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The Hybrid-Epistemic Model of Quantum Mechanics and the Possible Solution to the Measurement Problem

Jiří Souček

Published Feb 1, 2017• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this study we introduce and describe in details the hybrid-epistemic model for quantum mechanics. The main differences with respect to the standard model are following: (1) the measurement process is considered as an internal process inside quantum mechanics, i.e. it does not make a part of axioms and (2) the process of the observation of the state of the individual measuring system is introduced into axioms. The intrinsic measurement process is described in two variants (simplified and generalized). Our model contains hybrid, epistemic and hybrid-epistemic systems. Each hybrid system contains a unique orthogonal base composed from homogeneous (i.e. ontic) states. We show that in our model the measurement problem is consistently solvable. Our model represents the rational compromise between the Bohr’s view (the ontic model) and the Einstein’s view (the epistemic model).

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In this study we introduce and describe in details the hybrid-epistemic model for quantum mechanics. The main differences with respect to the standard model are following: (1) the measurement process is considered as an internal process inside quantum mechanics, i.e. it does not make a part of axioms and (2) the process of the observation of the state of the individual measuring system is introduced into axioms. The intrinsic measurement process is described in two variants (simplified and generalized). Our model contains hybrid, epistemic and hybrid-epistemic systems. Each hybrid system contains a unique orthogonal base composed from homogeneous (i.e. ontic) states. We show that in our model the measurement problem is consistently solvable. Our model represents the rational compromise between the Bohr’s view (the ontic model) and the Einstein’s view (the epistemic model).
In this study we introduce and describe in details the hybrid-epistemic model for quantum mechanics. The main differences with respect to the standard model are following: (1) the measurement process is considered as an internal process inside quantum mechanics, i.e. it does not make a part of axioms and (2) the process of the observation of the state of the individual measuring system is introduced into axioms. The intrinsic measurement process is described in two variants (simplified and generalized). Our model contains hybrid, epistemic and hybrid-epistemic systems. Each hybrid system contains a unique orthogonal base composed from homogeneous (i.e. ontic) states. We show that in our model the measurement problem is consistently solvable. Our model represents the rational compromise between the Bohr’s view (the ontic model) and the Einstein’s view (the epistemic model).
In this paper we define and study the new model for quantum mechanics (QM) – the hybrid epistemic model. The new feature of this model consists in the fact that it does not contain the formal definition of the measurement process but the measurement process is one of possible processes inside of QM. The hybrid-epistemic model of QM is based on two concepts: the quantum state of an ensemble and the properties of individual systems. We show the local nature of EPR correlations in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM in all details. We define precisely the epistemic and the ontic models of QM for the goal to prove that these three models give the same empirical predictions, i.e. that they are empirically equivalent. We show that the no-go theorems (Bell’s theorem, the Leggett-Garg’s theorem and others theorems) cannot be proved in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM. This is one of the main results of this paper. We shall consider the possible inconsistences of the ontic model of QM. We introduce the property-epistemic model of QM which is the special simple case of the hybrid-epistemic model.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics (QM) is related to the inability to include learning about the properties of a quantum system by an agent in the formalism of quantum theory. It includes questions about the physical processes behind the measurement, uniqueness, and randomness of obtained outcomes and an ontic or epistemic role of the state. These issues have triggered various interpretations of quantum theory. They vary from refusing any connection between physical reality and a measurement process to insisting that a collapse of the wave-function is real and possibly involves consciousness. On the other hand, the actual mechanism of a measurement is not extensively discussed in these interpretations. This essay attempts to investigate the quantum measurement problem from the position of the scientific consensus. We begin with a short overview of the development of sensing in living organisms. This is performed for the purpose of stressing the relation between reality and our experience. We then briefly present different approaches to the measurement problem in chosen interpretations. We then state three philosophical assumptions for further consideration and present a decomposition of the measurement act into four stages: transformation, conversion, amplification and broadcasting, and, finally, perception. Each of these stages provides an intuition about the physical processes contributing to it. These conclusions are then used in a discussion about, e.g., objectivity, the implausibility of reversing a measurement, or the epistemic status of the wave-function. Finally, we argue that those in favor of some of the most popular interpretations can find an overlap between their beliefs and the consequences of considerations presented here.
Abstract We define a concept of a QM-model. The true theorem in QM is a statement which is true in all QM-models. In some QM-models the Bell’s theorem can be proved (e.g. in the standard model of QM) while in other QM-models the Bell’s theorem cannot be proved (e.g. in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM). The same situation is true when other no-go theorems are considered. Thus no-go theorems are not true in QM and the proof of the non-locality of QM is invalid. Then the axiomatic definition of the hybrid-epistemic (HE) model of QM is presented in all details. At the end the recent proof of the inconsistency of the standard QM-model is discussed. Our main program is to start the axiomatic study of QM (in the sense of the Hilbert’s sixth problem), to prove the invalidity of no-go theorems and to identify the right (acceptable) QM-model.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been discussed since this theme first was brought up by Einstein and Bohr. This article describes a proposal for a new foundation of quantum theory, partly drawing upon ideas from statistical inference theory. The approach can be said to have an intuitive basis: The quantum states of a physical system are under certain conditions in one-to-one correspondence with the following: 1. Focus on a concrete question to nature and then 2. Give a definite answer to this question. This foundation implies an epistemic interpretation, depending upon the observer, but the objective world is restored when all observers agree on their observations on some variables. The article contains a survey of parts of the authors books on epistemic processes, which give more details about the theory. At the same time, the article extends some of the discussion in the books, and at places makes it more precise.