The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic. In standard presentations of the theory, the state of a system prior to a measurement is a sum of terms, with one term representing each possible outcome of the measurement. Many dynamical collapse theories imply that the quantum wavefunction is fundamental, and that particles are just a temporary “bunching up” of the fundamental wave-like entity. Quantum mechanics is often taken to be an indeterministic theory. Quantum mechanics represents the state of a system in various ways, but the representation that is most perspicuous for understanding collapse theories uses a wavefunction. Consistency with special relativity is, therefore, a problem for dynamical collapse theories, but perhaps not an insuperable one. Some have argued that the wavefunction needs to be supplemented to counteract the effects of the novel quantum vagueness introduced by dynamical collapse theories. The ontological consequences of dynamical collapse theories remain an area of active debate.
The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic. In standard presentations of the theory, the state of a system prior to a measurement is a sum of terms, with one term representing each possible outcome of the measurement. Many dynamical collapse theories imply that the quantum wavefunction is fundamental, and that particles are just a temporary “bunching up” of the fundamental wave-like entity. Quantum mechanics is often taken to be an indeterministic theory. Quantum mechanics represents the state of a system in various ways, but the representation that is most perspicuous for understanding collapse theories uses a wavefunction. Consistency with special relativity is, therefore, a problem for dynamical collapse theories, but perhaps not an insuperable one. Some have argued that the wavefunction needs to be supplemented to counteract the effects of the novel quantum vagueness introduced by dynamical collapse theories. The ontological consequences of dynamical collapse theories remain an area of active debate.
The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic due to the measurement problem. The problem lies not with collapse per se, but with the appeal to measurement; a theory that could underwrite the collapse process without ineliminable reference to measurement would constitute a solution to the measurement problem. This is the strategy pursued by dynamical (or spontaneous) collapse theories. But dynamical collapse theories face a number of challenges. First, they make different empirical predictions from standard quantum mechanics, and hence are potentially empirically refutable. Second, there are difficulties reconciling the dynamical collapse mechanism with special relativity. Third, the post-collapse state is not the same as the post-measurement state of standard quantum mechanics, raising the possibility that dynamical collapse theories do not solve the measurement problem after all. Assuming that these challenges can be met, dynamical collapse theories can lay claim to being serious contenders for the correct description of the quantum world. And the description they provide has a number of interesting consequences. First, it makes indeterminism an irreducible fact about the physical world. It has been argued that this has important consequences for the foundations of statistical mechanics, for free will, and for consciousness. Second, many dynamical collapse theories can be taken to imply that the quantum wave function is fundamental, giving rise to a new kind of vagueness, since a wave can be fuzzy around the edges in a way that a particle cannot. Furthermore, the quantum wave function is defined over a high-dimensional space, not the three-dimensional space of experience, suggesting to some that three-dimensionality is an illusion.
Recalling the state of the art in the interpretation of quantum physics, this paper emphasizes that one cannot simply add a collapse parameter to the Schrödinger equation in order to solve the measurement problem. If one does so, one is also committed to a primitive ontology of a configuration of matter in physical space in order to have something in the ontology that constitutes the determinate measurement outcomes. The paper then argues that in the light of this consequence, the collapse postulate loses its attractiveness in comparison to an ontology of persisting particles moving on continuous trajectories according to a deterministic law.
This is the first single volume about the collapse theories of quantum mechanics, which is becoming a very active field of research in both physics and philosophy. In standard quantum mechanics, it is postulated that when the wave function of a quantum system is measured, it no longer follows the Schrödinger equation, but instantaneously and randomly collapses to one of the wave functions that correspond to definite measurement results. However, why and how a definite measurement result appears is unknown. A promising solution to this problem are collapse theories in which the collapse of the wave function is spontaneous and dynamical. Chapters written by distinguished physicists and philosophers of physics discuss the origin and implications of wave-function collapse, the controversies around collapse models and their ontologies, and new arguments for the reality of wave function collapse. This is an invaluable resource for students and researchers interested in the philosophy of physics and foundations of quantum mechanics.
The quantum measurement problem remains a central unresolved issue in theoretical physics, arising from the incompatibility between unitary quantum dynamics and the emergence of definite measurement outcomes. Closely related is the question of the physical status of the wavefunction within contemporary quantum theory. This review critically surveys leading approaches to the measurement problem, focusing on their formal consistency, physical assumptions, and empirical implications. We examine the standard measurement framework, the role of environment-induced decoherence and quantum Darwinism, and the restrictions imposed by no-go theorems such as Bell, Kochen–Specker, and Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph. Interpretations including Everettian many-worlds, Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse models, relational quantum mechanics, QBist approaches, and Copenhagen-type frameworks are assessed in terms of their ability to account for classical definiteness without sacrificing empirical adequacy. We also review experimental efforts probing macroscopic superpositions and collapse dynamics. The analysis indicates that, despite its predictive success, quantum theory lacks a complete physical account of outcome selection. This suggests that the measurement problem reflects a fundamental structural limitation of current theory, motivating either new physical principles or a redefinition of the wavefunction’s ontological role.
ABSTRACT This essay aims at reviewing one of the major difficulties affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, that is, the well‐known measurement problem. As it will be explained, the latter originates as a consequence of the quantum theory's postulates. Referring to this, we analyze in particular the conceptual issues implied by the projection (or collapse) rule. After having presented the measurement problem, we then illustrate three possible solutions offered by major interpretations of/alternatives to quantum theory: Bohmian mechanics, Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theories, and the many‐worlds interpretation. As the reader will see, these theoretical frameworks solve this issue by virtue of their unambiguous ontologies and consistent dynamical laws. Finally, a synopsis of the open debates and future perspectives concerning the measurement problem in relativistic contexts concludes the paper.
Quantum physics provides us with a formalism with which we can try to understand the microscopic world. However, the underpinning concepts of the basic principles of quantum mechanics itself are surprisingly ill understood. Even the ubiquitous concept of the wavefunction collapsing post measurement, lives outside the formal theory of quantum mechanics and must be taken as a postulate. The Schr\"odinger equation, which governs the evolution of quantum systems, does not describe the system during the measurement process. This is referred to as the measurement problem, and has been debated since the inception of quantum theory. Many different interpretations of quantum mechanics try to elucidate what happens during wavefunction collapse, such as the famous many-worlds interpretation. However, these interpretations either give rise to the same physical outcome or simply are not testable, and so cannot be physically differentiated from one another. We attempt to gain insight into the measurement problem through experiments involving sequential measurements, both in the weak and strong regime. We find surprising outcomes such as the persistence of time-ordering asymmetry in the weak measurement limit, and the survival of coherence in the strong measurement limit.