We suggest a new answer to this intriguing question and argue that the answer may have implications for the solutions to the measurement problem. The main basis of our analysis is the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. First of all, based on this doctrine, we argue that an observer in a quantum superposition or a quantum observer has a definite conscious experience, which is neither disjunctive nor illusive. The inconsistency of this result with the bare theory is further analyzed, and it is shown that an appropriate use of the strategy of analyzing the disposition of an observer to answer a particular question also leads to the same result. Next, we argue that this new result seems to disfavor Everett's and Bohm's approaches to quantum mechanics when considering the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. This suggests that dynamical collapse theories are in the right direction to solve the measurement problem. Thirdly, we analyze the concrete content of the conscious experience of a quantum observer. It is argued that the mental content of a quantum observer is related to both the amplitude and relative phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in, and it is composed of the mental content corresponding to every branch of the superposition. In addition, we argue that when assuming the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness of the mental content corresponding to the branch, the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse theories can be solved.
We suggest a new answer to this intriguing question and argue that the answer may have implications for the solutions to the measurement problem. The main basis of our analysis is the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. First of all, based on this doctrine, we argue that an observer in a quantum superposition or a quantum observer has a definite conscious experience, which is neither disjunctive nor illusive. The inconsistency of this result with the bare theory is further analyzed, and it is shown that an appropriate use of the strategy of analyzing the disposition of an observer to answer a particular question also leads to the same result. Next, we argue that this new result seems to disfavor Everett's and Bohm's approaches to quantum mechanics when considering the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. This suggests that dynamical collapse theories are in the right direction to solve the measurement problem. Thirdly, we analyze the concrete content of the conscious experience of a quantum observer. It is argued that the mental content of a quantum observer is related to both the amplitude and relative phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in, and it is composed of the mental content corresponding to every branch of the superposition. In addition, we argue that when assuming the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness of the mental content corresponding to the branch, the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse theories can be solved.
In collapse theories of quantum mechanics, there exist quantum observers who are observers being in a superposition of different result branches. In this paper, I analyze the mental state of a quantum observer. First, I argue that the mental state of a quantum observer is not the usual state of recording one of the results in the superposition, but it is definite. Second, I argue that the mental state of a quantum observer is determined by both the amplitudes and relative phases of the result branches of the superposition, and the mental content is composed of every result. Third, I argue that there are new mental properties which are lack for classical observers and determined by the amplitude and relative phase. In particular, the mental property determined by the amplitude may be a certain property of vividness of the mental content; the bigger the amplitude of a result branch, the more vivid the result is in the whole mental content. Finally, I argue that the new experience of a quantum observer, which violates quantum mechanics, implies that consciousness is not physically reducible or emergent but fundamental in collapse theories.
The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic due to the measurement problem. The problem lies not with collapse per se, but with the appeal to measurement; a theory that could underwrite the collapse process without ineliminable reference to measurement would constitute a solution to the measurement problem. This is the strategy pursued by dynamical (or spontaneous) collapse theories. But dynamical collapse theories face a number of challenges. First, they make different empirical predictions from standard quantum mechanics, and hence are potentially empirically refutable. Second, there are difficulties reconciling the dynamical collapse mechanism with special relativity. Third, the post-collapse state is not the same as the post-measurement state of standard quantum mechanics, raising the possibility that dynamical collapse theories do not solve the measurement problem after all. Assuming that these challenges can be met, dynamical collapse theories can lay claim to being serious contenders for the correct description of the quantum world. And the description they provide has a number of interesting consequences. First, it makes indeterminism an irreducible fact about the physical world. It has been argued that this has important consequences for the foundations of statistical mechanics, for free will, and for consciousness. Second, many dynamical collapse theories can be taken to imply that the quantum wave function is fundamental, giving rise to a new kind of vagueness, since a wave can be fuzzy around the edges in a way that a particle cannot. Furthermore, the quantum wave function is defined over a high-dimensional space, not the three-dimensional space of experience, suggesting to some that three-dimensionality is an illusion.
