In this thesis, we consider secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper. With the explosion in the growth of the data produced and communicated, sensitive information such as financial transactions, health records, and control signals for cyber-physical systems, has to be securely exchanged. Today, the ever-increasing computational power of adversaries is challenging the state-of-the-art cryptographic encryption mechanisms, as these mechanisms assume adversaries with limited computational power. Thus, with the advent of the quantum computing era, we require new mechanisms to guarantee a secure exchange of information. Moreover, the growing number of small and energy constrained connected devices involved in data exchange calls for lightweight encryption schemes, as low-complexity devices cannot implement complex schemes. We consider three different scenarios and exploit specific opportunities present in each of these scenarios; we develop lightweight encryption schemes that do not require sharing large keys in advance and are secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computational capabilities.The first scenario we consider is multiple unicast traffic over wireline networks. In these networks, a single source is connected to m destinations interested in different messages. In designing encryption schemes, we exploit the fact that although the eavesdropper is computationally super-powerful, it might not have capabilities to eavesdrop the entire network. We use the multi-path diversity to securely communicate against the eavesdropper without requiring any pre-shared key.The second scenario we consider consists of millimeter wave (mmWave) networks. mmWave communication requires deploying networks of relays that communicate through directional beams to compensate for the high path-loss and the high blockage. Since we need to use beamforming and align beams to activate links, we cannot use all the underlying links of the network simultaneously. However, the degree of freedom in choosing the links to activate can be leveraged for secure communication against an eavesdropper. We show that we can achieve a secure capacity that in some cases, can be very close to the unsecure capacity. Here, capacity refers to the maximum flow of information over the network.For the third scenario, we consider cyber-physical systems and propose a distortion based security framework where the distortion measures the distance between the eavesdropper's estimates and the ground truth. The primary motivation for this framework is that the messages exchanged in these systems are embedded in a metric space having a notion of distance, and securing raw bits as in traditional encryption schemes might not be necessary. Instead, we show with an example of a linear dynamical system that a carefully designed encryption scheme can significantly distort the eavesdropper's view with just one bit of the pre-shared key.
In this thesis, we consider secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper. With the explosion in the growth of the data produced and communicated, sensitive information such as financial transactions, health records, and control signals for cyber-physical systems, has to be securely exchanged. Today, the ever-increasing computational power of adversaries is challenging the state-of-the-art cryptographic encryption mechanisms, as these mechanisms assume adversaries with limited computational power. Thus, with the advent of the quantum computing era, we require new mechanisms to guarantee a secure exchange of information. Moreover, the growing number of small and energy constrained connected devices involved in data exchange calls for lightweight encryption schemes, as low-complexity devices cannot implement complex schemes. We consider three different scenarios and exploit specific opportunities present in each of these scenarios; we develop lightweight encryption schemes that do not require sharing large keys in advance and are secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computational capabilities.The first scenario we consider is multiple unicast traffic over wireline networks. In these networks, a single source is connected to m destinations interested in different messages. In designing encryption schemes, we exploit the fact that although the eavesdropper is computationally super-powerful, it might not have capabilities to eavesdrop the entire network. We use the multi-path diversity to securely communicate against the eavesdropper without requiring any pre-shared key.The second scenario we consider consists of millimeter wave (mmWave) networks. mmWave communication requires deploying networks of relays that communicate through directional beams to compensate for the high path-loss and the high blockage. Since we need to use beamforming and align beams to activate links, we cannot use all the underlying links of the network simultaneously. However, the degree of freedom in choosing the links to activate can be leveraged for secure communication against an eavesdropper. We show that we can achieve a secure capacity that in some cases, can be very close to the unsecure capacity. Here, capacity refers to the maximum flow of information over the network.For the third scenario, we consider cyber-physical systems and propose a distortion based security framework where the distortion measures the distance between the eavesdropper's estimates and the ground truth. The primary motivation for this framework is that the messages exchanged in these systems are embedded in a metric space having a notion of distance, and securing raw bits as in traditional encryption schemes might not be necessary. Instead, we show with an example of a linear dynamical system that a carefully designed encryption scheme can significantly distort the eavesdropper's view with just one bit of the pre-shared key.
