In collapse theories of quantum mechanics such as the GRW theory, the measurement result is represented by the post-measurement state which is still a superposition of different result branches, although the modulus squared of the amplitude of one result branch is close to one. This leads to the tails problem. In this paper, I present a new analysis of the tails problem of collapse theories, and suggest a more complete solution to the problem. First, I argue that the tails problem exists not only in collapse theories, but also in Everett's theory and even in Bohm's theory. Moreover, I point out that the tails problem has two levels: the physical and mental levels, which may be called the objective and subjective tails problems, respectively. One needs to analyze not only the connection between high modulus-squared values and macro-existence, but also the connection between these values and our experience of macro-existence. Second, I briefly review the existing solutions to the objective and subjective tails problems. I argue that although the objective tails problem may be solved more directly, one needs to further investigate the psychophysical connection in order to solve the subjective tails problem. Third, I analyze how the mental state of an observer is determined by her wave function in collapse theories. It is argued that the mental content of an observer is related to the amplitude of each result branch of the superposition she is physically in, and it may be composed of all possible results. Moreover, it is conjectured that the modulus squared of the amplitude of each result branch may determine the vividness of the part of the mental content containing the result. Finally, I argue that this vividness conjecture may help solve the subjective tails problem of collapse theories.
We suggest a new answer to this intriguing question and argue that the answer may have implications for the solutions to the measurement problem. The main basis of our analysis is the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. First of all, based on this doctrine, we argue that an observer in a quantum superposition or a quantum observer has a definite conscious experience, which is neither disjunctive nor illusive. The inconsistency of this result with the bare theory is further analyzed, and it is shown that an appropriate use of the strategy of analyzing the disposition of an observer to answer a particular question also leads to the same result. Next, we argue that this new result seems to disfavor Everett's and Bohm's approaches to quantum mechanics when considering the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. This suggests that dynamical collapse theories are in the right direction to solve the measurement problem. Thirdly, we analyze the concrete content of the conscious experience of a quantum observer. It is argued that the mental content of a quantum observer is related to both the amplitude and relative phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in, and it is composed of the mental content corresponding to every branch of the superposition. In addition, we argue that when assuming the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness of the mental content corresponding to the branch, the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse theories can be solved.
In collapse theories of quantum mechanics, there exist quantum observers who are observers being in a superposition of different result branches. In this paper, I analyze the mental state of a quantum observer. First, I argue that the mental state of a quantum observer is not the usual state of recording one of the results in the superposition, but it is definite. Second, I argue that the mental state of a quantum observer is determined by both the amplitudes and relative phases of the result branches of the superposition, and the mental content is composed of every result. Third, I argue that there are new mental properties which are lack for classical observers and determined by the amplitude and relative phase. In particular, the mental property determined by the amplitude may be a certain property of vividness of the mental content; the bigger the amplitude of a result branch, the more vivid the result is in the whole mental content. Finally, I argue that the new experience of a quantum observer, which violates quantum mechanics, implies that consciousness is not physically reducible or emergent but fundamental in collapse theories.
Physical systems to exist in multiple states simultaneously. While standard quantumtheory permits superposition to persist indefinitely in the absence of mea-surement or environmental decoherence, this work proposes that superpositionstates possess an intrinsic temporal constraint. We argue that quantum super-position cannot remain stable forever and that every superposed system ischaracterized by a finite lifetime, beyond which the superposition inevitablybreaks down and the wave function collapses into a single definite state. Thisproposed time-limited superposition introduces an objective mechanism for wave-function collapse that does not rely on observation or classical interaction.Conceptual arguments, mathematical considerations, and potential experimentalimplications are discussed, including connections to macroscopic quantum lim-its, decoherence timescales, and fundamental temporal structure. If validated,this framework would offer a new perspective on the measurement problem andsuggest that time itself plays an active role in determining quantum outcomes.This perspective is conceptually related to objective collapse models such as theGhirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory and Penrose’s gravitationally inducedcollapse, while differing in that the collapse mechanism proposed here arisesfrom an intrinsic temporal instability of superposition rather than stochastic orgravity-driven effects.
The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic due to the measurement problem. The problem lies not with collapse per se, but with the appeal to measurement; a theory that could underwrite the collapse process without ineliminable reference to measurement would constitute a solution to the measurement problem. This is the strategy pursued by dynamical (or spontaneous) collapse theories. But dynamical collapse theories face a number of challenges. First, they make different empirical predictions from standard quantum mechanics, and hence are potentially empirically refutable. Second, there are difficulties reconciling the dynamical collapse mechanism with special relativity. Third, the post-collapse state is not the same as the post-measurement state of standard quantum mechanics, raising the possibility that dynamical collapse theories do not solve the measurement problem after all. Assuming that these challenges can be met, dynamical collapse theories can lay claim to being serious contenders for the correct description of the quantum world. And the description they provide has a number of interesting consequences. First, it makes indeterminism an irreducible fact about the physical world. It has been argued that this has important consequences for the foundations of statistical mechanics, for free will, and for consciousness. Second, many dynamical collapse theories can be taken to imply that the quantum wave function is fundamental, giving rise to a new kind of vagueness, since a wave can be fuzzy around the edges in a way that a particle cannot. Furthermore, the quantum wave function is defined over a high-dimensional space, not the three-dimensional space of experience, suggesting to some that three-dimensionality is an illusion.
It is often assumed that the only effect of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (`GRW') dynamical collapse mechanism on the `tails' of the wavefunction (that is, the components of superpositions on which the collapse is \emph{not} centred) is to reduce their weight. In consequence it seems to be generally accepted that the tails behave exactly as do the various branches in the Everett interpretation except for their much lower weight. These assumptions are demonstrably inaccurate: the collapse mechanism has substantial and detectable effects within the tails. The relevance of this misconception for the dynamical-collapse theories is debatable, though.
In this paper, we examine measurement using the Q-based, objective-field model for quantum mechanics. Schrodinger considered a microscopic system prepared in a superposition of states which is then coupled to a macroscopic meter. We analyze the entangled meter and system, and measurements on it, by solving forward-backward stochastic differential equations for real amplitudes
x(t) and
p(t) that correspond to the phase-space variables of the Q function of the system at a time
t. We model the system and meter as single-mode fields, and measurement of
x^ by amplification of the amplitude
x(t). Our conclusion is that the outcome for the measurement is determined at (or by) the time
tm, when the coupling to the meter is complete, the meter states being macroscopically distinguishable. There is consistency with macroscopic realism. By evaluating the distribution of the amplitudes
x and
p postselected on a given outcome of the meter, we show how the
Q-based model represents a more complete description of quantum mechanics: The variances associated with amplitudes
x and
p are too narrow to comply with the uncertainty principle, ruling out that the distribution represents a quantum state. We conclude that the collapse of the wavefunction occurs as a two-stage process: First there is an amplification that creates branches of amplitudes
x(t) of the meter, associated with distinct eigenvalues. The outcome of measurement is determined by
x(t) once amplified, explaining Born's rule. Second, the distribution that determines the final collapse is the state inferred for the system conditioned on the outcome of the meter: information is lost about the meter, in particular, about the complementary variable
p.