The concept of ‘Non-permissible experiments’ permeated the literature by Merzbacher as an articulation of Heisenberg’s Rules. Ample experiments in Modern Physics deem forbidden, but never the less, they do not violate the uncertainty relations. In contrast, recent ultrasonic time-of-flight experiments in condensed-matter channels, encounter violation of the uncertainty principle. Accordingly these agree with the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics, which does not support the uncertainty relations, and elaborated by the quantum theory of motion. This theory is expanded to account for ultrasound-phononic dispersion in condensed-matter channels.
The concept of ‘Non-permissible experiments’ permeated the literature by Merzbacher as an articulation of Heisenberg’s Rules. Ample experiments in Modern Physics deem forbidden, but never the less, they do not violate the uncertainty relations. In contrast, recent ultrasonic time-of-flight experiments in condensed-matter channels, encounter violation of the uncertainty principle. Accordingly these agree with the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics, which does not support the uncertainty relations, and elaborated by the quantum theory of motion. This theory is expanded to account for ultrasound-phononic dispersion in condensed-matter channels.
What is quantum theory? For much of the twentieth century, it was widely believed that the interpretation of quantum theory had been essentially settled by Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927. But not only were the ‘dissenters’ of 1927 – in particular de Broglie, Einstein and Schrödinger – unconvinced at the time: similar dissenting points of view are not uncommon even today. What Popper called ‘the schism in physics’ (Popper 1982) never really healed. Soon after 1927 it became standard to assert that matters of interpretation had been dealt with, but the sense of puzzlement and paradox surrounding quantum theory never disappeared. As the century wore on, many of the concerns and alternative viewpoints expressed in 1927 slowly but surely revived. In 1952, Bohm revived and extended de Broglie's theory (Bohm 1952a,b), and in 1993 the de Broglie–Bohm theory finally received textbook treatment as an alternative formulation of quantum theory (Bohm and Hiley 1993; Holland 1993). In 1957, Everett (1957) revived Schrödinger's view that the wave function, and the wave function alone, is real (albeit in a very novel sense), and the resulting ‘Everett’ or ‘many-worlds’ interpretation (DeWitt and Graham 1973) gradually won widespread support, especially among physicists interested in quantum gravity and quantum cosmology.
Interpreting quantum mechanics is a hard problem basically because it means explaining why and how the mathematics exploited to formulate wave-particle duality are related to observations or reality in classical physics (due to Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, gravity and entropy). Here, we first prove the limitation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle by invoking the wave-particle duality and apply it to revise and/or extend the Copenhagen postulates. In particular, even though the said uncertainty exists due to non-commuting operators, but these operators do not commute simply because one of the operators is well-defined in classical physics (particle-like), while the other is wave-like (well-defined in quantum mechanics), or the eigenvalue is not at all defined in classical physics. We also construct a new quantum mechanical postulate (Postulate 9) to deduce why the forbidden gap between discrete energy levels should exist in atoms, molecules and condensed matter phases. In fact, we tackle all the problems arising from the Copenhagen interpretation without violating established experiments and without proposing ideas that violate physical reality.
In the 17th century, it was thought that motion of macroscopic and microscopic objects could be well-expressed by using the laws of classical mechanics. But towards the end of 19th century, experimental studies showed that classical mechanics failed when applied to microscopic objects. This was mainly because classical mechanics did not take into account the concept of de-Broglie’s dual nature of matter and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Also, classical mechanics does not put any restrictions on the values of dynamical properties (likes position, momentum, energy etc.) calculated for microscopic object. According to classical mechanics, microscopic objects can have any value of dynamical properties, ( exact, large or small is permissible). Also any number of properties can be calculated simultaneously for a system.
In the 17th century, it was thought that motion of macroscopic and microscopic objects could be well-expressed by using the laws of classical mechanics. But towards the end of 19th century, experimental studies showed that classical mechanics failed when applied to microscopic objects. This was mainly because classical mechanics did not take into account the concept of de-Broglie’s dual nature of matter and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Also, classical mechanics does not put any restrictions on the values of dynamical properties (likes position, momentum, energy etc.) calculated for microscopic object. According to classical mechanics, microscopic objects can have any value of dynamical properties, ( exact , large or small is permissible). Also any number of properties can be calculated simultaneously for a system.
This paper explores how experiments influence the reception of interpretations of quantum mechanics, and also other relations between experiments and interpretations in that field. We start by surveying the struggle of different schools of philosophy of science in the 19th and early 20th centuries to adapt to the scientific advances, and then give a brief overview of realist and antirealist interpretations in quantum mechanics. Eight different types of relations between interpretations and experiments are then examined, with case studies from the history of quantum mechanics. (1) Many interpretations agree with all of the predictions of the instrumentalist interpretation, which is a good strategy for survival. (2) Some interpretations make different predictions that are not testable. (3) Other interpretations constitute ‘a different theory’ and are testable, although sometimes this is not anticipated by the interpretation. (4) Some interpretations have generated many variations, by adjustment of parameters or hypotheses, and part of these variations have been tested and ruled out by experiment. (5) At times experiments reinforce an interpretation. (6) Some experiments lead to a refinement of the interpretation. (7) There are experiments that suggest the creation of an interpretation. (8) And there are cases in which experiments are suggested by an interpretation, while not affecting its rivals.
One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S, (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S, simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).