Wireless communications are naturally exposed to important security risks due to their broadcast nature. In contrast with wired communications, no physical medium is isolating the transmission surroundings to a specific path. Traditional methods to reach the goals of communications security rely on algorithms at protocol stack level, which are based on mathematically derived cryptographic protocols. With the tremendous proliferation of wireless devices, and the increase in computational power available for decryption, traditional cryptographic measures may be compromised. To protect communications at the lowest level, physical layer (PHY) security methods have been proposed recently. These techniques aim to ensure secure communications by exploiting the unique characteristics of the physical medium between communicating nodes, effectively reducing the decryption capabilities of an eavesdropper to intercept transmissions. This thesis explains within a general framework the most important PHY layer security schemes. First we explore approaches which utilize the knowledge of the unique channel between communicating nodes to distort a transmitted signal with various kinds of randomizations, in such a way that the intended receivers are unaffected by the distortion, but any other observer will be exposed to it. These techniques, however, introduce several trade-offs between transmission resources and the effectiveness in achieving secrecy. Of particular interest for this investigation is a class of methods which can be referred to as "security enhancing techniques", in which minimal priors about the potential eavesdroppers locations and capabilities are assumed. In this thesis, a wave-based approach to the communication secrecy problem is introduced. An interesting perspective is provided by studying the relation between electromagnetic theory and information theory, the so-called electromagnetic information theory. This allows to properly identify the unavoidable limitations imposed by the laws of electromagnetics to our ability to communicate securely. The proposed model can be extended to the analysis of different signal distortion methodologies and different channel conditions. The resulting approach is highly relevant to the study of PHY layer security methods since it is physically fundamental as well as architecture independent, which leads to a consolidating point of view of the secrecy problem. In addition, the thesis presents computer simulation results which shed insight on the security possibilities and limitations of three different security scenarios, which are termed MISO (multiple-input, single-output) (with single eavesdropper), MISOME (multiple-input, single-output, multiple eavesdropper), and MIMOME (multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple-eavesdropper).
In cyber-physical systems (CPS), inference based on communicated data is of critical significance as it can be used to manipulate or damage the control operations by adversaries. This calls for efficient mechanisms for secure transmission of data since control systems are becoming increasingly distributed over larger geographical areas. Distortion-based security, recently proposed as one candidate for secure transmissions in CPS, is not only more appropriate for these applications but also quite frugal in terms of prior requirements on shared keys. In this article, we propose distortion-based metrics to protect CPS communication and show that it is possible to confuse adversaries with just a few bits of preshared keys. In particular, we will show that a linear dynamical system can communicate its state in a manner that prevents an eavesdropper from accurately learning the state.
This dissertation studies the fundamental rate limits of wireless communication systems through which confidential messages can be transmitted without being intercepted by an adversary. It is assumed that the adversary is subject to noise and interference, as are the legitimate nodes in the system. The security guarantees offered are irrespective of the computational power of the adversary.
Three themes are developed in parallel throughout the dissertation. The first theme explores the relationship between cooperation and secrecy. In wireless networks, cooperation from intermediate relay nodes are essential for facilitating long range communications. This dissertation considers a series of network models where the information from a source to a destination needs to be kept confidential from intermediate relays. Four different network models with untrusted relay nodes are considered: the three-node relay channel, the two-hop link, the two-way relay channel and the multi-hop line network. These models are studied for relays that are honest but curious. That is, the relay nodes are legitimate nodes with lower security clearance, that willingly carry out the designated relay schemes. Secrecy capacity lower and upper bounds for each channel model are found and cases where secrecy capacity can be found are identified. Next the two-hop link is studied where the relay turns malicious in that it can manipulate the signals being relayed and carry out a Byzantine attack. In this case, two requirements must be satisfied simultaneously: The message must be kept confidential from the relay node, and, any modification carried out by the relay node must be detected reliably by the legitimate parties. The dissertation shows that both requirements can be fulfilled for this model with arbitrarily small overhead.
The next two themes developed in this dissertation serve as the technical foundation for the first theme. One establishes the foundation for providing secrecy using structured codes. Traditionally, the achievability proofs for information theoretic secrecy rely on Shannon’s random codebook generation argument in which the codebook does not exhibit structure. In this dissertation, it is shown that by imposing structure requirements in random codebook generation, higher rates for secure communication can be achieved than known results obtained using the conventional approach. This dissertation develops the necessary tool and general methodology for computing the secrecy rate when a nested lattice structure is used in codebook generation. Two results are presented that rely on this foundation. First, it is proved that, for a class of Gaussian channel models with interference and secrecy constraints, structured codes outperform Gaussian signaling at medium to high SNR. Second, this tool is used to develop a strong secrecy scheme for the two-hop link with an untrusted relay, which in turn is the centerpiece of the Byzantine detection scheme developed in this dissertation.
