Applied Optics

Analytic known-plaintext attack on a phase-shifting interferometry-based cryptosystem

Tuo Li, Yali Wang, Jun Zhang, Yishi Shi

Published Jan 7, 2015• 11 citations

Abstract

We demonstrate a new analytic approach to a known-plaintext attack (KPA) on an optical cryptosystem based on the phase-shifting interferometry (PSI) technique. With the proposed analytic attack method, an opponent can access the exact decryption keys and obtain perfect attack results. This demonstration, to the best of our knowledge, shows for the first time that the optical cryptosystem based on the PSI technique is vulnerable to KPA.

DOI: 10.1364/ao.54.000306

Related papers

Vulnerability to chosen-plaintext attack of optoelectronic information encryption with phase-shifting interferometry

Wan Qin, Xiang Peng, Xiangfeng Meng +1 more

The optical cryptosystem based on phase-shifting interferometry (PSI) is one of the most interesting optical cryptographic schemes in recent years. However, we find that the PSI technique provides an attractive method to record the ciphertext, but contributes little to the security level of the cryptosystem. From the cryptanalysis point of view, in a certain simplified case, an attacker is only required to crack two equivalent decryption keys instead of the original random phase keys and geometric key. Moreover, a chosen-plaintext attack method is proposed, in which an impulse function is chosen as a known plaintext. By using this attack, the attacker can effectively recover any plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext. The validity of the attack is verified by computer simulations.

Optical EngineeringJun 1, 201119 citations

Ciphertext-Only Attack on Phase-Shifting Interferometery-Based Encryption

Tuo Li, Zongcheng Miao, Yishi Shi

The phase-shifting interferometry-based (PSI-based) encryption is one of most typical optical encryption systems. In this paper, we demonstrate a new approach to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on PSI-based encryption, revealing that there is serious security risk in PSI-based encryption. With the proposed COA approach, an opponent can crack the ciphertexts directly without use of the keys of the system. This demonstration, as far as our best knowledge, shows the PSI technique is vulnerable to COA for the first time. A series of attack results are shown to demonstrate the feasibility and robustness of the attack method. Our study reveals a critical security issue that should be taken in to account when designing an optical information security system.

IEEE photonics journalAug 29, 20174 citations

Hybrid plaintext attack for a cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique

Y. Xiong, Jie Gu, Ravi Kumar

In this paper, the security strength of an enhanced cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is evaluated. The security strength of the optical cryptosystem was improved through the phase-retrieval technique used to generate a phase-only mask (POM) as the ciphertext. Due to the complex mathematical model of the phase-retrieval technique, it seems that a silhouette problem existing in the conventional interference-based scheme was removed. However, we noted that the random phase mask (RPM) regarded as the only private key was fixed in the encryption path, which is not related to the plaintext and makes it possible to be recovered using a known-plaintext attack (KPA). Moreover, we also found that the RPM has high key sensitivity, and it should be recovered precisely to retrieve information of plaintexts during the attack. Thus, a hybrid KPA where three pairs of known plaintexts and their ciphertexts are regarded as the amplitude and phase constraints to obtain the precise estimation of the RPM is proposed. Then, with the help of the estimated private key, information of the original plaintexts encoded using the cryptosystem under study could be retrieved from an arbitrarily given ciphertext without any knowledge of the private key. Our cryptoanalysis shows that the cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is vulnerable to the proposed attack, and there is a security leak in it. Numerical simulations have been carried out to demonstrate the performance of our proposed attack.

Applied OpticsMay 9, 20234 citations

Known-plaintext attack on optical encryption based on double random phase keys

Xiang Peng, Peng Zhang, Hengzheng Wei +1 more

We demonstrate a new approach to known-plaintext attack on an optical encryption scheme based on double random phase keys. With this attack an opponent can access both random phase keys with the help of the phase retrieval technique. This demonstration shows that an optical encryption scheme based on double random encoding is vulnerable to known-plaintext attack.

Optics LettersMar 29, 2006704 citations

Hybrid attack for the optical cryptosystem based on interference and additional fixed phase masks

Yi Xiong, Jiashuai Liu, Hongjie Xu +1 more

This paper presents a security analysis of the optical image encryption scheme based on interference and fixed phase masks. Unlike the traditional interference-based scheme, which uses only one phase-only mask (POMs) generated during the encryption process as the private key, the improved system incorporates fixed phase masks as the additional private keys. While it appears that the security strength of the interference-based scheme is enhanced by expanding the key space, our analysis reveals that these fixed phase masks are independent of the plaintext and can be recovered through a known-plaintext attack (KPA). Once these additional private keys are obtained, the number of unknown private keys is reduced to one, allowing the plaintext information encrypted by the improved interference-based scheme to be recovered from any arbitrarily given ciphertexts without any knowledge of the private key. To show the vulnerability of this cryptosystem, we propose a hybrid attack combining the KPA and ciphertext-only attack (COA) which can break the improved interference-based cryptosystem. Numerical simulations have been performed to confirm the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed hybrid attack.

Applied OpticsDec 9, 20251 citation

Hybrid attack on an optical cryptosystem based on phase-truncated Fourier transforms and a random amplitude mask

Y. Xiong, A. He, Chenggen Quan

In this paper, the security of a cryptosystem based on phase-truncated Fourier transforms (PTFTs) and a random amplitude mask (RAM) is evaluated. In the cryptosystem, fake keys used as encryption keys in the second PTFT-based structure are generated by the first PTFT-based structure in which the RAM is encoded by random phase masks (RPMs) used as public keys. Compared to the classical PTFT-based encryption scheme, the security level of the cryptosystem is improved by using cascaded PTFTs to encode the encryption keys and the plaintext simultaneously. However, it is found that a known plaintext-ciphertext pair can provide enough constraints in the iterative process to retrieve the fake keys, which then can be used to retrieve unknown arbitrary plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext. Based on the analysis, we propose a specific attack based on hybrid iterative processes to break the cryptosystem. Two iterative processes with different constraints are involved in the proposed attack. The first known-plaintext-attack (KPA)-based iterative process is used to retrieve two fake keys with the help of two public keys and a known plaintext-ciphertext pair, while the second amplitude-phase retrieval algorithm-based iterative process with a median filter is employed to retrieve the plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext using two retrieval fake keys. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that the cryptosystem is attacked by the KPA-based iterative algorithm successfully. Numerical simulation results validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed attack.

Applied OpticsJul 12, 201832 citations