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Analysis of randomized security protocols

Matthew S. Bauer

Published Nov 30, 2018• 1 citation
OpenAlex

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Jisuanji gongcheng•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations
Deniability is a feature that aims at protecting the privacy of the protocol participants in the key establishment protocols.Currently all the previous researches about deniability in group key establishment protocols were based on the Random Oracle assumption.In this paper,the authors gives a deniable group key establishment protocol without Random Oracle along with its security analysis and deniability analysis.All the proofs are done in Standard Model.The author hopes that the work in this paper could be helpful for the research on the anlysis of the various security features of the group key establishment protocols and the proof in this paper could be helpful for the security analysis of other key establishment protocols.
We present a device-independent randomness expansion protocol, involving only a constant number of non-signaling quantum devices, that achieves \emph{infinite expansion}: starting with mmm bits of uniform private randomness, the protocol can produce an unbounded amount of certified randomness that is exp⁡(−Ω(m1/3))\exp(-Ω(m^{1/3}))exp(−Ω(m1/3))-close to uniform and secure against a quantum adversary. The only parameters which depend on the size of the input are the soundness of the protocol and the security of the output (both are inverse exponential in mmm). This settles a long-standing open problem in the area of randomness expansion and device-independence. The analysis of our protocols involves overcoming fundamental challenges in the study of \emph{adaptive} device-independent protocols. Our primary technical contribution is the design and analysis of device-independent protocols which are \emph{Input Secure}; that is, their output is guaranteed to be secure against a quantum eavesdropper, \emph{even if the input randomness was generated by that same eavesdropper}! The notion of Input Security may be of independent interest to other areas such as device-independent quantum key distribution.
This paper proposes a new RFID secure protocol which uses the mechanism that the random sequence stored in the tag produces the pseudo random number to replace the random value generator.With both tag-to-reader and reader-to-tag authentication,the protocol can prevent the RFID system from some malicious attack,such as tracking,spoofing,forgery,and replay attack.It reduces the tag designing cost while ensuring the security grade.After setting up an idealized protocol model,a process of formal analysis of this protocol is presented and the security is proved theoretically by using the BAN logic.