The third theme is methods of proving strong secrecy. Information theoretic secrecy results often rely on the weak secrecy constraint which provides only asymptotic guarantees with respect to the information rate leaked to the adversary. As this would likely be insufficient in a practical system, a non-asymptotic, strong secrecy guarantee must be sought. More often than not, weak secrecy rates can be strengthened to strong secrecy rates in a straightforward manner, leading back to the justification of proving weak secrecy only. This dissertation challenges this conventional wisdom and identifies two cases where this approach does not follow. In both cases, direct strong secrecy proofs are established. These are: the two-hop link with a Byzantine relay, and models with arbitrarily varying eavesdropper channel considered in the last chapter of this dissertation.
The latter model is motivated by the need to bring the theory of providing unconditional secrecy guarantees closer to practice. In particular, the dissertation addresses the case where the channel that the adversary (eavesdropper) experiences is completely unknown to the legitimate parties. To do so, a multiple input-multiple output (MIMO) wiretap channel is considered where the eavesdropper’s channel is arbitrarily varying. A coding theorem is derived for with this setting. The secrecy rate obtained from this coding theorem is tight in terms of secure degree of freedom, which is a high SNR characterization of the secrecy capacity. In addition, the secure degree of freedom regions for the MIMO multiple access (MAC) wiretap channel and the MIMO broadcast wiretap channel are derived when the legitimate nodes have the same number of antennas, identifying the high SNR characterization of the fundamental transmission limits for these models.
Wireless networks have experienced rapid evolutions toward sustainability, scalability and interoperability. The digital economy is driven by future networked societies to a more holistic community of intelligent infrastructures and connected services for a more sustainable and smarter society. Furthermore, an enormous amount of sensitive and confidential information, e.g., medical records, electronic media, financial data, and customer files, is transmitted via wireless channels. The implementation of higher layer key distribution and management was challenged by the emergence of these new advanced systems. In order to resist various malicious abuses and security attacks, physical layer security (PLS) has become an appealing alternative. The basic concept behind PLS is to exploit the characteristics of wireless channels for the confidentiality. Its target is to blind the eavesdroppers such that they cannot extract any confidential information from the received signals. This thesis presents solutions and analyses to improve the PLS in wireless networks. \n \nIn the second chapter, we investigate the secrecy capacity performance of an amplify-andforward (AF) dual-hop network for both distributed beamforming (DBF) and opportunistic relaying (OR) techniques. We derive the capacity scaling for two large sets; trustworthy relays and untrustworthy aggressive relays cooperating together with a wire-tapper aiming to intercept the message. We show that the capacity scaling in the DBF is lower bounded by a value which depends on the ratio between the number of the trustworthy and the untrustworthy aggressive relays, whereas the capacity scaling of OR is upper bounded by a value depending on the number of relays as well as the signal to noise ratio (SNR). \n \nIn the third chapter, we propose a new location-based multicasting technique, for dual phase AF large networks, aiming to improve the security in the presence of non-colluding passive eavesdroppers. We analytically demonstrate that the proposed technique increases the security by decreasing the probability of re-choosing a sector that has eavesdroppers, for each transmission time. Moreover, we also show that the secrecy capacity scaling of our technique is the same as for broadcasting. Hereafter, the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy outage probability are calculated, and it is shown that the security performance is remarkably enhanced, compared to the conventional multicasting technique. \n \nIn the fourth chapter, we propose a new cooperative protocol, for dual phase amplify-andforward large wireless sensor networks, aiming to improve the transmission security while taking into account the limited capabilities of the sensor nodes. In such a network, a portion of the K relays can be potential passive eavesdroppers. To reduce the impact of these untrustworthy relays on the network security, we propose a new transmission protocol, where the source agrees to share with the destination a given channel state information (CSI) of source-trusted relay-destination link to encode the message. Then, the source will use this CSI again to map the right message to a certain sector while transmitting fake messages to the other sectors. Adopting such a security protocol is promising because of the availability of a high number of cheap electronic sensors with limited computational capabilities. For the proposed scheme, we derived the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and demonstrated that the probability of receiving the right encoded information by an untrustworthy relay is inversely proportional to the number of sectors. We also show that the aggressive behavior of cooperating untrusted relays is not effective compared to the case where each untrusted relay is trying to intercept the transmitted message individually. \n \nFifth and last, we investigate the physical layer security performance over Rayleigh fading channels in the presence of impulsive noise, as encountered, for instance, in smart grid environments. For this scheme, secrecy performance metrics were considered with and without destination assisted jamming at the eavesdropper’s side. From the obtained results, it is verified that the SOP, without destination assisted jamming, is flooring at high signal-to-noise-ratio values and that it can be significantly improved with the use of jamming.
