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Reply to Comment on

Jesni Shamsul Shaari, Marco Lucamarini, Asmaʼ Ahmad Bahari

Published Oct 6, 2011• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We reply to the Comment made in arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] (Phys. Lett. A \textbf{374} (2010) 1097) by noting some erroneous considerations therein resulting in a misleading view of the quantum key distribution protocol in question. We then correct the rates provided for the Intercept-and-Resend attack and we complete the analysis of Eve's attack based on a double CNOT gate.

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arXiv:quant-ph/0009042•Physical Review A•Feb 13, 2001•100 citations
We reply to the Comment made in arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] (Phys. Lett. A \textbf{374} (2010) 1097) by noting some erroneous considerations therein resulting in a misleading view of the quantum key distribution protocol in question. We then correct the rates provided for the Intercept-and-Resend attack and we complete the analysis of Eve's attack based on a double CNOT gate.