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Entropy

Quantum Key Distribution in the Presence of the Intercept-Resend with Faked States Attack

Luis Adrián Lizama-Pérez, José López, Eduardo de Carlos Lopez

Published Dec 23, 2016• 25 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Despite the unconditionally secure theory of the Quantum Key Distribution (Q K D), several attacks have been successfully implemented against commercial Q K D systems. Those systems have exhibited some flaws, as the secret key rate of corresponding protocols remains unaltered, while the eavesdropper obtains the entire secret key. We propose the negative acknowledgment state quantum key distribution protocol as a novel protocol capable of detecting the eavesdropping activity of the Intercept Resend with Faked Sates (I R F S) attack without requiring additional optical components different from the B B 84 protocol because the system can be implemented as a high software module. In this approach, the transmitter interleaves pairs of quantum states, referred to here as parallel and orthogonal states, while the receiver uses active basis selection.

DOI
10.3390/e19010004

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Despite the unconditionally secure theory of the Quantum Key Distribution (Q K D), several attacks have been successfully implemented against commercial Q K D systems. Those systems have exhibited some flaws, as the secret key rate of corresponding protocols remains unaltered, while the eavesdropper obtains the entire secret key. We propose the negative acknowledgment state quantum key distribution protocol as a novel protocol capable of detecting the eavesdropping activity of the Intercept Resend with Faked Sates (I R F S) attack without requiring additional optical components different from the B B 84 protocol because the system can be implemented as a high software module. In this approach, the transmitter interleaves pairs of quantum states, referred to here as parallel and orthogonal states, while the receiver uses active basis selection.
Despite the unconditionally secure theory of quantum key distribution (QKD), several attacks have been successfully implemented against commercial QKD systems. Those systems have exhibited some flaws, as the secret key rate of corresponding protocols remains unaltered, while the eavesdropper obtains the entire secret key. We propose a new theoretical approach called quantum flows to be able to detect the eavesdropping activity in the channel without requiring additional optical components different from the BB84 protocol because the system can be implemented as a high software module. In this approach, the transmitter interleaves pairs of quantum states, referred to here as parallel and orthogonal (non-orthogonal) states, while the receiver uses active basis selection.
The existing studies proved the importance of quantum key distribution protocols,unfortunately, most of them have been known only as theoretical models. Starting from the mathematical models, this study explores quantum alternatives to traditional key distribution protocols and involves software implementations of the quantum key distribution protocols with two, three and four-state systems. The paper presents the results obtained on case of the cybernetic attack simulation, type Intercept-Resend - the well known attack on quantum world, over the each protocol. Presence of the eavesdropper is determined by calculating the errors obtained at the end of transmission through quantum channel. The method Quantum Error Rate for detecting the eavesdropper can be applied to the majority key distribution systems, each system having its own acceptable error rate. Starting from the same size of input data, the paper presents an analysis of the data obtained on cybernetic attack simulations and analyzes the percentage of errors by comparison with the dimensions of the cryptographic keys obtained in the case of each protocol.
In this paper, we propose a software implementation of Quantum Key Distribution scheme using twelve orthogonal states in a four-state system. With the twelve states, the Sender can encode two bits classical information in one particle, and distribute her secret key to the Receiver. This study explores quantum alternatives to traditional key distribution protocols, and involves implementations of quantum key distribution protocol on two cases: with and without cyber-attacks (the Intercept-Resend attack).
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is intended to produce cryptographic secret keys between two remote parties, usually called Alice and Bob. Even though QKD has been proven to be unconditionally secure against the eavesdropper, commonly called Eve, practical implementations of QKD may contain vulnerabilities that may lead to the generated secret keys being compromised. In order to detect the presence of the eavesdropper in the channel, in our proposal Alice introduces an interleaved sequence of decoy states which produce a characteristic distribution at Bob's station. Thus, in analyzing such distribution in presence and absence of the eavesdropper Eve, her activity in the channel is detected. This protocol doesn’t require changes at the quantum physical level, but it can be incorporated at the high software level.
Leveraging quantum mechanics, cryptographers have devised provably secure key sharing protocols. Despite proving the security in theory, real-world application falls short of the ideal. Last year, cryptanalysts completed an experiment demonstrating a successful eavesdropping attack on commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. This attack exploits a weakness in the typical real-world implementation of quantum cryptosystems. Cryptanalysts have successfully attacked several protocols. In this paper, we examine the Kak quantum cryptography protocol and how it may perform under such attacks.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communication based on fundamental laws of physics, though practical realizations of QKD may have loopholes and side channels, thus their security can be compromised. We analyze the intercept-resend attack on the BB84 decoy-state protocol under the presence of a passive side channel of the light source. We derive an upper bound for the secret key rate and show that it does not significantly deviate from the ideal side-channel-free case.