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A New Model for Quantum Mechanics and the Invalidity of no-go Theorems

Jiří Souček

Published Feb 1, 2018• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this paper we define and study the new model for quantum mechanics (QM) – the hybrid epistemic model. The new feature of this model consists in the fact that it does not contain the formal definition of the measurement process but the measurement process is one of possible processes inside of QM. The hybrid-epistemic model of QM is based on two concepts: the quantum state of an ensemble and the properties of individual systems. We show the local nature of EPR correlations in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM in all details. We define precisely the epistemic and the ontic models of QM for the goal to prove that these three models give the same empirical predictions, i.e. that they are empirically equivalent. We show that the no-go theorems (Bell’s theorem, the Leggett-Garg’s theorem and others theorems) cannot be proved in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM. This is one of the main results of this paper. We shall consider the possible inconsistences of the ontic model of QM. We introduce the property-epistemic model of QM which is the special simple case of the hybrid-epistemic model.

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Abstract We define a concept of a QM-model. The true theorem in QM is a statement which is true in all QM-models. In some QM-models the Bell’s theorem can be proved (e.g. in the standard model of QM) while in other QM-models the Bell’s theorem cannot be proved (e.g. in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM). The same situation is true when other no-go theorems are considered. Thus no-go theorems are not true in QM and the proof of the non-locality of QM is invalid. Then the axiomatic definition of the hybrid-epistemic (HE) model of QM is presented in all details. At the end the recent proof of the inconsistency of the standard QM-model is discussed. Our main program is to start the axiomatic study of QM (in the sense of the Hilbert’s sixth problem), to prove the invalidity of no-go theorems and to identify the right (acceptable) QM-model.

Journal of Physics Conference Series•Dec 1, 2019•0 citations

The Hybrid-Epistemic Model of Quantum Mechanics and the Possible Solution to the Measurement Problem

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In this study we introduce and describe in details the hybrid-epistemic model for quantum mechanics. The main differences with respect to the standard model are following: (1) the measurement process is considered as an internal process inside quantum mechanics, i.e. it does not make a part of axioms and (2) the process of the observation of the state of the individual measuring system is introduced into axioms. The intrinsic measurement process is described in two variants (simplified and generalized). Our model contains hybrid, epistemic and hybrid-epistemic systems. Each hybrid system contains a unique orthogonal base composed from homogeneous (i.e. ontic) states. We show that in our model the measurement problem is consistently solvable. Our model represents the rational compromise between the Bohr’s view (the ontic model) and the Einstein’s view (the epistemic model).

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Hybrid-epistemický model kvantové mechaniky a možné řešení problému měření

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In this study we introduce and describe in details the hybrid-epistemic model for quantum mechanics. The main differences with respect to the standard model are following: (1) the measurement process is considered as an internal process inside quantum mechanics, i.e. it does not make a part of axioms and (2) the process of the observation of the state of the individual measuring system is introduced into axioms. The intrinsic measurement process is described in two variants (simplified and generalized). Our model contains hybrid, epistemic and hybrid-epistemic systems. Each hybrid system contains a unique orthogonal base composed from homogeneous (i.e. ontic) states. We show that in our model the measurement problem is consistently solvable. Our model represents the rational compromise between the Bohr’s view (the ontic model) and the Einstein’s view (the epistemic model).

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Nová axiomatizace kvantové mechaniky

Jiří Souček

In this paper we describe a new (complete) axiomatization of quantum mechanics (QM) in which we add axioms describing the concept of an observation. We show that new axioms are clear and evident and based on common sense. Our approach is based on the idea of the observation of properties of an individual measuring system. We distinguish two concepts of a state: the properties of an individual measuring system and the state of an ensemble of systems. Then we prove that the ontic model of QM is inconsistent. This is our main result. This implies the necessity to consider “non-realistic” models for QM in which it is not true that each wave-function describes a possible state of an individual system. Our axiomatization is based on the postulate of the existence of definite outputs of an experiment. Thus the evident reality of the existence of definite outputs implies that our axiomatization is true and verifiable.

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Multipartite Nonlocality in Ontological Models of Quantum Theory

Fumiaki Morikoshi

Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003

Journal of the Physical Society of Japan•Apr 23, 2013•0 citations

Understanding sequential measurements in psi-epistemic ontological models

Joshua B. Ruebeck

Since the famous debates of Einstein & Bohr, physicists have argued about the nature of the quantum state. Is it best thought of as describing the-way-things-are out there in the world, or merely as a description of our knowledge of such things? In more recent years, this has been termed the ψ-epistemic/ψ-ontic debate, and that distinction has been given a mathematical definition within the ontological models formalism. This formalism is a framework for describing a large class of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we show that consideration of sequential measurements, and the fact that the quantum state changes during measurements, has been a neglected topic in this area as it places nontrivial restrictions on the structure of ψ-epistemic ontological models. \n \nWe do this by finding a general restriction on the structure of ψ-epistemic models, although not one that is strong enough to rule them out categorically. We then apply this restriction to all of the known examples of ψ-epistemic ontological models and show that they can’t represent sequential measurements. We also present a new version of the ontological models formalism, based on hidden Markov models, which we develop briefly and describe how it may be useful for either proving a no-go theorem (i.e. ‘ψ-epistemic models can’t exist’) or for learning more about the structure of ψ-epistemic models and how to construct them.

