I argue that philosophical issues concerning reductive explanations help constrain the construction of quantum theories with appropriate state spaces. I illustrate this general proposal with two examples of restricting attention to physical states in quantum theories: regular states and symmetry-invariant states.
It is very likely that most readers and authors of articles appearing in Classical and Quantum Gravity are interested in what might loosely be termed the philosophy of science. It is equally likely, with perhaps a few exceptions, that the research of these same readers and authors has not been influenced in the least by the work of professional philosophers of science. This is certainly the case for those of us who work in quantum field theory. One must therefore ask who the intended audience is for a book which purports to discuss the philosophical implications of quantum field theory. In the preface, the author states that there are two intended audiences for his book. The first is `other interested interpreters of physics' who wish to learn something about quantum field theory in as painless a way as possible. The second is for students of physics who are bogged down in the details of learning quantum field theory and cannot see the overall picture. I am not convinced that either audience will find this book to be of much use. There are two basic problems with this book. The first is that the quantum field theory in it is of the old-fashioned kind, and is not really representative of the way the subject is either taught or thought of today. The second is that there is not sufficient background material present to make this book suitable for a novice reader. For example, I wonder how much a reader who has not studied quantum mechanics in any depth will get out of a treatment which launches into Hilbert space and a discussion of states without much in the way of proper introduction. Any reader who is familiar with the workings of quantum field theory will find much to disagree with in this book. For example, the author tries to make a case that a Fock space description is better than talking about particle labels and restricting to symmetric or antisymmetric states. The reason claimed for this is that there are states in Fock space which are neither symmetric nor antisymmetric under particle interchange which must be discarded. (In the author's words, this introduces `surplus formal structure'.) However, in Fock space an equally arbitrary choice is made by focusing on relations among the creation and annihilation operators which involve only commutation or anticommutation relations. Although this is acknowledged by Teller, no satisfactory explanation is given as to why one procedure is any less arbitrary than the other. The book is incomplete in many ways, with many interesting points mentioned just in passing. For example, the discussion around the Newton--Wigner position operator would have been greatly enhanced by including more details, such as an explanation as to why quanta described by Newton--Wigner states seem to propagate at superluminal speeds. It is hard to believe that a reader who has not met the Rindler vacuum before would find Teller's discussion to be very informative. After being so critical of this book, I should mention a part which I did enjoy and would recommend to students of physics. This is the last chapter of the book which contains a discussion of renormalization theory. It is my experience that students often find renormalization theory confusing, and may find Teller's semiqualitative discussion illuminating.
I offer an account of how the quantum theory we have helps us explain so much. The account depends on a pragmatist interpretation of the theory: this takes a quantum state to serve as a source of sound advice to physically situated agents on the content and appropriate degree of belief about matters concerning which they are currently inevitably ignorant. The general account of how to use quantum states and probabilities to explain otherwise puzzling regularities is then illustrated by showing how we can explain single-particle interference phenomena, the stability of matter, and interference of Bose–Einstein condensates. Finally, I note some open problems and relate this account to alternative approaches to explanation that emphasize the importance of causation, of unification, and of structure. 1 Introduction 2 Two Requirements on Explanations in Physics 3 What We Can use Quantum Theory to Explain 4 The Function of Quantum States and Born Probabilities 5 How These Functions Contribute to the Explanatory Task 6 Example One: Single-Particle Interference 7 Example Two: Explanation of the Stability of Matter 8 Example Three: Bose Condensation 9 Conclusion
I. Prigogine has proposed, and the writings of N. S. Krylov to some extent suggest, a novel and unorthodox solution to foundational problems in statistical mechanics. In particular, the view claims to offer new insight into two interconnected problems: underst and ing the role of probability in physics, and that of reconciling the irreversibility of physical processes with the temporal symmetry (time reversal invariance) of dynamical theories. The approach in question advocates a conception of the state of a system which incorporates features of the quantum mechanical state concept in a context, classical statistical mechanics, where quantum considerations are generally considered to be irrelevant. I examine the plausibility of this new approach by offering an analysis of the various notions of state employed in modern physics. In the first chapter, I analyze the conceptual connections between dynamical laws and the nature of a system's state. I argue that laws and states are correlative. In constructing dynamical theories one does not start with a fixed or pre-determined state concept. Neither is one given the laws of the theory from which the conception of state is derived. Rather, we get the law/state structure as a "package." In light of this general analysis, I next examine the notion of state employed in the quantum theory. Here I consider a variety of conceptions of quantum states and assess their ability to answer the "paradoxes" of quantum theory. I pay particular attention to the role of probability and related restrictions on the realization of certain states. The new approach to statistical mechanics proposes to exploit similar restrictions on states in order to resolve the irreversibility problem. But is this unorthodox approach viable? In the final four chapters, I offer a detailed critique of this approach, examining the plausibility of the radical reworking of the state concept. I argue that while some important progress can be made, certain old puzzles remain, and new and difficult ones arise--ones which raise serious doubts about the ultimate success of this particular approach. I conclude, however, by arguing that such radical proposals are not unmotivated; and that novel and unorthodox proposals concerning the foundations of statistical mechanics must be taken seriously.
Mature theories of physical science associate states with systems, for instance with particles or waves in classical physics. The quantities whose values comprise states in classical mechanics, namely position and momentum, are chosen, first of all, for predictive purposes. Everything that one would want to say about classical systems can, it seems, be said in terms of properties: specification of the properties of a system gives a complete specification of its state, and conversely. Quantum mechanics associates states with physical systems; whatever else these might be, systems are the particulars which bear physical properties. The former is non-reduced state, the quantum state proper, while the latter is the reduced state, the class of quantitative properties possessed by the system. The state therefore determines which quantities and which properties are instantiated. The non-reductive account of states was initially appealing because it seemed to promise some additional explanatory scope.
The principle aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical application of quantum information theory to interpretational issues regarding the theory of quantum mechanics. Recently, quantum information theory has emerged as a potential source for such an interpretation. The main question with which this dissertation will be concerned is whether or not an information-theoretic interpretation can serve as a conceptually acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will be argued that some of the more obvious approaches - that quantum information theory shows us that ultimately the world is made of information, and quantum Bayesianism - fail as philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, the information-theoretic approach of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson introduces Einstein's distinction between principle theories and constructive theories, arguing that quantum mechanics is best understood as an information-theoretic principle theory. While I argue that this particular approach fails, it does offer a viable new philosophical role for information theory. Specifically, an investigation of interpretationally successful principle theories such as Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, and general relativity, shows that the particular principles employed are necessary as constitutive elements of a framework which partially defines the basic explanatory concepts of space, time, and motion. Without such constitutive principles as preconditions for empirical meaning, scientific progress is hampered. It is argued that the philosophical issues in quantum mechanics stem from an analogous conceptual crisis. On the basis of this comparison, the best strategy for resolving these problems is to apply a similar sort of conceptual analysis to quantum mechanics so as to provide an appropriate set of constitutive principles clarifying the conceptual issues at stake. It is further argued that quantum information theory is ideally placed as a novel conceptual framework from which to conduct this analysis.