Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Cluster Computing

Cryptanalysis of lattice-based key exchange on small integer solution problem and its improvement

Zhengjun Jing, Chunsheng Gu, Zhimin Yu, Peizhong Shi, Chongzhi Gao

Published Mar 5, 2018• 14 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10586-018-2293-x

Related papers

Lattice-based key exchange on small integer solution problem

Shanbiao Wang, Yan Zhu, Di Ma +1 more

Science China Information Sciences•Sep 17, 2014•56 citations

Cryptanalysis of Wang et al.’s lattice-based key exchange protocol

Daya Sagar Gupta, G. P. Biswas

Wang et al. proposed a new hard problem on lattices which is an extension of the small integer solution (SIS) on lattices. This new generated hard problem is named to be bilateral in-homogeneous small integer solution (Bi-ISIS). Using the hardness of Bi-ISIS, Wang et al. proposed a new key exchange protocol, which is based on the lattice-based cryptography. In this paper, we signalize that Wang et al.’s lattice-based key exchange protocol is vulnerable to an attack, namely, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Through this attack, Eavesdropper can intercept the authenticated messages and communicate the unauthentic messages among the communicating parties.

Perspectives in Science•Apr 30, 2016•22 citations

An Analysis of Lattice-Based Key Exchange Protocols

Susanne Rieß

•Feb 1, 2016•0 citations

a key exchange scheme based on lattice

Wulu Li

We construct a key exchange scheme with session key security and Alice's privacy, assuming the hardness of "small integer solution" (SIS) problem and "learning with errors" (LWE) problem, which have worst-case to average-case reductions from lattice problems. Our key exchange scheme is the first lattice-based key exchange scheme with provable security. Moreover, our scheme can be modified to be secure under impersonation attack by adding an authentication step, also, it can be modified to be more efficient using a new variant of LWE.

IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress (DASC/PiCom/CBDCom/CyberSciTech)•Dec 1, 2013•2 citations

An Analysis of Lattice-Based Cryptography with Existing Protocols

Atul Chaturvedi, Anand Ballabh Joshi, Sonam Yadav

Algorithms for intelligent systems•Jan 1, 2025•0 citations

Cryptanalysis of Post-Quantum Security Schemes Based on the Hardness of the Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS) Problem

An Braeken, Awaneesh Kumar Yadav

With the rise of new advancements in quantum computing, more attention is given to the development of post-quantum security primitives and protocols. Recently, several authentication, key agreement and signature schemes relying on the hardness of the Inhomogeneous Small Inter Solution (ISIS) and its variants have been defined in literature. The advantage of these schemes is that they are simple, easy to implement and possess a reasonable communication and computation cost, compared to other post-quantum alternatives. Unfortunately, we show serious attacks on six different categories of these schemes, corresponding with more than ten publications in recent highly reputed journals. These vulnerabilities pose serious risks to consumer electronics, including IoT devices, smart home systems, and wearable technologies, where secure communication and authentication are vital. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities could lead to unauthorized access, device tampering, and data breaches, significantly impacting user trust and device functionality. Finally, we discuss the feasibility of defining post-quantum secure key exchange protocols, based on the ISIS problem and propose a high level approach to derive secure post-quantum protocols.

IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics•Nov 17, 2025•1 citation
Wang et al. proposed a new hard problem on lattices which is an extension of the small integer solution (SIS) on lattices. This new generated hard problem is named to be bilateral in-homogeneous small integer solution (Bi-ISIS). Using the hardness of Bi-ISIS, Wang et al. proposed a new key exchange protocol, which is based on the lattice-based cryptography. In this paper, we signalize that Wang et al.’s lattice-based key exchange protocol is vulnerable to an attack, namely, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Through this attack, Eavesdropper can intercept the authenticated messages and communicate the unauthentic messages among the communicating parties.
We construct a key exchange scheme with session key security and Alice's privacy, assuming the hardness of "small integer solution" (SIS) problem and "learning with errors" (LWE) problem, which have worst-case to average-case reductions from lattice problems. Our key exchange scheme is the first lattice-based key exchange scheme with provable security. Moreover, our scheme can be modified to be secure under impersonation attack by adding an authentication step, also, it can be modified to be more efficient using a new variant of LWE.
With the rise of new advancements in quantum computing, more attention is given to the development of post-quantum security primitives and protocols. Recently, several authentication, key agreement and signature schemes relying on the hardness of the Inhomogeneous Small Inter Solution (ISIS) and its variants have been defined in literature. The advantage of these schemes is that they are simple, easy to implement and possess a reasonable communication and computation cost, compared to other post-quantum alternatives. Unfortunately, we show serious attacks on six different categories of these schemes, corresponding with more than ten publications in recent highly reputed journals. These vulnerabilities pose serious risks to consumer electronics, including IoT devices, smart home systems, and wearable technologies, where secure communication and authentication are vital. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities could lead to unauthorized access, device tampering, and data breaches, significantly impacting user trust and device functionality. Finally, we discuss the feasibility of defining post-quantum secure key exchange protocols, based on the ISIS problem and propose a high level approach to derive secure post-quantum protocols.