Cyber physical systems (CPSs) will be deployed for decades, thus they should be secure against long-term attacks. Most CPSs adopt the datagram transport layer security (DTLS), as the de facto security protocol. By using public key cryptography (PKC) based on traditional RSA or elliptic-curves, DTLS establishes secured communication channels between multiple parties. However, the foreseeable breakthrough of quantum computers represents a risk for many PKC ecosystems. Traditional PKC will no be longer considered secure. Therefore, the integration of post-quantum security is mandatory. Due to their limited resources, tight performance requirements, and long-term life-cycles, this is especially challenging for CPSs. In this letter we propose, implement and evaluate for the first time a post-quantum enhanced DTLS, able to establish secure communications of CPSs, even in the presence of quantum computers. An NTRU post-quantum solution was used to perform the key transport among the CPSs entities. We show that is feasible to integrate our post-quantum enhanced DTLS, together with the full Internet engineering task force protocol stack in highly constrained environments, such as the CPSs.
Cyber physical systems (CPSs) will be deployed for decades, thus they should be secure against long-term attacks. Most CPSs adopt the datagram transport layer security (DTLS), as the de facto security protocol. By using public key cryptography (PKC) based on traditional RSA or elliptic-curves, DTLS establishes secured communication channels between multiple parties. However, the foreseeable breakthrough of quantum computers represents a risk for many PKC ecosystems. Traditional PKC will no be longer considered secure. Therefore, the integration of post-quantum security is mandatory. Due to their limited resources, tight performance requirements, and long-term life-cycles, this is especially challenging for CPSs. In this letter we propose, implement and evaluate for the first time a post-quantum enhanced DTLS, able to establish secure communications of CPSs, even in the presence of quantum computers. An NTRU post-quantum solution was used to perform the key transport among the CPSs entities. We show that is feasible to integrate our post-quantum enhanced DTLS, together with the full Internet engineering task force protocol stack in highly constrained environments, such as the CPSs.
The reliance on asymmetric public key cryptography (PKC) and symmetric encryption for cyber-security in current telecommunication networks is threatened by the emergence of powerful quantum computing technology. This is due to the ability of quantum computers to efficiently solve problems such as factorization or discrete logarithms, which are the basis for classical PKC schemes. Thus, the assumption that communications networks are secure no longer holds true. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are the first cyber-security technologies that allow communications to resist the attacks of a quantum computer. To achieve quantum-resistant communications, the aforementioned technologies need to be incorporated into a network security protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). In this paper, we describe and implement two novel, hybrid solutions in which QKD and PQC are combined inside TLS for achieving quantum-resistant authenticated key exchange: Concatenation and Exclusively-OR (XOR). We present the results, in terms of complexity and security enhancement, of integrating state-of-the-art QKD and PQC technologies into a practical, industry-ready TLS implementation. Our findings demonstrate that the adoption of a PQC-only approach enhances the TLS handshake performance by approximately 9 % compared to classical methods. Furthermore, our hybrid PQC-QKD quantum-resistant TLS comes at a performance cost of approximately 117 % during the key establishment process. In return, we substantially augment the security of the handshake, paving the road for the development of future-proof quantum-resistant communication systems based on QKD and PQC.
The threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer contributes to an increasing interest in the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Compared to existing research efforts regarding the integration of PQC into the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, industrial communication protocols have so far been neglected. Since industrial cyber-physical systems (CPS) are typically deployed for decades, protection against such long-term threats is needed. In this work, we propose two novel solutions for the integration of post-quantum (PQ) primitives (digital signatures and key establishment) into the industrial protocol Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA): a hybrid solution combining conventional cryptography with PQC and a solution solely based on PQC. Both approaches provide mutual authentication between client and server and are realized with certificates fully compliant to the X.509 standard. We implement the two solutions and measure and evaluate their performance across three different security levels. All selected algorithms (Kyber, Dilithium, and Falcon) are candidates for standardization by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We show that Falcon is a suitable option – especially – when using floating-point hardware provided by our ARM-based evaluation platform. Our proposed hybrid solution provides PQ security for early adopters but comes with additional performance and communication requirements. Our solution solely based on PQC shows superior performance across all evaluated security levels in terms of handshake duration compared to conventional OPC UA but comes at the cost of increased handshake sizes. In addition to our performance evaluation, we provide a proof of security in the symbolic model for our two PQC-based variants of OPC UA. For this proof, we use the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif and formally verify confidentiality and authentication properties of our quantum-resistant variants.
Recent advances in quantum computing and Shor’s discovery of quantum algorithms that efficiently solve computational problems (integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems) form the basis of the Internet cryptographic infrastructure. It has fueled intensive research into the design and development of post-quantum (PQ) cryptographic systems that maintain their security when a quantum computer is built.We consider the PQ security of DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security), a communication security protocol that protects against eavesdropping, tampering, and packet forgery for datagrams. DTLS is the UDP counterpart of TLS (Transport Layer Security) and proposed to secure control messages in 5G networks. We offer a novel and efficient approach for providing secure source authentication and message integrity for DTLS that removes the need for a computationally expensive key exchange for message integrity by using PQ TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) that relies on delayed key release mechanism to provide integrity and use a PQ hash-based signature for providing PQ source authentication. We analyze the security of our design, implement it in a widely used library called TinyDTLS, report the result of our experiments, and propose direction for future research.
