What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. We argue for an approach focusing on reconstruction rather than interpretation of quantum mechanics and analyze several examples of reconstruction. We submit that reconstruction advances our understanding of quantum theory irrespective of one's ontological stance.
What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. We argue for an approach focusing on reconstruction rather than interpretation of quantum mechanics and analyze several examples of reconstruction. We submit that reconstruction advances our understanding of quantum theory irrespective of one's ontological stance.
What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. Keeping to this maxim, we record a paradigmatic shift in the foundations of quantum mechanics, where the focus has recently moved from interpreting to reconstructing quantum theory. Several historic and contemporary reconstructions are analyzed, including the work of Hardy, Rovelli, and Clifton, Bub and Halvorson. We conclude by discussing the importance of a novel concept of intentionally incomplete reconstruction. 1. What is Wrong with Interpreting Quantum Mechanics2. Reconstruction of Physical Theory2.1. Schema2.2. Selection of the first principles2.3. Status of the first principles3. Examples of Reconstruction3.1. Early examples of reconstruction3.2. Hardy's reconstruction3.3. Rovelli's reconstruction3.4. The CBH reconstruction3.5. Intentionally incomplete reconstructions4. Conclusion
One hundred years after the creation of quantum theory, there is no consensus on the kind of reality that is described by the theory. Here, I attribute the lack of progress to the prevailing interpretative methodology, which invariably takes the quantum formalism as the starting point for philosophical reflection and analysis. I argue that this methodology is particularly inappropriate, for it invariably marginalizes much of the theory's content, both that implicit in modelling heuristics and experimental practices, and that encapsulated in the mathematical structures of its formalism. In addition, the prevailing methodology offers little protection against undue influence by metaphysically-laden language which invariably accompanies the formalism.
Here, I summarize an alternative methodology whose goal is to ensure that an interpretational project take into account all forms of theoretic content. The methodology harnesses the recent results of the quantum reconstruction program. These results distil the mathematical content of the quantum formalism into physical principles and assumptions, which are more readily philosophically digestible than the formalism itself, and bracket much of its metaphysically-laden language.
As a case study of reconstruction-based interpretation, I describe the reconstruction of the identical particle formalism, and its step-by-step interpretation, highlighting the key questions that drive the interpretation forwards and the techniques and stances that are employed in each step. The interpretation yields a novel metaphysical profile for systems of identical particles as potential parts of a whole, which can be traced step-by-step to elementary experimental data and the reconstruction's physical postulates and assumptions. I also describe some of the pitfalls that one faces in any attempt to directly interpret the identical particle formalism.
The program of reconstructing quantum theory based on information-theoretic principles enjoys much popularity in the foundations of physics. Surprisingly, this endeavor has only received very little attention in philosophy. Here I argue that this should change. This is because, on the one hand, reconstructions can help us to better understand quantum mechanics, and, on the other hand, reconstructions are themselves in need of interpretation. My overall objective, thus, is to motivate the reconstruction program and to show why philosophers should care. My specific aims are threefold. (i) Clarify the relationship between reconstructing and interpreting quantum mechanics, (ii) show how the informational reconstruction of quantum theory puts pressure on standard realist interpretations, (iii) defend the quantum reconstruction program against possible objections.
For a century, quantum theory has posed a fundamental challenge to philosophical thinking. On its face, it repudiates many of the key features of the mechanical conception of physical reality. However, the challenge of developing a precise, coherent alternative to that conception has yet to be met. Here, I argue that a major hindrance to the project of quantum interpretation is its existing interpretative methodologies, which suffer from a lack of systematicity in their judgements about what aspects of the theory are interpretational relevant. In particular, I argue that current interpretations tend to marginalize the informal part of the theory in favour of its formal part, and place inappropriate emphasis on the natural language component of the formalism over its detailed mathematical structure. To counterbalance these biases, I propose that an interpretation-free zone be constructed around the theory, wherein an interpreter initially adopt a descriptive stance which considers all parts of the theory, and that the results of this deliberation~(and the judgements about what facts are interpretationally relevant) are reported as part of their interpretation.
I argue that the interpretation of quantum theory poses special challenges and difficulties which necessitate this interpretation-free zone, and that existing interpretative methodologies are insufficient to address them. Further, I argue that a reconstructive interpretative methodology, which harnesses the recent results of the quantum reconstruction program, provides a powerful means to identify almost all facts that could be interpretationally relevant, and naturally meets these challenges and difficulties. Moreover, I argue that the quantum reconstruction program offers a powerful way to discover new physical principles, and offers a systematic pathway to build a rich, coherent conception of quantum reality.
We give a condensed and accessible summary of a recent derivation of quantum theory from information-theoretic principles, and use it to study the consequences of this and other reconstructions for our conceptual understanding of the quantum world. Since these principles are to a large extent expressed in computational terminology, we argue that the hypothesis of "physics as computation", if suitably interpreted, attains surprising explanatory power. Similarly as Jeffrey Bub and others, we conclude that quantum theory should be understood as a "principle theory of information", and we regard this view as a partial interpretation of quantum theory. We outline three options for completion into a full-fledged interpretation of quantum theory, but argue that, despite their interpretational agnosticism, the principled reconstructions pose a challenge for existing psi-ontic interpretations. We also argue that continuous reversible time evolution can be understood as a characteristic property of quantum theory, offering a possible answer to Chris Fuchs' search for a "glimpse of quantum reality".