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DRAFT: On the Logical Foundation of Physics (Part 2)

Alexandre Harvey-Tremblay

Published Dec 1, 2018• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The aim of this work is, first, to set the basis for a formal model of science, then, it is to show that the laws of physics are its theorems. Necessarily, all theories that are the logical product of science are theorems of our model. As this includes physics, our model is, therefore, its logical foundation. Our model is an axiomatic realization of the participatory universe envisioned by John Archibald Wheeler, in which the observer's practice of science is associated with proving reality. As our model is constructive of the mathematical structure isomorphic to nature, it deprecates Karl Popper's definition of science based on falsifiability. The formal practice of science consists of constructing a message (in the sense of Shannon's theory of information) of experiments (the elements of the message) constrained by the requirement that the elements are verifiable by the statistical priors of the message. In this context, we define the priors as Nature and we qualify the message as scientific. Nature is thus understood as a general proof checker for experiments. We show that the construction of a scientific message bounds nature (the priors) to a cosmology entirely emergent from the entropy of the scientific message. Finally, we conclude that the participatory-universe is emergent from the ideal practice of science.

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Introduction

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arXiv:1206.5075•Jun 22, 2012•2 citations
The aim of this work is, first, to set the basis for a formal model of science, then, it is to show that the laws of physics are its theorems. Necessarily, all theories that are the logical product of science are theorems of our model. As this includes physics, our model is, therefore, its logical foundation. Our model is an axiomatic realization of the participatory universe envisioned by John Archibald Wheeler, in which the observer's practice of science is associated with proving reality. As our model is constructive of the mathematical structure isomorphic to nature, it deprecates Karl Popper's definition of science based on falsifiability. The formal practice of science consists of constructing a message (in the sense of Shannon's theory of information) of experiments (the elements of the message) constrained by the requirement that the elements are verifiable by the statistical priors of the message. In this context, we define the priors as Nature and we qualify the message as scientific. Nature is thus understood as a general proof checker for experiments. We show that the construction of a scientific message bounds nature (the priors) to a cosmology entirely emergent from the entropy of the scientific message. Finally, we conclude that the participatory-universe is emergent from the ideal practice of science.
Introduction First a word of thanks. When I first came across the papers of John Archibald Wheeler on the foundations of quantum mechanics, most of them reprinted in Wheeler and Zurek (1983), I could not believe what I read. Finally here was a colleague of worldwide reputation, given his many contributions to theoretical physics, who was not afraid to discuss openly the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics. The outstanding feature of Professor Wheeler's viewpoint is his realization that the implications of quantum mechanics are so far-reaching that they require a completely novel approach in our view of reality and in the way we see our role in the universe. This distinguishes him from many others who in one way or another tried to save pre-quantum viewpoints, particularly the obviously wrong notion of a reality independent of us. Particularly remarkable is Professor Wheeler's austerity in thinking. He tries to use as few concepts as possible and to build on this the whole of physics. A fascinating case in point is the title of one of his papers “Law without law,” the attempt to arrive at the laws of nature without assuming any law a priori. For me personally his work on fundamental issues in quantum mechanics has been particularly inspiring. The questions he raises are exceptionally far-reaching and some of his concepts in the foundations of physics are so radical that calling them revolutionary would not do them justice.
Aims of the book The primary aim of this book is to develop a theory of measurement that incorporates the observer into the phenomenon under measurement. By this theory, the observer becomes both a collector of data and an activator of the phenomenon that gives rise to the data. These ideas have probably been best stated by J. A. Wheeler (1990; 1994): All things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe … Observer participancy gives rise to information; and information gives rise to physics. The measurement theory that will be presented is largely, in fact, a quantification of these ideas. However, the reader might be surprised to find that the “information” that is used is not the usual Shannon or Boltzmann entropy measures, but one that is relatively unknown to physicists, that of R. A. Fisher. The measurement theory is simply a description of how Fisher information flows from a physical source effect to a data space. It therefore applies to all scenarios where quantitative data from repeatable experiments may be collected. This describes measurement scenarios of physics but, also, of science in general. The theory of measurement is found to define an analytical procedure for deriving all laws of science. The approach is called EPI, for “extreme physical information.” The secondary aim of the book is to show, by example, that most existing laws of science fit within the EPI framework. That is, they can be derived by its use. (Many can of course be derived by other approaches, but, apparently, no other single approach can derive all of them.) In this way the EPI approach unifies science under an umbrella of measurement and information.
