The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic due to the measurement problem. The problem lies not with collapse per se, but with the appeal to measurement; a theory that could underwrite the collapse process without ineliminable reference to measurement would constitute a solution to the measurement problem. This is the strategy pursued by dynamical (or spontaneous) collapse theories. But dynamical collapse theories face a number of challenges. First, they make different empirical predictions from standard quantum mechanics, and hence are potentially empirically refutable. Second, there are difficulties reconciling the dynamical collapse mechanism with special relativity. Third, the post-collapse state is not the same as the post-measurement state of standard quantum mechanics, raising the possibility that dynamical collapse theories do not solve the measurement problem after all. Assuming that these challenges can be met, dynamical collapse theories can lay claim to being serious contenders for the correct description of the quantum world. And the description they provide has a number of interesting consequences. First, it makes indeterminism an irreducible fact about the physical world. It has been argued that this has important consequences for the foundations of statistical mechanics, for free will, and for consciousness. Second, many dynamical collapse theories can be taken to imply that the quantum wave function is fundamental, giving rise to a new kind of vagueness, since a wave can be fuzzy around the edges in a way that a particle cannot. Furthermore, the quantum wave function is defined over a high-dimensional space, not the three-dimensional space of experience, suggesting to some that three-dimensionality is an illusion.
The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic due to the measurement problem. The problem lies not with collapse per se, but with the appeal to measurement; a theory that could underwrite the collapse process without ineliminable reference to measurement would constitute a solution to the measurement problem. This is the strategy pursued by dynamical (or spontaneous) collapse theories. But dynamical collapse theories face a number of challenges. First, they make different empirical predictions from standard quantum mechanics, and hence are potentially empirically refutable. Second, there are difficulties reconciling the dynamical collapse mechanism with special relativity. Third, the post-collapse state is not the same as the post-measurement state of standard quantum mechanics, raising the possibility that dynamical collapse theories do not solve the measurement problem after all. Assuming that these challenges can be met, dynamical collapse theories can lay claim to being serious contenders for the correct description of the quantum world. And the description they provide has a number of interesting consequences. First, it makes indeterminism an irreducible fact about the physical world. It has been argued that this has important consequences for the foundations of statistical mechanics, for free will, and for consciousness. Second, many dynamical collapse theories can be taken to imply that the quantum wave function is fundamental, giving rise to a new kind of vagueness, since a wave can be fuzzy around the edges in a way that a particle cannot. Furthermore, the quantum wave function is defined over a high-dimensional space, not the three-dimensional space of experience, suggesting to some that three-dimensionality is an illusion.
The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic. In standard presentations of the theory, the state of a system prior to a measurement is a sum of terms, with one term representing each possible outcome of the measurement. Many dynamical collapse theories imply that the quantum wavefunction is fundamental, and that particles are just a temporary “bunching up” of the fundamental wave-like entity. Quantum mechanics is often taken to be an indeterministic theory. Quantum mechanics represents the state of a system in various ways, but the representation that is most perspicuous for understanding collapse theories uses a wavefunction. Consistency with special relativity is, therefore, a problem for dynamical collapse theories, but perhaps not an insuperable one. Some have argued that the wavefunction needs to be supplemented to counteract the effects of the novel quantum vagueness introduced by dynamical collapse theories. The ontological consequences of dynamical collapse theories remain an area of active debate.
The postulate of the collapse of the wave-function stands between the microscopic, quantum world, and the macroscopic world. Because of this intermediate position, the collapse process cannot be examined with the formalism of the quantum mechanics (QM), neither with that of classical mechanics. This fact makes some physicists propose interpretations of QM, which avoid this postulate. However, the common procedure used in that is making assumptions incompatible with the QM formalism. The present work discusses the most popular interpretations. It is shown that because of such assumptions those interpretations fail, i.e. predict for some experiments results which differ from the QM predictions. Despite that, special attention is called to a proposal of S. Gao, the only one which addresses and tries to solve an obvious and major contradiction. A couple of theorems are proved for showing that the collapse postulate is necessary in the QM. Although non-explainable with the quantum formalism, this postulate cannot be denied, otherwise one comes to conclusions which disagree with the QM. It is also proved here that the idea of “collapse at a distance” is problematic especially in relativistic cases, and is a misunderstanding. Namely, in an entanglement of two quantum systems, assuming that the measurement of one of the systems (accompanied by collapse of that system on one of its states) collapses the other systems, too without the second system being measured, which leads to a contradiction.
