One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S, (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S, simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).
One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S, (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S, simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).
refer to the joint measurement problem for noncommuting quantum observables: “One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).” The object of the present paper is to consider what approximate solution one may hope to find to the joint measurement problem. Our main conclusion, based on a rigorous notion of unsharp observable, is that one can reasonably expect to find approximate joint measurements for any pair of noncommuting sharp observables, provided a trade-off in the sense of a Heisenberg uncertainty relation for measurement inaccuracies is taken into account. In addition, it will be seen that as a consequence of the noncom-mutativity of the given observables, the approximating observables must have degrees of unsharpness that obey yet another trade-off relation in the spirit of Heisenberg’s principle. These connections will be
There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory. Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, orobservables(position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know thestateof the system.
The EPR argued that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of reality. So far, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and its extensions are all still inequalities form which hold the superior approximate estimations, a precise estimation and environmental variables have never appeared in any formula. With the indeterminism of observable quantities constrained by the uncertainty principle. The question arises whether there might be some deeper reality hidden beneath quantum mechanics, to be described by a more fundamental theory that can always predict the outcome of each measurement with certainty, this paper by using the QCPB attempts to answer this question. As a result of the QCPB theory, we geometrically propose an equality called quantum geomertainty relation (QGR) to modify the uncertainty relation based on the fundamental theory QCPB to positively give a complete description of reality that predicts the outcome of each measurement with certainty, meanwhile, the uncertainty relation is just a derivation from this quantum geometric certainty equality. It deals with the measurement in quantum equality for different manifolds equipped with various mathematical or physical structure. Accordingly, the environment joins the physical process, by taking environment variable as a geometric structure function in the QCPB into consideration, it has naturally solved the environment problem for the measurements. We demonstrate that entanglement term exists between the observable and the environment. Actually, the QCPB nicely explains how the environment has an effect on the measurement which causes the unavoidable influences. Conversely, we state that quantum mechanics is incomplete assuredly. Doubtlessly, the QCPB is surely a new way for such complete description of reality.
What does not satisfy me in that theory [quantum mechanics], from the standpoint of principle, is its attitude towards that which appears to me to be the programmatic aim of all physics: the complete description of any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or substantiation). Albert Einstein, Reply to Criticisms [This] implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear . In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of interaction between objects and measuring instruments which in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects. Indeed the finite interaction between object and measuring agencies conditioned by the very existence of the quantum of action entails – because of the impossibility of controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments, if these are to serve their purpose – the necessity of a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality and a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality. […]
One of the reasons for 1932 Nobel Prize for physics is “for the creation of quantum mechanics”. As well-known, the most famous contribution of Heisenberg is therefore one of the most importment reasons for Heisenberg was awarded the Nobel Prize is the creation of principle. While, this paper points out that the original principle is improper. Considering all the possible situations (including the case that people can create laws), the author presents certainty-uncertainty with general form and variable dimension fractal form. According to the classification of Neutrosophy, certainty-uncertainty can be divided into three principles in different conditions: certainty principle, namely a particle’s position and momentum can be known simultaneously; uncertainty principle, namely a particle’s position and momentum cannot be known simultaneously; and neutral (fuzzy) indeterminacy principle, namely whether or not a particle’s position and momentum can be known simultaneously is undetermined. The special cases of certainty-uncertainty include the original principle and Ozawa inequality. In addition, in accordance with the original discussing high-speed particle’s speed and track with Newton mechanics is unreasonable; but according to certainty-uncertainty Newton mechanics can be used to discuss the problem of gravitational defection of a photon orbit around the Sun (it gives the same result of deflection angle as given by general relativity). Finally, for the reason that in physics the principles, laws and the like that are regardless of the principle (law) of conservation of energy may be invalid; therefore certainty-uncertainty should be restricted (or constrained) by principle (law) of conservation of energy, and thus it can satisfy the principle (law) of conservation of energy.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.