The rise of quantum computing threatens traditional cryptographic algorithms that secure Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems (TCPS). Shor's algorithm poses a significant threat to RSA and ECC, while Grover's algorithm reduces the security of symmetric encryption schemes, such as AES. The objective of this paper is to underscore the urgency of transitioning to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to mitigate these risks in TCPS by analyzing the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic schemes and the applicability of standardized PQC schemes in TCPS. We analyzed vulnerabilities in traditional cryptography against quantum attacks and reviewed the applicability of NIST-standardized PQC schemes, including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+, in TCPS. We conducted a case study to analyze the vulnerabilities of a TCPS application from the Architecture Reference for Cooperative and Intelligent Transportation (ARC-IT) service package, i.e., Electronic Toll Collection, leveraging the Microsoft Threat Modeling tool. This case study highlights the cryptographic vulnerabilities of a TCPS application and presents how PQC can effectively counter these threats. Additionally, we evaluated CRYSTALS-Kyber's performance across wired and wireless TCPS data communication scenarios. While CRYSTALS-Kyber proves effective in securing TCPS applications over high-bandwidth, low-latency Ethernet networks, our analysis highlights challenges in meeting the stringent latency requirements of safety-critical wireless applications within TCPS. Future research should focus on developing lightweight PQC solutions and hybrid schemes that integrate traditional and PQC algorithms, to enhance compatibility, scalability, and real-time performance, ensuring robust protection against emerging quantum threats in TCPS.
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) based on the Internet of Things (IoT) form the backbone of modern smart infrastructures, including smart cities, healthcare monitoring, industrial automation, and intelligent transportation. However, connecting many resource-limited IoT devices makes them more vulnerable to cyber threats, particularly quantum attacks. This review comprehensively examines quantum-secure communication (QSC) frameworks for IoT-enabled CPS, focusing on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, and hybrid quantum–classical security models suitable for constrained devices. A PRISMA-guided search of the Scopus and Google Scholar database was conducted in January 2026 using three keyword groups related to hybrid security, artificial intelligence, and cyber-physical systems. Based on the evaluation, 6008 publications have been identified between 2001 and 2026. The first-round screening was performed for 4948 articles, after excluding duplicates. During the screening stage, 348 articles were selected for abstract scrutiny, 115 records were excluded due to no direct focus on CPS/IoT applications, 52 studies were excluded because these papers relied on traditional security models, 25 studies were excluded due to insufficient relevance to the review objectives, and 15 additional non-English studies were removed. Following the screening stage, 141 studies were selected for full-text eligibility. Out of those, 86 studies were removed due to a lack of specific evaluation metrics or not being published in a peer-reviewed venue. Furthermore, the publications are classified as QKD-based secure CPS and QSC for industrial IoT, AI-Assisted Secure Communication for CPS Networks, and hybrid PQC-QKD models for CPS/IoT devices. This article investigates recent advancements in secure data transmission, verified protocols, and AI-driven anomaly detection customized to CPS/IoT environments. In addition, operational hurdles, interaction with open innovations, real-time deployment, and secure edge-cloud integration are highlighted. By analyzing recent developments and identifying research gaps, this review provides a structured roadmap for designing secure, scalable, and quantum-safe IoT-based CPS frameworks capable of withstanding next-generation cyber threats. This systematic review was performed and reported according to the PRISMA 2020 guidelines.
Current improvements in quantum computing present a substantial challenge to classical cryptographic systems, which typically rely on problems that can be solved in polynomial time using quantum algorithms. Consequently, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a promising solution to emerging quantum-based cryptographic challenges. The greatest threat is public-key cryptosystems, which are primarily responsible for key exchanges. In PQC, key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) are crucial for securing key exchange protocols, particularly in Internet communication, virtual private networks (VPNs), and secure messaging applications. CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU are two well-known PQC KEMs offering robust security in the quantum world. However, even when quantum computers are functional, they are not easily accessible. IoT devices will not be able to utilize them directly, so there will still be a requirement to protect IoT devices from quantum attacks. Concerns such as limited computational power, energy efficiency, and memory constraints in devices such as those used in IoTs, embedded systems, and smart cards limit the use of these techniques in constrained environments. These concerns always arise there. To address this issue, this study conducts a broad comparative analysis of Kyber and NTRU, with special focus on their security, performance, and implementation efficiency in such environments (IOT/constrained environments). In addition, a case study was conducted by applying KEMs to a low-power embedded device to analyze their performance in real-world scenarios. These results offer an important comparison for cyber security engineers and cryptographers who are involved in integrating post-quantum cryptography into resource-constrained devices.