ABSTRACT This essay aims at reviewing one of the major difficulties affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, that is, the well‐known measurement problem. As it will be explained, the latter originates as a consequence of the quantum theory's postulates. Referring to this, we analyze in particular the conceptual issues implied by the projection (or collapse) rule. After having presented the measurement problem, we then illustrate three possible solutions offered by major interpretations of/alternatives to quantum theory: Bohmian mechanics, Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theories, and the many‐worlds interpretation. As the reader will see, these theoretical frameworks solve this issue by virtue of their unambiguous ontologies and consistent dynamical laws. Finally, a synopsis of the open debates and future perspectives concerning the measurement problem in relativistic contexts concludes the paper.
The postulate of the collapse of the wave function stands between the microscopic, quantum world, and the macroscopic world. Because of this intermediate position, the collapse process cannot be examined with the formalism of the quantum mechanics (QM), neither with that of classical mechanics. This fact makes some physicists to propose interpretations of QM, which avoid this postulate. However, the common procedure used in that, is making assumptions incompatible with the QM formalism. The present work discusses the most popular interpretations. It is shown that because of such assumptions those interpretations fail, i.e. predict for some experiments results which differ from the QM predictions. Despite of that, special attention is called to a proposal of S. Gao, the only one which addresses and tries to solve an obvious and major contradiction. A couple of theorems are proved for showing that the collapse postulate is necessary in the QM. Although nonexplainable with the quantum formalism this postulate cannot be denied, otherwise one comes to conclusions which disagree with the QM. It is also proved here that the idea of collapse at a distance is problematic especially in relativistic cases, and is a misunderstanding. Namely, in an entanglement of two quantum systems, assuming that the measurement of one of the systems (accompanied by collapse of that system on one of its states) collapses the other system too without the second system being measured, leads to a contradiction.
This is the first single volume about the collapse theories of quantum mechanics, which is becoming a very active field of research in both physics and philosophy. In standard quantum mechanics, it is postulated that when the wave function of a quantum system is measured, it no longer follows the Schrödinger equation, but instantaneously and randomly collapses to one of the wave functions that correspond to definite measurement results. However, why and how a definite measurement result appears is unknown. A promising solution to this problem are collapse theories in which the collapse of the wave function is spontaneous and dynamical. Chapters written by distinguished physicists and philosophers of physics discuss the origin and implications of wave-function collapse, the controversies around collapse models and their ontologies, and new arguments for the reality of wave function collapse. This is an invaluable resource for students and researchers interested in the philosophy of physics and foundations of quantum mechanics.
We present the quantum measurement problem as a serious physics problem. Serious because without a resolution, quantum theory is not complete, as it does not tell how one should - in principle - perform measurements. It is physical in the sense that the solution will bring new physics, i.e. new testable predictions, hence it is not merely a matter of interpretation of a frozen formalism. I argue that the two popular ways around the measurement problem, many-worlds and Bohmian-like mechanics, do, de facto, introduce effective collapses when "I" interact with the quantum system. Hence, surprisingly, in many-worlds and Bohmian mechanics, the "I" plays a more active role than in alternative models, like e.g. collapse models. Finally, I argue that either there are several kinds of stuffs out there, i.e. physical dualism, some stuff that respects the superposition principle and some that doesn't, or there are special configurations of atoms and photons for which the superposition principle breaks down. Or, and this I argue is the most promising, the dynamics has to be modified, i.e. in the form of a stochastic Schrödinger equation.