Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Optical Engineering

Vulnerability to chosen-plaintext attack of optoelectronic information encryption with phase-shifting interferometry

Wan Qin, Xiang Peng, Xiangfeng Meng, Bruce Zhi Gao

Published Jun 1, 2011• 19 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The optical cryptosystem based on phase-shifting interferometry (PSI) is one of the most interesting optical cryptographic schemes in recent years. However, we find that the PSI technique provides an attractive method to record the ciphertext, but contributes little to the security level of the cryptosystem. From the cryptanalysis point of view, in a certain simplified case, an attacker is only required to crack two equivalent decryption keys instead of the original random phase keys and geometric key. Moreover, a chosen-plaintext attack method is proposed, in which an impulse function is chosen as a known plaintext. By using this attack, the attacker can effectively recover any plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext. The validity of the attack is verified by computer simulations.

DOI
10.1117/1.3590725

Related papers

Analytic known-plaintext attack on a phase-shifting interferometry-based cryptosystem

Tuo Li, Yali Wang, Jun Zhang +1 more

We demonstrate a new analytic approach to a known-plaintext attack (KPA) on an optical cryptosystem based on the phase-shifting interferometry (PSI) technique. With the proposed analytic attack method, an opponent can access the exact decryption keys and obtain perfect attack results. This demonstration, to the best of our knowledge, shows for the first time that the optical cryptosystem based on the PSI technique is vulnerable to KPA.

Applied Optics•Jan 7, 2015•11 citations

Chosen-plaintext attack on lensless double-random phase encoding in the Fresnel domain

Xiang Peng, Hengzheng Wei, Peng Zhang

We demonstrate a method of chosen-plaintext attack on lensless double-random phase encoding (L-DRPE) in the Fresnel domain. With this attack an opponent can access two encryption keys with help of the impulse functions as chosen plaintexts. This shows that a lensless optical encryption scheme based on DRPE is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attack. Cryptoanalysis also indicates that the security worry originates from the linearity of the encryption and decryption mechanism of the L-DRPE scheme. One of the interesting features of the proposed attack is that the decryption process is lossless. Numerical simulations show good agreement with theoretical analysis.

Optics Letters•Oct 26, 2006•472 citations

Hybrid plaintext attack for a cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique

Y. Xiong, Jie Gu, Ravi Kumar

In this paper, the security strength of an enhanced cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is evaluated. The security strength of the optical cryptosystem was improved through the phase-retrieval technique used to generate a phase-only mask (POM) as the ciphertext. Due to the complex mathematical model of the phase-retrieval technique, it seems that a silhouette problem existing in the conventional interference-based scheme was removed. However, we noted that the random phase mask (RPM) regarded as the only private key was fixed in the encryption path, which is not related to the plaintext and makes it possible to be recovered using a known-plaintext attack (KPA). Moreover, we also found that the RPM has high key sensitivity, and it should be recovered precisely to retrieve information of plaintexts during the attack. Thus, a hybrid KPA where three pairs of known plaintexts and their ciphertexts are regarded as the amplitude and phase constraints to obtain the precise estimation of the RPM is proposed. Then, with the help of the estimated private key, information of the original plaintexts encoded using the cryptosystem under study could be retrieved from an arbitrarily given ciphertext without any knowledge of the private key. Our cryptoanalysis shows that the cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is vulnerable to the proposed attack, and there is a security leak in it. Numerical simulations have been carried out to demonstrate the performance of our proposed attack.

Applied Optics•May 9, 2023•4 citations

Ciphertext-Only Attack on Phase-Shifting Interferometery-Based Encryption

Tuo Li, Zongcheng Miao, Yishi Shi

The phase-shifting interferometry-based (PSI-based) encryption is one of most typical optical encryption systems. In this paper, we demonstrate a new approach to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on PSI-based encryption, revealing that there is serious security risk in PSI-based encryption. With the proposed COA approach, an opponent can crack the ciphertexts directly without use of the keys of the system. This demonstration, as far as our best knowledge, shows the PSI technique is vulnerable to COA for the first time. A series of attack results are shown to demonstrate the feasibility and robustness of the attack method. Our study reveals a critical security issue that should be taken in to account when designing an optical information security system.

IEEE photonics journal•Aug 29, 2017•4 citations

Known-plaintext attack on double phase encoding encryption technique

Peng Xiang, Peng Zhang, Wei Heng-Zheng +2 more

In the field of optical information security, the most attractive work is the so-called double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme proposed by Javidi. However, the security of this cryptosystem has not been analyzed thoroughly from the point of view of cryptoanalysis. In this article, the weakness of Javidi's optical security system is carefully analyzed with a known-plain text attack. It is shown that the double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme is a linear symmetric block cipher cryptosystem and its linearity opens avenues of attacks. Under the known-plaintext attack, attacker can obtain the phase key(s) in the input plane using the typical phase retrieval algorithms and subsequently deduce the phase key(s) in the Fourier domain easily. In addition, an optical implementation of known-plain text attack is also proposed.