Logical foundation for quantum theory is considered. I claim that quantum theory correctly represents Nature when mathematical physics embraces and indeed features, logical anomalies inherent in pure mathematics. This approach links undecidability in arithmetic with the logic of quantum experiments. The undecidablity occupies an algebraic environment which is the missing foundation for the 3-valued logic predicted by Hans Reichenbach, shown by him to resolve `causal anomalies' of quantum mechanics, such as: inconsistency between prepared and measured states, complementarity between pairs of observables, and the EPR-paradox of action at a distance. Arithmetic basic to mathematical physics, is presented formally as a logical system consisting of axioms and propositions. Of special interest are all propositions asserting the existence of particular numbers. All numbers satisfying the axioms permeate the arithmetic indistinguishably, but these logically partition into two distinct sets: numbers whose existence the axioms determine by proof, and numbers whose existence axioms cannot determine, being neither provable nor negatable. Failure of mathematical physics to incorporate this logical distinction is seen as reason for quantum theory being logically at odds with quantum experiments. Nature is interpreted as having rules isomorphic to the abovementioned axioms with these governing arithmetical combinations of necessary and possible values or effects in experiments. Soundness and Completeness theorems from mathematical logic emerge as profoundly fundamental principles for quantum theory, making good intuitive sense of the subject.
The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many-world hypothe­sis. Many-worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many-world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to chal­lenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non-contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incor­rect and even counterintuitive under many-world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future be­come an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many-world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi-world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for exam­ple, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.
It has always been the ideal of science to discover laws of nature on which we can all agree. Agreement requires evidence independent of individual judgment, i.e., objective evidence. We apply the term objective to such unbiased scientific evidence because we associate it with an external world of objects that we conceive to be the origin of our information. This external world is instinctively invented by each of us as a means of dealing with invariant patterns in his private world of experience. The invention is validated and elaborated as a consequence of the fact that it turns out to be sharable. In fact the common content of all our invented external worlds is so unambiguous and independent of individual bias that it can form the universally accepted basis for communication and action in an organized society. The consistency of the patterns of experience associated with the external world is such that we are under severe psychological compulsion to assign to this world an existence independent of our experience and a reality superior to that of any small part of our experience. Physical science is devoted to the study of the “laws” of the external physical universe, i.e., to the behaviour of the objects in it. Hence there is a strong tendency to project into the external world the information gathered by scientifically objective methods and even the theoretical concepts in terms of which the information is interpreted. Whatever is so projected is objective in a second sense of the term, i.e., assigned by us to the external world of objects.
Every experiment or observational study is made in a context. This context is being explicitly considered in this book. To do so, a conceptual variable is defined as any variable which can be defined by (a group of) researchers in a given setting. Such variables are classified. Sufficiency and ancillarity are defined conditionally on the context. The conditionality principle, the sufficiency principle and the likelihood principle are generalized, and a tentative rule for when one should not condition on an ancillary is motivated by examples. The theory is illustrated by the case where a nuisance parameter is a part of the context, and for this case, model reduction is motivated. Model reduction is discussed in general from the point of view that there exists a mathematical group acting upon the parameter space. It is shown that a natural extension of this discussion also gives a conceptual basis from which essential parts of the formalism of quantum mechanics can be derived. This implies an epistemological basis for quantum theory, a kind of basis that has also been advocated by part of the quantum foundation community in recent years. Born's celebrated formula is shown to follow from a focused version of the likelihood principle together with some reasonable assumptions on rationality connected to experimental evidence. Some statistical consequences of Born's formula are sketched. The questions around Bell's inequality are approached by using the conditionality principle for each observer. The objective aspects of the world are identified with the ideal inference results upon which all observers agree (epistemological objectivity).