An Analysis of Lattice-Based Key Exchange Protocols

Nina Bindel, Johannes A Buchmann, Susanne Rieß

Weiqiang Wen, Wang Li-bin

Sonika Singh, Sahadeo Padhye

Seyedamirhossein Hesamian

Lattice-based cryptographic primitives are believed to offer resilience against attacks by quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key-exchange protocols based on hard problems in lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem.\nIn this work we present an analysis of Ring-LWE based key-exchange mechanisms and compare two implementations of Ring-LWE based key-exchange protocol: BCNS and NewHope. This is important as NewHope protocol implementation outperforms state-of-the art elliptic curve based Diffie-Hellman key-exchange X25519, thus showing that using quantum safe key-exchange is not only a viable option but also a faster one. Specifically, this thesis compares different reconciliation methods, parameter choices, noise sampling algorithms and performance.

Atul Chaturvedi, Anand Ballabh Joshi, Sonam Yadav

Yun Song, Songhui Guo, Ruiyang Ding

As the security of password authenticated key exchange protocols based on traditional public key cryptosystems is threatened by quantum computing, the research on password authenticated key exchange protocols that can resist quantum computing attacks has become a hot spot of current research. At present, the anonymity of anonymous PAKE protocol is generally linkable, and cannot completely protect the user’s identity privacy information. This paper proposes a two-party password authenticated key exchange protocol with anonymity based on SPHF from ideal lattice, and gives a strict security proofunder the BPR model. The security and performance analysis proves that the proposed protocol has good advantages in communication costs and security.