Acta Physica Sinica•Jan 1, 2006•14 citations

Optical cryptanalysis of DRPE-based encryption systems

Wan Qin, Wenqi He, Xiangfeng Meng +1 more

In this paper, we analyze the security of the classical double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique in Fourier domain, as well as its extended schemes in Fresnel and fractional Fourier domains. These schemes are resistant to bruteforce attacks, for their large key spaces. However, due to the linearity property of their encryption transformations, they are vulnerable to other attacks, such as chosen-plaintext attack and known-plaintext attack. We successfully break each of the three encryption schemes with the help of a certain quantity of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Each attack is validated by computer simulations. The cryptanalysis indicates that, to minimize the risks, it is recommendable to introduce nonlinear operations to optical encryption systems.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Nov 4, 2009•6 citations
The optical cryptosystem based on phase-shifting interferometry (PSI) is one of the most interesting optical cryptographic schemes in recent years. However, we find that the PSI technique provides an attractive method to record the ciphertext, but contributes little to the security level of the cryptosystem. From the cryptanalysis point of view, in a certain simplified case, an attacker is only required to crack two equivalent decryption keys instead of the original random phase keys and geometric key. Moreover, a chosen-plaintext attack method is proposed, in which an impulse function is chosen as a known plaintext. By using this attack, the attacker can effectively recover any plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext. The validity of the attack is verified by computer simulations.
We demonstrate a method of chosen-plaintext attack on lensless double-random phase encoding (L-DRPE) in the Fresnel domain. With this attack an opponent can access two encryption keys with help of the impulse functions as chosen plaintexts. This shows that a lensless optical encryption scheme based on DRPE is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attack. Cryptoanalysis also indicates that the security worry originates from the linearity of the encryption and decryption mechanism of the L-DRPE scheme. One of the interesting features of the proposed attack is that the decryption process is lossless. Numerical simulations show good agreement with theoretical analysis.
In this paper, the security strength of an enhanced cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is evaluated. The security strength of the optical cryptosystem was improved through the phase-retrieval technique used to generate a phase-only mask (POM) as the ciphertext. Due to the complex mathematical model of the phase-retrieval technique, it seems that a silhouette problem existing in the conventional interference-based scheme was removed. However, we noted that the random phase mask (RPM) regarded as the only private key was fixed in the encryption path, which is not related to the plaintext and makes it possible to be recovered using a known-plaintext attack (KPA). Moreover, we also found that the RPM has high key sensitivity, and it should be recovered precisely to retrieve information of plaintexts during the attack. Thus, a hybrid KPA where three pairs of known plaintexts and their ciphertexts are regarded as the amplitude and phase constraints to obtain the precise estimation of the RPM is proposed. Then, with the help of the estimated private key, information of the original plaintexts encoded using the cryptosystem under study could be retrieved from an arbitrarily given ciphertext without any knowledge of the private key. Our cryptoanalysis shows that the cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is vulnerable to the proposed attack, and there is a security leak in it. Numerical simulations have been carried out to demonstrate the performance of our proposed attack.
The phase-shifting interferometry-based (PSI-based) encryption is one of most typical optical encryption systems. In this paper, we demonstrate a new approach to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on PSI-based encryption, revealing that there is serious security risk in PSI-based encryption. With the proposed COA approach, an opponent can crack the ciphertexts directly without use of the keys of the system. This demonstration, as far as our best knowledge, shows the PSI technique is vulnerable to COA for the first time. A series of attack results are shown to demonstrate the feasibility and robustness of the attack method. Our study reveals a critical security issue that should be taken in to account when designing an optical information security system.
In the field of optical information security, the most attractive work is the so-called double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme proposed by Javidi. However, the security of this cryptosystem has not been analyzed thoroughly from the point of view of cryptoanalysis. In this article, the weakness of Javidi's optical security system is carefully analyzed with a known-plain text attack. It is shown that the double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme is a linear symmetric block cipher cryptosystem and its linearity opens avenues of attacks. Under the known-plaintext attack, attacker can obtain the phase key(s) in the input plane using the typical phase retrieval algorithms and subsequently deduce the phase key(s) in the Fourier domain easily. In addition, an optical implementation of known-plain text attack is also proposed.
In this paper, we analyze the security of the classical double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique in Fourier domain, as well as its extended schemes in Fresnel and fractional Fourier domains. These schemes are resistant to bruteforce attacks, for their large key spaces. However, due to the linearity property of their encryption transformations, they are vulnerable to other attacks, such as chosen-plaintext attack and known-plaintext attack. We successfully break each of the three encryption schemes with the help of a certain quantity of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Each attack is validated by computer simulations. The cryptanalysis indicates that, to minimize the risks, it is recommendable to introduce nonlinear operations to optical encryption systems.