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Journal of Wuhan University

A Deniable Group Key Establishment Protocol in Standard Model

Bao Li

Published Jan 1, 2008• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Deniability is a feature that aims at protecting the privacy of the protocol participants in the key establishment protocols.Currently all the previous researches about deniability in group key establishment protocols were based on the Random Oracle assumption.In this paper,the authors gives a deniable group key establishment protocol without Random Oracle along with its security analysis and deniability analysis.All the proofs are done in Standard Model.The author hopes that the work in this paper could be helpful for the research on the anlysis of the various security features of the group key establishment protocols and the proof in this paper could be helpful for the security analysis of other key establishment protocols.

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Abstract. Deniable authentication is a technique that allows one party to send messages to another while the latter can not prove to a third party the fact of communication. In this paper, we first formalize a natural notion of deniable security and naturally extend the basic authenticator theorem by Bellare et al. [2] to the setting of deniable authentication. Of independent interest, this extension is achieved by defining a deniable MT-authenticator via a game. This game is essentially borrowed from the notion of universal composition [8] although we do not assume any result or background about it. Then we construct two deniable MT-authenticators: uncontrollable random oracle based and the PKI based, both of which are just 3-round protocols. The second construction assumes the receiver owns a secret key. Such a setup assumption is very popular in the real world. (Without this assumption), all the previous protocols do not have a widely satisfiable performance when applied in the Internet-like environment. Finally, as our application, we obtain key exchange protocols that is deniably secure in the real world. 1

•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations
Deniability is a feature that aims at protecting the privacy of the protocol participants in the key establishment protocols.Currently all the previous researches about deniability in group key establishment protocols were based on the Random Oracle assumption.In this paper,the authors gives a deniable group key establishment protocol without Random Oracle along with its security analysis and deniability analysis.All the proofs are done in Standard Model.The author hopes that the work in this paper could be helpful for the research on the anlysis of the various security features of the group key establishment protocols and the proof in this paper could be helpful for the security analysis of other key establishment protocols.
A generic way to construct a deniable group key establishment protocol from an unauthenticated group key es-tablishment protocol was proposed.The construction could be seen as a compiler.By using Schnorr's zero-knowledge identification scheme,this compiler could transform an unauthenticated group key establishment to a deniable group key establishment protocol with only additional two round communications and one round verification.It is very efficient and practical.The security and deniability proof is in the Random Oracle model.A concrete transforming example of the con-struction was also presented.
Motivated by the problem of establishing a session key among parties based on the possession of certain credentials only, we discuss a notion of attribute-based key establishment. A number of new issues arise in this setting that are not present in the usual settings of group key establishment where unique user identities are assumed to be publicly available. After detailing the security model, we give a two-round solution in the random oracle model. As main technical tool we introduce a notion of attribute-based signcryption, which may be of independent interest. We show that the type of signcryption needed can be realized through the encrypt-then-sign paradigm. Further, we discuss additional guarantees of the proposed protocol, that can be interpreted in terms of deniability and privacy.
We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. [BCPQ01,BCP01] and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol participants. We show that established group key establishment schemes from CRYPTO 2003 and ASIACRYPT 2004 do not fully meet these new requirements. Next to giving a formal definition of these extended security properties, we prove a variant of the explored proposal from ASIACRYPT 2004 secure in this stricter sense. Our proof builds on the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption and the random oracle model.
Motivated by the problem of establishing a session key among parties based on the possession of certain credentials only, we discuss a notion of attribute-based key establishment. A number of new issues arise in this setting that are not present in the usual settings of group key establishment where unique user identities are assumed to be publicly available. After detailing the security model, we give a two-round solution in the random oracle model. As main technical tool we introduce a notion of attribute-based signcryption, which may be of independent interest. We show that the type of signcryption needed can be realized through the encrypt-then-sign paradigm. Further, we discuss additional guarantees of the proposed protocol, that can be interpreted in terms of deniability and privacy.
Abstract: Deniable authenticated protocol is a new and attractive protocol compared to the traditional authentication protocol. It allows the appointed receiver to identify the source of a given message, but not to prove the identity of the sender to a third party even if the appointed receiver is willing to reveal its private key. In this paper, we first define a security model for certificateless deniable authentication protocols. Then we propose a non-interactive certificateless deniable authentication protocol, by combining deniable authentication protocol with certificateless cryptography. In addition, we prove its security in the random oracle model.
Abstract. Deniable authentication is a technique that allows one party to send messages to another while the latter can not prove to a third party the fact of communication. In this paper, we first formalize a natural notion of deniable security and naturally extend the basic authenticator theorem by Bellare et al. [2] to the setting of deniable authentication. Of independent interest, this extension is achieved by defining a deniable MT-authenticator via a game. This game is essentially borrowed from the notion of universal composition [8] although we do not assume any result or background about it. Then we construct two deniable MT-authenticators: uncontrollable random oracle based and the PKI based, both of which are just 3-round protocols. The second construction assumes the receiver owns a secret key. Such a setup assumption is very popular in the real world. (Without this assumption), all the previous protocols do not have a widely satisfiable performance when applied in the Internet-like environment. Finally, as our application, we obtain key exchange protocols that is deniably secure in the real world. 1