•Aug 6, 2019•0 citations
In this paper we define and study the new model for quantum mechanics (QM) – the hybrid epistemic model. The new feature of this model consists in the fact that it does not contain the formal definition of the measurement process but the measurement process is one of possible processes inside of QM. The hybrid-epistemic model of QM is based on two concepts: the quantum state of an ensemble and the properties of individual systems. We show the local nature of EPR correlations in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM in all details. We define precisely the epistemic and the ontic models of QM for the goal to prove that these three models give the same empirical predictions, i.e. that they are empirically equivalent. We show that the no-go theorems (Bell’s theorem, the Leggett-Garg’s theorem and others theorems) cannot be proved in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM. This is one of the main results of this paper. We shall consider the possible inconsistences of the ontic model of QM. We introduce the property-epistemic model of QM which is the special simple case of the hybrid-epistemic model.
Abstract We define a concept of a QM-model. The true theorem in QM is a statement which is true in all QM-models. In some QM-models the Bell’s theorem can be proved (e.g. in the standard model of QM) while in other QM-models the Bell’s theorem cannot be proved (e.g. in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM). The same situation is true when other no-go theorems are considered. Thus no-go theorems are not true in QM and the proof of the non-locality of QM is invalid. Then the axiomatic definition of the hybrid-epistemic (HE) model of QM is presented in all details. At the end the recent proof of the inconsistency of the standard QM-model is discussed. Our main program is to start the axiomatic study of QM (in the sense of the Hilbert’s sixth problem), to prove the invalidity of no-go theorems and to identify the right (acceptable) QM-model.
In this study we introduce and describe in details the hybrid-epistemic model for quantum mechanics. The main differences with respect to the standard model are following: (1) the measurement process is considered as an internal process inside quantum mechanics, i.e. it does not make a part of axioms and (2) the process of the observation of the state of the individual measuring system is introduced into axioms. The intrinsic measurement process is described in two variants (simplified and generalized). Our model contains hybrid, epistemic and hybrid-epistemic systems. Each hybrid system contains a unique orthogonal base composed from homogeneous (i.e. ontic) states. We show that in our model the measurement problem is consistently solvable. Our model represents the rational compromise between the Bohr’s view (the ontic model) and the Einstein’s view (the epistemic model).
In this study we introduce and describe in details the hybrid-epistemic model for quantum mechanics. The main differences with respect to the standard model are following: (1) the measurement process is considered as an internal process inside quantum mechanics, i.e. it does not make a part of axioms and (2) the process of the observation of the state of the individual measuring system is introduced into axioms. The intrinsic measurement process is described in two variants (simplified and generalized). Our model contains hybrid, epistemic and hybrid-epistemic systems. Each hybrid system contains a unique orthogonal base composed from homogeneous (i.e. ontic) states. We show that in our model the measurement problem is consistently solvable. Our model represents the rational compromise between the Bohr’s view (the ontic model) and the Einstein’s view (the epistemic model).
In this paper we describe a new (complete) axiomatization of quantum mechanics (QM) in which we add axioms describing the concept of an observation. We show that new axioms are clear and evident and based on common sense. Our approach is based on the idea of the observation of properties of an individual measuring system. We distinguish two concepts of a state: the properties of an individual measuring system and the state of an ensemble of systems. Then we prove that the ontic model of QM is inconsistent. This is our main result. This implies the necessity to consider “non-realistic” models for QM in which it is not true that each wave-function describes a possible state of an individual system. Our axiomatization is based on the postulate of the existence of definite outputs of an experiment. Thus the evident reality of the existence of definite outputs implies that our axiomatization is true and verifiable.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
Since the famous debates of Einstein & Bohr, physicists have argued about the nature of the quantum state. Is it best thought of as describing the-way-things-are out there in the world, or merely as a description of our knowledge of such things? In more recent years, this has been termed the ψ-epistemic/ψ-ontic debate, and that distinction has been given a mathematical definition within the ontological models formalism. This formalism is a framework for describing a large class of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we show that consideration of sequential measurements, and the fact that the quantum state changes during measurements, has been a neglected topic in this area as it places nontrivial restrictions on the structure of ψ-epistemic ontological models. \n \nWe do this by finding a general restriction on the structure of ψ-epistemic models, although not one that is strong enough to rule them out categorically. We then apply this restriction to all of the known examples of ψ-epistemic ontological models and show that they can’t represent sequential measurements. We also present a new version of the ontological models formalism, based on hidden Markov models, which we develop briefly and describe how it may be useful for either proving a no-go theorem (i.e. ‘ψ-epistemic models can’t exist’) or for learning more about the structure of ψ-epistemic models and how to construct them.