The central part of Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is a quantum mechanical model of memory and of observation as the recording of information in a memory. To use this model as an answer to the measurement problem, Everett has to assume that a conscious observer can be in a superposition of such memory states and be unaware of it. This assumption has puzzled generations of readers. The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to find a set of simpler assumptions which are sufficient to show that Everett's model is empirically adequate. I argue that Everett's model needs three assumptions to account for the process of observation: an assumption of decoherence of observers as quantum mechanical systems; an assumption of supervenience of mental states (qualities) over quantum mechanical properties; and an assumption about the interpretation of quantum mechanical states in general: quantum mechanical states describe ensembles of states of affairs coexisting in the same system. I argue that the only plausible understanding of such ensembles is as ensembles of possibilities, and that all standard no-collapse interpretations agree in this reading of quantum mechanical states. Their differences can be understood as different theories about what marks the real state within this ensemble, and Everett's theory as the claim that no additional 'mark of reality' is necessary. Using the three assumptions, I argue that introspection cannot determine the objective quantum mechanical state of an observer. Rather, the introspective qualities of a quantum mechanical state can be represented by a (classical) statistical ensemble of subjective states. An analysis of these subjective states and their dynamics leads to the conclusion that they suffice to give empirically correct predictions. The argument for the empirical adequacy of the subjective state entails that knowledge of the objective quantum mechanical state is impossible in principle. Empirical reality for a conscious observer is not described by the objective state, but by a Everettian relative state conditional on the subjective state, and no theoretical 'mark of reality' is necessary for this concept of reality. I compare the resulting concept of reality to Kant's distinction between empirical and transcendental reality.
The question of what generates conscious experience has mesmerized thinkers since the dawn of humanity, yet its origins remain a mystery. The topic of consciousness has gained traction in recent years, thanks to the development of large language models that now arguably pass the Turing test, an operational test for intelligence. However, intelligence and consciousness are not related in obvious ways, as anyone who suffers from a bad toothache can attest—pain generates intense feelings and absorbs all our conscious awareness, yet nothing particularly intelligent is going on. In the hard sciences, this topic is frequently met with skepticism because, to date, no protocol to measure the content or intensity of conscious experiences in an observer-independent manner has been agreed upon. Here, we present a novel proposal: Conscious experience arises whenever a quantum mechanical superposition forms. Our proposal has several implications: First, it suggests that the structure of the superposition determines the qualia of the experience. Second, quantum entanglement naturally solves the binding problem, ensuring the unity of phenomenal experience. Finally, a moment of agency may coincide with the formation of a superposition state. We outline a research program to experimentally test our conjecture via a sequence of quantum biology experiments. Applying these ideas opens up the possibility of expanding human conscious experience through brain–quantum computer interfaces.
I survey some of these connections between 'collapse solutions' to the measurement problem, and the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism. I have two main conclusions. (1) These solutions, though compatible with physicalism, can involve a very different conception of the physical from what most philosophers and neuroscientists expect. (2) The 'Wigner-Stapp' solution gives a real-life example of a problem, which metaphysical discussions of physicalism have seen only in the abstract: the problem that because psycho-physical correlation is a `two-way street', the strategy of defining physicalism in terms of supervenience threatens to be too weak. That is, the precise definition can be satisfied, even while intuitively physicalism is false. A version of the paper has appeared in "Consciousness and Human Identity", ed. John Cornwell, OUP 1997, pp. 122-159.
Abstract Classical mechanistic models of the mind often fail to capture the complex intricate interplay of human emotions and cognitive processes, particularly their interconnected and evolving nature. Recent advancements in quantum cognition suggest that thoughts and feelings may be influenced by principles analogous to those in quantum mechanics, such as superposition and entanglement. This paper examines the concept of emergence through destruction, a framework in which the collapse of potential emotional or cognitive states leads to the emergence of new attributes. The collapse of these states can be understood as an emergent phenomenon shaped by both intention and attention. In scenarios involving multiple potential mental states—whether in decision-making, perception, or thought—conscious focus serves as a selective way that transforms a superposition of possibilities into a single, actualized experience. This process, similar to the quantum observer effect, underscores that conscious attention is not a passive observation but an active force that shapes reality. Building on Bohm’s interpretation of active information, this collapse is seen as not merely a reduction of potential states but an informational process that channels possibilities into concrete forms. As one cognitive experience materializes, others recede into the background, yet this selection process simultaneously fosters the emergence of new properties or cognitive patterns. This dynamic mirrors the quantum measurement process, where observation reduces possibilities and enables new forms of emergence.