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Voprosy filosofii

Some Remarks on the Requirements for Scientific Theory in the Context of Many-worlds Models

Карпенко Иван Александрович

Published Jul 1, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many-world hypothe­sis. Many-worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many-world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to chal­lenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non-contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incor­rect and even counterintuitive under many-world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future be­come an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many-world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi-world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for exam­ple, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.

DOI
10.21146/0042-8744-2024-5-140-146

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The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many-world hypothe­sis. Many-worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many-world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to chal­lenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non-contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incor­rect and even counterintuitive under many-world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future be­come an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many-world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi-world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for exam­ple, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.
The article analyzes the problem of the relationship between consciousness and physical reality in the context of some multi-world models. It is shown that the adoption of many- worlds models imposes certain restrictions on the criteria of scientific theory, as well as on the concept of what is considered a “theory of everything”. Based on the original criticism of solipsism and the properties of the second law of thermodynamics, it is proved that consciousness can be considered as a derivative of the fundamental principles (laws of nature) of the physical reality in which it operates. From this follows the conclusion, considering the adoption of the many-worlds hypothesis, that different types of consciousness should correspond to different worlds (with different sets of basic principles). Conclusions are also made about the role and status of mathematics in the considered hypothetical conditions, and the possibility of creating a “theory of everything” is questioned.
Abstract One can consider the developments in quantum field theory from the point of view of foundational problems posed about physical reality at both the epistemological and ontological levels, or as a ‘laboratory’ to study the actual methodology of the scientific enterprise. I shall address both of these issues in this paper. My contention is that at the foundational level there is essentially nothing new in quantum field theory that is not already present in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This is quite different in emphasis from the view expressed by Redhead (1983a). Even in quantum mechanics most of the difficulties which arise are generated by the realist’s inclination to take the formalism too literally as representing physical reality, often in a modified or distorted classical view. More serious consideration of Bohr’s philosophical framework of complementarity may prove fruitful for coping with this problem, which is not new to quantum field theory, being already the central interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, as a source to illustrate how theories arc constructed and established in actual scientific practice, quantum field theory does provide a wide range of useful examples. Here too, although there are many technically fascinating topics (such as renormalization), quantum field theory is pretty much (meth odological) business as usual. Much more interesting, essentially new, methodological departures are seriously proposed (with varying degrees of credibility) by some rival or alternative developments in modern theoretical physics, such as the S-matrix programme, with its bootstrap conjecture, or cosmology, with various forms of the anthropic principle (Gale 1983) and with the inflationary universe scenario (Guth 1981 ).
The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental con­cepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by exam­ples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scien­tific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of main­stream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the on­tologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.
The growth of modern science resulted in a radically new cognitive approach to many problems of classical philosophy. In the context of contemporary theoretical physics, if only one avoids easy apologetic, it is no longer possible to defend this version of epistemological empiricism that was defended half a century ago. Whereas in the 1930’s the traditional distinction between theoretical and observational terms was called into question, due to its arbitrary nature, in the 1980’s the basic philosophical opposition between material and immaterial (resp. between physical and mathematical) objects seems arbitrary since the very notion of matter appears nothing but a terminological relic of the bygone epoch.
In course of the development of modern science, inadequacy of classical logic and Eastern philosophy have generally been associated only with quantum mechanics in particular, notably by Schroedinger, Finkelstein and Zeilinger among others. Our motive is to showcase a deviation from this prototypical association. So, we consider the equation of motion of a classical harmonic oscillator, and demonstrate how our habit of writing the general solution, by applying the principle of superposition, can not be explained by remaining within the bounds of classical logic. The the law of identity gets violated. The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle fail to hold strictly throughout the whole process of reasoning consequently leading to a decision problem where we can not decide whether these two 'laws' hold or not. We discuss how we, by habit, apply our intuition to write down the general solution. Such intuitive steps of reasoning, if formalized in terms of propositions, result in a manifestation of the inadequacy of classical logic. In view of our discussion, we conclude that the middle way (Mulamadhyamakakarika), a feature of Eastern philosophy, founds the basis of human reasoning. The essence of the middle way can be realized through self-inquiry (Atmavichar), another crucial feature of Eastern philosophy, which however is exemplified by our exposition of the concerned problem. From the Western point of view, our work showcases an example of Hilbert's axiomatic approach to deal with the principle of superposition in the context of the classical harmonic oscillator. In the process, it becomes a manifestation of Brouwer's views concerning the role of intuition in human reasoning and inadequacy of classical logic which were very much influenced by, if not founded upon, Eastern philosophy.
This work explores foundational issues related to many-worlds theories in Cosmology. It is argued that the metaphysical picture drawn by these theories arise from metaphysical assumptions made during their formulation—most of which are problematic. I elucidate the nature of these assumptions and examine their legitimacy. I conclude the metaphysical presuppositions responsible for the apparent reliability of many-worlds theories in Cosmology are unmotivated and unwarranted by evidence. On this basis, the questions many-worlds models in Cosmology attempt to solve turn out to be a non-starter because their presupposed metaphysical grounding is ill-founded.