Wang et al. proposed a new hard problem on lattices which is an extension of the small integer solution (SIS) on lattices. This new generated hard problem is named to be bilateral in-homogeneous small integer solution (Bi-ISIS). Using the hardness of Bi-ISIS, Wang et al. proposed a new key exchange protocol, which is based on the lattice-based cryptography. In this paper, we signalize that Wang et al.’s lattice-based key exchange protocol is vulnerable to an attack, namely, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Through this attack, Eavesdropper can intercept the authenticated messages and communicate the unauthentic messages among the communicating parties.
Wang et al. proposed a new hard problem on lattices which is an extension of the small integer solution (SIS) on lattices. This new generated hard problem is named to be bilateral in-homogeneous small integer solution (Bi-ISIS). Using the hardness of Bi-ISIS, Wang et al. proposed a new key exchange protocol, which is based on the lattice-based cryptography. In this paper, we signalize that Wang et al.’s lattice-based key exchange protocol is vulnerable to an attack, namely, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Through this attack, Eavesdropper can intercept the authenticated messages and communicate the unauthentic messages among the communicating parties.
With the rise of new advancements in quantum computing, more attention is given to the development of post-quantum security primitives and protocols. Recently, several authentication, key agreement and signature schemes relying on the hardness of the Inhomogeneous Small Inter Solution (ISIS) and its variants have been defined in literature. The advantage of these schemes is that they are simple, easy to implement and possess a reasonable communication and computation cost, compared to other post-quantum alternatives. Unfortunately, we show serious attacks on six different categories of these schemes, corresponding with more than ten publications in recent highly reputed journals. These vulnerabilities pose serious risks to consumer electronics, including IoT devices, smart home systems, and wearable technologies, where secure communication and authentication are vital. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities could lead to unauthorized access, device tampering, and data breaches, significantly impacting user trust and device functionality. Finally, we discuss the feasibility of defining post-quantum secure key exchange protocols, based on the ISIS problem and propose a high level approach to derive secure post-quantum protocols.
The proliferation of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices, coupled with their computational constraints, has necessitated robust authenticated key exchange mechanisms to secure communications. To address this issue, Gupta recently introduced a lattice-based lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol, PiLike, in the IEEE Systems Journal. Despite rigorous security proofs being provided, our cryptanalysis unveils a critical vulnerability in their scheme which may cause impersonation attacks. Specifically, in the private key extraction phase, an adversary can leverage secret information obtained during registration to impersonate legitimate users, successfully negotiating session keys while evading detection. In addition to the theoretical analysis, a corresponding concrete experiment was also conducted, showing that the adversary has a 100% success rate in breaking the required security claimed in PiLike. Our findings underscore the urgency to address PiLike's vulnerabilities, ensuring its reliability in safeguarding IIoT communications against conventional and quantum threats.
A key exchange protocol is an important primitive in the field of information and network security and is used to exchange a common secret key among various parties. A number of key exchange protocols exist in the literature and most of them are based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem. But, these DH type protocols cannot resist to the modern computing technologies like quantum computing, grid computing etc. Therefore, a more powerful non-DH type key exchange protocol is required which could resist the quantum and exponential attacks. In the year 2013, Lei and Liao, thus proposed a lattice-based key exchange protocol. Their protocol was related to the NTRU-ENCRYPT and NTRU-SIGN and so, was referred as NTRU-KE. In this paper, we identify that NTRU-KE lacks the authentication mechanism and suffers from the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. This attack may lead to the forging the authenticated users and exchanging the wrong key.
By using trapdoor functions with preimage sampling,lattice's growth,and lattice basis randomization in the bonsai tree,a lattice-based proxy signature scheme was proposed.The security of the proxy signature is based on the hardness of average-case SIS(Small Integer Solution) and ISIS(Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution).It is also existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack in the random oracle.Compared with the schemes based on factoring or discrete log,the public and secret keys of our scheme are larger,but it requires only linear operation on small integers.
We construct a key exchange scheme with session key security and Alice's privacy, assuming the hardness of "small integer solution" (SIS) problem and "learning with errors" (LWE) problem, which have worst-case to average-case reductions from lattice problems. Our key exchange scheme is the first lattice-based key exchange scheme with provable security. Moreover, our scheme can be modified to be secure under impersonation attack by adding an authentication step, also, it can be modified to be more efficient using a new variant of LWE.
In this paper, we have proposed a two-party authenticated key establishment (AKE), and authenticated key transport protocols based on lattice-based cryptography, aiming to provide security against quantum attacks for secure communication. This protocol enables two parties, who may share long-term public keys, to securely establish a shared session key, and transportation of the session key from the server while achieving mutual authentication. Our construction leverages the hardness of lattice problems Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE), ensuring robustness against quantum and classical adversaries. Unlike traditional schemes whose security depends upon number-theoretic assumptions being vulnerable to quantum attacks, our protocol ensures security in the post-quantum era. The proposed protocol ensures forward secrecy, and provides security even if the long-term key is compromised. This protocol also provides essential property key freshness and resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and key mismatch attacks. On the other hand, the proposed key transport protocol provides essential property key freshness, anonymity, and resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and key mismatch attacks. A two-party key transport protocol is a cryptographic protocol in which one party (typically a trusted key distribution center or sender) securely generates and sends a session key to another party. Unlike key exchange protocols (where both parties contribute to key generation), key transport protocols rely on one party to generate the key and deliver it securely. The protocol possesses a minimum number of exchanged messages and can reduce the number of communication rounds to help minimize the communication overhead.