What is quantum theory? For much of the twentieth century, it was widely believed that the interpretation of quantum theory had been essentially settled by Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927. But not only were the ‘dissenters’ of 1927 – in particular de Broglie, Einstein and Schrödinger – unconvinced at the time: similar dissenting points of view are not uncommon even today. What Popper called ‘the schism in physics’ (Popper 1982) never really healed. Soon after 1927 it became standard to assert that matters of interpretation had been dealt with, but the sense of puzzlement and paradox surrounding quantum theory never disappeared. As the century wore on, many of the concerns and alternative viewpoints expressed in 1927 slowly but surely revived. In 1952, Bohm revived and extended de Broglie's theory (Bohm 1952a,b), and in 1993 the de Broglie–Bohm theory finally received textbook treatment as an alternative formulation of quantum theory (Bohm and Hiley 1993; Holland 1993). In 1957, Everett (1957) revived Schrödinger's view that the wave function, and the wave function alone, is real (albeit in a very novel sense), and the resulting ‘Everett’ or ‘many-worlds’ interpretation (DeWitt and Graham 1973) gradually won widespread support, especially among physicists interested in quantum gravity and quantum cosmology.
What is quantum theory? For much of the twentieth century, it was widely believed that the interpretation of quantum theory had been essentially settled by Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927. But not only were the ‘dissenters’ of 1927 – in particular de Broglie, Einstein and Schrödinger – unconvinced at the time: similar dissenting points of view are not uncommon even today. What Popper called ‘the schism in physics’ (Popper 1982) never really healed. Soon after 1927 it became standard to assert that matters of interpretation had been dealt with, but the sense of puzzlement and paradox surrounding quantum theory never disappeared. As the century wore on, many of the concerns and alternative viewpoints expressed in 1927 slowly but surely revived. In 1952, Bohm revived and extended de Broglie's theory (Bohm 1952a,b), and in 1993 the de Broglie–Bohm theory finally received textbook treatment as an alternative formulation of quantum theory (Bohm and Hiley 1993; Holland 1993). In 1957, Everett (1957) revived Schrödinger's view that the wave function, and the wave function alone, is real (albeit in a very novel sense), and the resulting ‘Everett’ or ‘many-worlds’ interpretation (DeWitt and Graham 1973) gradually won widespread support, especially among physicists interested in quantum gravity and quantum cosmology.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.
In 1957 H. Everett published a paper setting out what seemed to be a radically new interpretation of quantum mechanics. His approach has recently received increasing attention. He did not refer to the ideas of de Broglie of thirty years before nor to the intervening elaboration of those ideas by Bohm. Yet it will be argued here that the elimination of arbitrary and inessential elements from Everett's theory leads back to, and throws new light on, the concepts of de Broglie. Everett was motivated by the notion of a quantum theory of gravitation and cosmology. In a thoroughly quantum cosmology, a quantum mechanics of the whole world, the wave function of the world could not be interpreted in the usual way. For this usual interpretation refers only to the statistics of measurement results for an observer intervening from outside the quantum system. When that system is the whole world, there is nothing outside. This situation presents no particular difficulty for the traditional (or ‘Copenhagen’) philosophy, which holds that a classical conception of the macroscopic world is logically prior to the quantum conception of the microscopic. The microscopic world is described by wave functions which are determined by and have implications for macroscopic phenomena in experimental set-ups.
The first famous thought experiment of Einstein gives rise to his theories of relativity, the bedrock of modern astrophysics and cosmology. His second famous thought experiment begins the investigation into the foundations of quantum mechanics. It leads to a paradox, inspiring various 'no-go' theorems proven by Bell, Kochen, and Specker. Physicists and philosophers worldwide become increasingly dissatisfied with the probabilistic complementarity interpretation (Born-Bohr) and eventually offer their own accounts of the theory. By the end of the 20th century two alternative approaches stand out as the best candidates: Both the hidden variables interpretation (de Broglie-Bohm) and the many worlds interpretation (Everett-DeWitt) give compelling descriptions of what the true nature of quantum reality could be. In this paper, a chronological overview of all these events is given, followed by a philosophical analysis of the three aforementioned interpretations. Ultimately it is concluded that the many worlds interpretation should be adopted as the best understanding of the formalism of quantum mechanics and, therefore, should be used in the multiversity textbooks.
The history of the quantum theory has received rather uneven treatment from professional historians of science. There has been a great deal of emphasis on the early period from 1900 to 1926, during which time the classic formulations of the so-called old and new quantum theories were laid down. But there have been many important subsequent improvements in the underlying theory, its applications and interpretation. The present article attempts a more balanced perspective on the whole theory from the initial inception to its ongoing development. The subject is necessarily a technical and mathematical one, and no account, worthy of any pretensions to accuracy, can avoid reference to some technical matters. An attempt has been made to keep these to a minimum, but it is not entirely possible to eliminate them. This probably helps to explain why the more recent history has largely been dealt with by practising physicists, rather than by historians.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been disputed ever since the advent of the theory in the 1920’s. Famous are the discussions over long time between Einstein and Bohr. Einstein refused to accept the so‐called Copenhagen interpretation, where the wave function collapses at a measurement and where the outcome of the measurement is essentially accidental (“God does not play dice”). Alternative interpretations have appeared, but the Copenhagen school has dominated the thoughts throughout the decades. One interesting interpretation was formulated in 1957 by Hugh Everett at Princeton, a student of John Wheeler, which abandons the wave‐function collapse. In this model the universe is governed entirely by the Schrödinger equation, which does not allow for any collapse. In Everett’s model after a measurement the wave function is separated into different branches that do not interact. This model was left unnoticed for long time until Bryce DeWitt took it up in 1970 and termed it “Many‐Worlds Interpretation”, a term that in some sense is misleading. Everett’s model is incomplete, and it was later supplemented by the theory of decoherence, which explains how the different branches decouple as a result of the interaction with the environment. This extended model has in recent years gained increased respect, and some believe that it is the only model made available so far that is fully consistent with quantum mechanics. This interpretation can also shed some light on the development of the universe and, in particular, on the so‐called Anthropic principle, which puts human beings at the center of the development.