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IEEE photonics journal

Ciphertext-Only Attack on Phase-Shifting Interferometery-Based Encryption

Tuo Li, Zongcheng Miao, Yishi Shi

Published Aug 29, 2017• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The phase-shifting interferometry-based (PSI-based) encryption is one of most typical optical encryption systems. In this paper, we demonstrate a new approach to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on PSI-based encryption, revealing that there is serious security risk in PSI-based encryption. With the proposed COA approach, an opponent can crack the ciphertexts directly without use of the keys of the system. This demonstration, as far as our best knowledge, shows the PSI technique is vulnerable to COA for the first time. A series of attack results are shown to demonstrate the feasibility and robustness of the attack method. Our study reveals a critical security issue that should be taken in to account when designing an optical information security system.

DOI
10.1109/jphot.2017.2743060

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The phase-shifting interferometry-based (PSI-based) encryption is one of most typical optical encryption systems. In this paper, we demonstrate a new approach to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on PSI-based encryption, revealing that there is serious security risk in PSI-based encryption. With the proposed COA approach, an opponent can crack the ciphertexts directly without use of the keys of the system. This demonstration, as far as our best knowledge, shows the PSI technique is vulnerable to COA for the first time. A series of attack results are shown to demonstrate the feasibility and robustness of the attack method. Our study reveals a critical security issue that should be taken in to account when designing an optical information security system.
The optical cryptosystem based on phase-shifting interferometry (PSI) is one of the most interesting optical cryptographic schemes in recent years. However, we find that the PSI technique provides an attractive method to record the ciphertext, but contributes little to the security level of the cryptosystem. From the cryptanalysis point of view, in a certain simplified case, an attacker is only required to crack two equivalent decryption keys instead of the original random phase keys and geometric key. Moreover, a chosen-plaintext attack method is proposed, in which an impulse function is chosen as a known plaintext. By using this attack, the attacker can effectively recover any plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext. The validity of the attack is verified by computer simulations.
Security analysis of optical encryption system based on double random phase encoding indicates that the system can be classified as a linear symmetric block-cipher cryptosystem, which may lead to a great vulnerability. Under the ciphertext-only attack (COA), an opponent can attack such a cryptosystem only on the basis of estimated support of wave function in the object plane with iterative phase retrieval methods, and subsequently deduce the phase keys in the Fourier plane easily. The ciphertext-only attack (COA) requires much less resources than other types of attacks. Estimated support of wave function in the object plane could have some translations relative to the true support, so retrieved wave function could also have translations in both the amplitude and the phase, leading to a translation of retrieved plaintext relative to original plaintext. However, attackers can take this translation as a priori knowledge to traverse estimated support in the object plane until finding the best estimated keys, which bring about the best decryption quality.
The speckle correlation technique is applied to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on optical cryptosystem based on double random phase encoding. According to the inherent merits of speckle correlation, we have revealed a fact that the ciphertext’s autocorrelation is essentially identical to the plaintext’s own autocorrelation. Then, a plaintext image can be directly reconstructed from the autocorrelation of its corresponding ciphertext by employing a iterate phase-retrieval algorithm. This could then lead to a potential security flaw because an unauthorized user could directly retrieve the plaintext from an intercepted ciphertext by performing proposed COA approach. Meanwhile, a series of numerical simulations will also be provided to verify the validity and feasibility of our proposed COA method.
Optical techniques have boosted a new class of cryptographic systems with some remarkable advantages, and optical encryption not only has spurred practical developments but also has brought a new insight into cryptography. However, this does not mean that it is elusive for the opponents to attack optical encryption systems. In this paper, for the first time to our knowledge, we experimentally demonstrate the machine-learning attacks on interference-based optical encryption. Using machine-learning models that are trained by a series of ciphertext-plaintext pairs, an unauthorized person is capable to retrieve the unknown plaintexts from the given ciphertexts without the usage of various different optical encryption keys existing in interference-based optical encryption. In comparison with conventional cryptanalytic methods, the proposed machine-learning-based attacking method can estimate transfer function or point spread function of interference-based optical encryption systems without subsidiary conditions. Simulations and optical experiments demonstrate feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method, and the proposed machine-learning-based attacking method provides a versatile approach to analyzing the vulnerability of interference-based optical encryption.
A ciphertext-only attack (COA) on a joint transform correlator (JTC) encryption system is proposed. From the perspective view of optical cryptanalysis, we find out that the issue to be solved in the COA scheme could be transferred into a phase retrieval problem with single intensity measurement. And in this paper, the hybrid input-output (HIO) algorithm is employed to handle this issue with the help of an inartificial signal domain support and a given frequency domain constraint. Meanwhile, we provide a set of numerical simulations to demonstrate the validity and feasibility of the presented method.