This essay reviews a modern understanding of a quantum measurement. Rather than reducing the picture to the observer's experience with quantum system, we try to put it in the context of a broader physical picture. We also attempt to distinguish some basic components and stages of a generic measurement. In this way, we want to understand which aspects of quantum measurements are important to mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics.
This essay reviews a modern understanding of a quantum measurement. Rather than reducing the picture to the observer's experience with quantum system, we try to put it in the context of a broader physical picture. We also attempt to distinguish some basic components and stages of a generic measurement. In this way, we want to understand which aspects of quantum measurements are important to mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics (QM) is related to the inability to include learning about the properties of a quantum system by an agent in the formalism of quantum theory. It includes questions about the physical processes behind the measurement, uniqueness, and randomness of obtained outcomes and an ontic or epistemic role of the state. These issues have triggered various interpretations of quantum theory. They vary from refusing any connection between physical reality and a measurement process to insisting that a collapse of the wave-function is real and possibly involves consciousness. On the other hand, the actual mechanism of a measurement is not extensively discussed in these interpretations. This essay attempts to investigate the quantum measurement problem from the position of the scientific consensus. We begin with a short overview of the development of sensing in living organisms. This is performed for the purpose of stressing the relation between reality and our experience. We then briefly present different approaches to the measurement problem in chosen interpretations. We then state three philosophical assumptions for further consideration and present a decomposition of the measurement act into four stages: transformation, conversion, amplification and broadcasting, and, finally, perception. Each of these stages provides an intuition about the physical processes contributing to it. These conclusions are then used in a discussion about, e.g., objectivity, the implausibility of reversing a measurement, or the epistemic status of the wave-function. Finally, we argue that those in favor of some of the most popular interpretations can find an overlap between their beliefs and the consequences of considerations presented here.
Since its inception, quantum theory has been the subject of fierce interpretive controversy, which persists to this day. Disputed topics include the basic ontology and dynamics of the theory, the role (if any) of measurement, the meaning of probability, and the issue of non-locality. But there is yet another problem that has been largely ignored: how the theory makes contact with observational data. The problem is endemic to physics, and was discussed by Einstein in several places. In this essay, I discuss Einstein's general approach, how it applied to some quantum-mechanical phenomena, and why a central aspect of the solution might lead to novel and important new predictions.
In these notes, based on lectures given as part of the Les Houches summer school on Quantum Optics and Nanophotonics in August, 2013, I have tried to give a brief survey of some important approaches and modern tendencies in quantum measurement. I wish it to be clear from the outset that I shy explicitly away from the "quantum measurement problem," and that the present treatment aims to elucidate the theory and practice of various ways in which measurements can, in light of quantum mechanics, be carried out; and various formalisms for describing them. While the treatment is by necessity largely theoretical, the emphasis is meant to be on an experimental "perspective" on measurement -- that is, to place the priority on the possibility of gaining information through some process, and then attempting to model that process mathematically and consider its ramifications, rather than stressing a particular mathematical definition as the {\it sine qua non} of measurement. The textbook definition of measurement as being a particular set of mathematical operations carried out on particular sorts of operators has been so well drilled into us that many have the unfortunate tendency of saying "that experiment can't be described by projections onto the eigenstates of a Hermitian operator, so it is not really a measurement," when of course any practitioner of an experimental science such as physics should instead say "that experiment allowed us to measure something, and if the standard theory of measurement does not describe it, the standard theory of measurement is incomplete." Idealisations are important, but when the real world breaks the approximations made in the theory, it is the theory which must be fixed, and not the real world.
Measurements play a specific role in quantum mechanics; only measurements allow us to catch a glimpse of the eluding physical reality. However, there is something deeply unsatisfactory with this specificity—a measurement is itself a physical process! Several varying modes of coping with this dilemma have been proposed and this article tries to describe how a now-century-long discussion has led to new insights about the transition from the quantum to the classical world. Starting from the pioneer’s view of the quantum measurement problem, it follows the development of formalisms, the interest from philosophers for its new aspects on reality and how different interpretations of quantum mechanics have tried to support our classically working brains in understanding quantum phenomena. Decoherence is a main topic and its role in measurement processes exemplified. The question of whether the quantum measurement problem is now solved is left open for the readers’ own judgment.
‘Quantum theory’ is not a single physical theory but a framework in which many different concrete theories fit. As such, a solution to the quantum measurement problem ought to provide a recipe to interpret each such concrete theory, in a mutually consistent way. But with the exception of the Everett interpretation, the main extant solutions either try to make sense of the abstract framework as if it were concrete, or else interpret one particular quantum theory under the fiction that it is fundamental and exact. In either case, these approaches are unable to help themselves to the very theory-laden, level-relative ways in which quantum theory makes contact with experiment in mainstream physics, and so are committed to major revisionary projects which have not been carried out even in outline. As such, only the Everett interpretation is currently suited to make sense of quantum physics as it is found.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.