Secure communication under channel uncertainty is an important and challenging problem in physical-layer security and cryptography. In this dissertation, we take a \nfundamental information-theoretic view at three concrete settings and use them to shed insight into efficient secure communication techniques for different scenarios under channel uncertainty. \n \nFirst, a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel with two receivers and two messages: a common message intended for both receivers (i.e., channel \nuncertainty for decoding the common message at the receivers) and a confidential message intended for one of the receivers but needing to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from the other is considered. A matrix characterization of the secrecy capacity region is established via a channel-enhancement argument and an extremal entropy inequality previously established for characterizing the capacity region of a degraded compound MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel. \n \nSecond, a multilevel security wiretap channel where there is one possible realization for the legitimate receiver channel but multiple possible realizations for the eavesdropper channel (i.e., channel uncertainty at the eavesdropper) is considered. A coding scheme is designed such that the number of secure bits delivered to the legitimate receiver depends on the actual realization of the eavesdropper channel. More specifically, when the eavesdropper channel realization is weak, all bits delivered to the legitimate receiver need to be secure. In addition, when the eavesdropper channel realization is strong, a prescribed part of the bits needs to remain secure. We call such codes security embedding codes, referring to the fact that high-security bits are now embedded into the low-security ones. We show that the key to achieving efficient security embedding is to jointly encode the low-security and high-security bits. In particular, the low-security bits can be used as (part of) the transmitter randomness to protect the high-security ones. \n \nFinally, motivated by the recent interest in building secure, robust and efficient distributed information storage systems, the problem of secure symmetrical multilevel diversity coding (S-SMDC) is considered. This is a setting where there are channel uncertainties at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The problem of encoding individual sources is first studied. A precise characterization of the entire admissible rate region is established via a connection to the problem of secure coding over a three-layer wiretap network and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of the admissible rate region. Building on this result, it is then shown that the simple coding strategy of separately encoding individual sources at the encoders can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem.
With the advent of mobile telephony, complemented by the availability of economic infrastructure devices has provided users the freedom to communicate and perform everyday tasks wirelessly. The access to information anywhere anytime provide users more flexibility to communicate, nonetheless it also makes communication more vulnerable to eavesdropping. Security is now considered as an important issue in the design of modern wireless communication system. In contrast to the conventional systems where security issues are dealt in the upper\nlayers of the protocol stack, in this thesis we focus our attention to construct security schemes by exploiting the attributes of the physical layer. \nIn the first part of the thesis, we consider a two-user multiacces channel where the two encoders, Encoder 1 and Encoder 2, are allowed to communicate with each other over a unidirectional noiseless bit-pipe of finite capacity in the presence of an adversary. In this model, the role of Encoder 2 is restricted to only help Encoder 1 in securing information from adversary. For this model, we\nestablish fundamental performance limits on secure communication and characterizes the secrecy capacity in some extreme cases of cooperation between the encoders. The second part of the thesis considers an elementary\nnetwork, which consists of four nodes – a source, a relay, a legitimate receiver and a passive eavesdropper. In this network, the link between two nodes consists of multiple parallel channels as subchannel. Towards this end, we establish bounds on secure communication. We show that for the case in which the relay does not listens to the source, under certain conditions secrecy capacity is established. In the last part of the thesis, we studied a two-user multi-input multioutput X-channel with local feedback and delayed channel state information\navailable at the transmitter in high signal-to-noise ratio regimes. In this setting each transmitter transmits independent messages to both receivers that need to be kept secret from each other. We characterize the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom region of this model.