretical predictions and real measurements it is the usage of the "F-tests".
Random number generators play a pivotal role in generating security primitives, e.g., encryption keys, nonces, initial vectors, and random masking for side-channel countermeasures. A quantum entropy source based on radioactive isotope decay can be exploited to generate random numbers with sufficient entropy. If a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) is combined for post-processing, throughput of the quantum random number generator (QRNG) can be improved. However, general DRBGs are susceptible to side-channel attacks. In this paper, we propose a framework called SCR-QRNG framework, which offers Side-Channel Resistant primitives using QRNG. The QRNG provides sources of randomness for modulating the clock frequency of a DRBG to obfuscate side-channel leakages, and to generate unbiased random numbers for security primitives. The QRNG has robustness against power side-channel attacks and is in compliance with NIST SP 800-22/90B and BSI AIS 31. We fabricate a quantum entropy chip, and implement a PCB module for a random frequency clock generator and a side-channel resistant QRNG on an FPGA.
The security of current key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the hardness of number theoretic problems. However, these key exchange protocols are threatened by weak random number generators, advances to CPU power, a new attack from the eavesdropper, and the emergence of a quantum computer. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by using quantum properties to exchange a secret key without the risk of being intercepted. Recent developments on the QKD system resulted in a stable key generation with fewer errors so that the QKD system is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. However, although the security of the QKD system is guaranteed by quantum physics, its careless implementation could make the system vulnerable. In this paper, we proposed the first side-channel attack on plug-and-play QKD system. Through a single electromagnetic trace obtained from the phase modulator on Alice's side, we were able to classify the electromagnetic trace into four classes, which corresponds to the number of bit and basis combination in the BB84 protocol. We concluded that the plug-and-play QKD system is vulnerable to side-channel attack so that the countermeasure must be considered.
Abstract In the practical continuous-variable source-independent quantum random number generator, it is usually necessary to introduce a local oscillator to amplify the received quantum signal due to its weak intensity. However, the intensity fluctuation of the local oscillator itself will lead to a deviation in evaluating the randomness without monitoring the local oscillator in real time and calibrating each output measurement, which will inevitably open a loophole for the eavesdropper to intercept the information of generated random numbers. Here, we present an eavesdropping attack utilizing this loophole. The results of numerical simulation indicate that when the proposed eavesdropping attack is performed, the evaluated extractable randomness value will be compromised severely, which will impact the communication security under the practical conditions. Meanwhile, we analyze the effects of practical imperfections in the presence of local oscillator fluctuation. Taking this as a reference, we may consider how to perfect the experimental system in practice and how to deal with this kind of eavesdropping attack.
Abstract Quantum random number generator (QRNG) based on the inherent randomness of fundamental quantum processes can provide provable true random numbers which play an important role in many fields. However, the security of practical QRNGs is linked to the performance of realistic devices. In particular, devices based on the Faraday effect in a QRNG system may be affected by external magnetic fields, which will inevitably open a loophole that an eavesdropper can exploit to steal the information of generated random numbers. In this work, the effects of external magnetic fields on the security of practical QRNGs are analyzed. Taking the quantum phase fluctuation based QRNG with unbalanced Michelson interferometer as an example, we experimentally demonstrate the rotation angle of the Faraday rotation mirror (FRM) is influenced by external magnetic fields. Then, we develop a theoretical model between the rotation angle deviation of FRM and conditional min-entropy. Simulation results show that the imperfect FRM leads to a reduction in the variance of measured signal and extractable randomness. Furthermore, the impacts of practical sampling device on the extractable randomness are analyzed in the presence of imperfect FRM, which indicates suitable parameters of the sampling device can improve the security of practical QRNGs. Potential countermeasures are also proposed. Our work reveals that external magnetic fields should be carefully considered in the application of practical QRNGs.