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Single trace side-channel attack on key reconciliation in quantum key distribution system and its efficient countermeasures

Dongjun Park, Gyusang Kim, Donghoe Heo, Suhri Kim, Hee Seok Kim, Seokhie Hong

Published Feb 7, 2021• 17 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender’s side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.

DOI
10.1016/j.icte.2021.01.013

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Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender’s side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.
In this paper, we propose the first single trace side-channel attack on the key reconciliation process for the quantum key distribution (QKD) system. Through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation of the key reconciliation process on the sender's side, we were able to fully recover the sifted key and the syndrome. The shared secret key between the two users can be directly obtained from the sifted key and the syndrome. The result of our work shows that the QKD system must consider side-channel attacks on the key reconciliation process for its practical use.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a key exchange protocol based on quantum physics, and the key reconciliation process is a necessary process that should not be omitted from QKD in correcting discrepancies between the key sent and the one received. In this paper, we propose the single trace side channel attack on the parity sum, which is a common operation in general error-correcting algorithms. We show that one can fully recover the secret key using a power consumption trace captured when a processor computes the parity sum.
The security of current key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the hardness of number theoretic problems. However, these key exchange protocols are threatened by weak random number generators, advances to CPU power, a new attack from the eavesdropper, and the emergence of a quantum computer. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by using quantum properties to exchange a secret key without the risk of being intercepted. Recent developments on the QKD system resulted in a stable key generation with fewer errors so that the QKD system is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. However, although the security of the QKD system is guaranteed by quantum physics, its careless implementation could make the system vulnerable. In this paper, we proposed the first side-channel attack on plug-and-play QKD system. Through a single electromagnetic trace obtained from the phase modulator on Alice's side, we were able to classify the electromagnetic trace into four classes, which corresponds to the number of bit and basis combination in the BB84 protocol. We concluded that the plug-and-play QKD system is vulnerable to side-channel attack so that the countermeasure must be considered.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. However, practical implementations deviate from idealized models and are therefore susceptible to side-channel attacks that exploit physical imperfections rather than theoretical vulnerabilities. Over the past two decades, a wide range of attacks have been demonstrated against QKD systems, including those targeting detectors, sources, timing information, power consumption, and electromagnetic emissions. This paper addresses a selection of a few side-channel attacks reported in the literature, classifying them according to their underlying physical mechanisms and attack strategies. We analyze their impact on the security of different QKD protocols and platforms, and highlight how experimental demonstrations have shaped the community's understanding of implementation security. In addition, we present and evaluate mitigation techniques proposed to date, such as device-independent and measurement-device-independent QKD, hardware countermeasures, monitoring strategies, and so on. We also identify open challenges and promising directions for enhancing the robustness of future quantum communication systems.
In traditional quantum key distribution protocol, both communication parties need to reconciliate their encoding basis to realize sharing secret keys. However, the process of basis reconciliation decreases the generation efficiency of the secret key and classical information is needed to be transmitted for every raw key. Based on quantum interference, we propose a high-efficiency quantum key distribution protocol without basis reconciliation. The presented protocol can greatly improve the generating efficiency of secret keys, reaching 100% in the ideal case, and no classical information is needed. We also analyze the security of the protocol in detail, which shows that the protocol is robust against common attack strategies. Furthermore, the protocol can be implemented with current technologies and open promising possibilities for quantum cryptography.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising technique to share unconditionally secure keys between remote parties. As an essential part of a practical QKD system, reconciliation is responsible for correcting the errors due to the quantum channel noise by exchanging information through a public classical channel. In the present work, we propose a novel syndrome-based low-density parity-check (LDPC) reconciliation protocol to reduce the information leakage of reconciliation by fully utilizing the syndrome information that was previously wasted. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results show that our protocol can evidently reduce the information leakage as well as the number of communication rounds.