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International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC)

Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution

Suhri Kim, Sunghyun Jin, Yechan Lee, Byeonggyu Park, Hanbit Kim, Seokhie Hong

Published Oct 1, 2018• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The security of current key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the hardness of number theoretic problems. However, these key exchange protocols are threatened by weak random number generators, advances to CPU power, a new attack from the eavesdropper, and the emergence of a quantum computer. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by using quantum properties to exchange a secret key without the risk of being intercepted. Recent developments on the QKD system resulted in a stable key generation with fewer errors so that the QKD system is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. However, although the security of the QKD system is guaranteed by quantum physics, its careless implementation could make the system vulnerable. In this paper, we proposed the first side-channel attack on plug-and-play QKD system. Through a single electromagnetic trace obtained from the phase modulator on Alice's side, we were able to classify the electromagnetic trace into four classes, which corresponds to the number of bit and basis combination in the BB84 protocol. We concluded that the plug-and-play QKD system is vulnerable to side-channel attack so that the countermeasure must be considered.

DOI
10.1109/ictc.2018.8539703

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The security of current key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the hardness of number theoretic problems. However, these key exchange protocols are threatened by weak random number generators, advances to CPU power, a new attack from the eavesdropper, and the emergence of a quantum computer. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by using quantum properties to exchange a secret key without the risk of being intercepted. Recent developments on the QKD system resulted in a stable key generation with fewer errors so that the QKD system is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. However, although the security of the QKD system is guaranteed by quantum physics, its careless implementation could make the system vulnerable. In this paper, we proposed the first side-channel attack on plug-and-play QKD system. Through a single electromagnetic trace obtained from the phase modulator on Alice's side, we were able to classify the electromagnetic trace into four classes, which corresponds to the number of bit and basis combination in the BB84 protocol. We concluded that the plug-and-play QKD system is vulnerable to side-channel attack so that the countermeasure must be considered.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. However, practical implementations deviate from idealized models and are therefore susceptible to side-channel attacks that exploit physical imperfections rather than theoretical vulnerabilities. Over the past two decades, a wide range of attacks have been demonstrated against QKD systems, including those targeting detectors, sources, timing information, power consumption, and electromagnetic emissions. This paper addresses a selection of a few side-channel attacks reported in the literature, classifying them according to their underlying physical mechanisms and attack strategies. We analyze their impact on the security of different QKD protocols and platforms, and highlight how experimental demonstrations have shaped the community's understanding of implementation security. In addition, we present and evaluate mitigation techniques proposed to date, such as device-independent and measurement-device-independent QKD, hardware countermeasures, monitoring strategies, and so on. We also identify open challenges and promising directions for enhancing the robustness of future quantum communication systems.
Over recent decades, quantum key distribution (QKD) has arisen as a promising solution for secure communications; however, like all cryptographic protocols, implementations of QKD can open security vulnerabilities. Until now, the study of physical vulnerabilities in QKD setups has focused primarily on the optical channel. In classical cryptoanalysis, power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis are powerful techniques that can be used to access secret information about the encryption key in symmetric-key algorithms. Such attacks have rarely been used in QKD, since they require an eavesdropper to have access to Alice’s or Bob’s setup; however, security proofs of QKD protocols generally assume that these setups are secure, making it crucial to understand the security measures required to ensure this protection. In this work, we propose and implement a power side-channel analysis of a QKD system by exploiting the power consumption of the electronic driver controlling the electro-optical components of the QKD transmitter. QKD modules typically require very precise electronic drivers, such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Here, we show that the FPGA’s power consumption can leak information about the QKD operation and consequently the transmitted key. Our results are consistent and show critical information leakage, having reached a maximum accuracy of 73.35% in predicting transmitted qubits at a 100-MHz repetition frequency. We also discuss possible countermeasures to prevent such an attack.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a key exchange protocol based on quantum physics, and the key reconciliation process is a necessary process that should not be omitted from QKD in correcting discrepancies between the key sent and the one received. In this paper, we propose the single trace side channel attack on the parity sum, which is a common operation in general error-correcting algorithms. We show that one can fully recover the secret key using a power consumption trace captured when a processor computes the parity sum.
Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender’s side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that enables secure private key exchange between geographically distant parties over an insecure channel, protecting confidentiality against potential eavesdroppers. QKD has evolved significantly since its inception with the BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. Its theoretical foundation relies on quantum physics, particularly the uncertainty principle, the no-cloning theorem, and particle entanglement, which ensures its information-theoretic security when combined with the one-time-pad cryptographic algorithm. However, certain security loopholes persist in terms of practical implementation in commercial devices. Some vulnerabilities are associated with side-channel vectors linked to commonly used optical subcomponents, while others are more related to how existing protocols handle encoding and communication pipelines. In this work, we aim to comprehensively study the current state of security loopholes affecting QKD technology in commercial devices. We also provide a concise overview of the existing types of QKD implementations. Additionally, we offer insights into current trends and vulnerability countermeasures, paving the way for future research and novel mechanisms to enhance the implementation security of commercial QKD devices.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides an innovative approach for secure communication by utilizing the principles of quantum mechanics. Among various QKD protocols, the BB84 protocol remains the most widely studied and implemented due to its simplicity and theoretical security guarantees. However, practical implementations of BB84 are vulnerable to several eavesdropping attacks and channel imperfections. This paper presents a comprehensive study on the detection and analysis of eavesdropping attacks in the BB84 protocol. The work focuses on common attacks such as intercept-resend attack, photon-number splitting attack, Trojan horse attack, and phase-covariant cloning attack. The effect of these attacks on Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is analyzed in detail. Simulation-based observations are discussed to demonstrate how QBER increases under malicious interference. The study further explores statistical methods for detecting eavesdropping and examines practical countermeasures including decoy states, privacy amplification, and error correction techniques. The paper concludes that BB84 remains robust against eavesdropping when proper detection and mitigation mechanisms are employed.