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JOURNAL OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Security Analysis and Improvements of Hierarchical Identity Based Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme

Mao Kefei, Jie Chen, Jianwei Liu

Published Jan 1, 2016• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

The security of hierarchical identity based authenticated key agreement scheme which was proposed by CAO et al. (2014) is cryptanalyzed. First, it is pointed out that the scheme is not completely secure against the basic impersonation attack. Then, the process and the reasons of the attack are described. Finally, an improvement scheme to mend the security leaks is proposed based on the hierarchical identity based encryption (BONEH et al. 2005). The security proof of the proposal is presented in the BJM model. The computation efficiency of the

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The security of hierarchical identity based authenticated key agreement scheme which was proposed by CAO et al. (2014) is cryptanalyzed. First, it is pointed out that the scheme is not completely secure against the basic impersonation attack. Then, the process and the reasons of the attack are described. Finally, an improvement scheme to mend the security leaks is proposed based on the hierarchical identity based encryption (BONEH et al. 2005). The security proof of the proposal is presented in the BJM model. The computation efficiency of the
This paper studied two-party authenticated agreement protocol in the certificateless public setting.Analyzed the security of Liu-xu's certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocol,and it was shown that the scheme did not achieve strong security.The scheme was vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attack and leakage of ephemeral secrets attack.The reason why the attack can work was analyzed and proposed an improved scheme to remove the attack.It is not hard to devise certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols that look secure,but making the proofs word is not always so simple.
We point out the RYY+ identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol is vulnerable to Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack and Intermediate results leakage (IRL) attack. Then we give the improved protocol which provides KCI and IRL resistance. The novel protocol is provably secure under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the seCK model, which enhances the adversary's queries comparing with previous ID based AKE models. The proposed scheme also has an advantage over most previous schemes on security and efficiency.
Abstract. Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. The protocol design is, however, extremely error-prone as evidenced by the iterative process of fixing discovered attacks on published protocols. We revisit an efficient identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Ryu, Yoon and Yoo. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for real-world applications despite offering no resilience against key-compromise impersonation (K-CI). We then show that the protocol is, in fact, insecure against reflection attacks. A slight modification to the protocol is proposed, which results in significant benefits for the security of the protocol without compromising on its efficiency. Finally, we prove the improved protocol secure in a widely accepted model.
McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto, and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto’s second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model.
Key agreement and digital signature are two significant and most useful contributions of modern cryptography. Such protocols and schemes allow two or more parties to establish a common session key securely in the presence of a malicious adversary and provide means of ensuring data origin authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. Thus, secure key agreement protocols and signature schemes are fundamental building blocks for constructing complex higher-level protocols. In this thesis, we deal with security analysis of existing key agreement protocols and digital signature schemes. We examine ten authenticated key agreement protocols without key confirmation, out of which half are two-party and the other half are three-party, and one deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme. By giving concrete attacks, we show that these protocols and the scheme do not possess the desirable security attributes or security attributes claimed by their authors. We also present a secure deterministic identity-based signature scheme that supports partial aggregation. First, we show that Okamoto's and Chen et al.’s protocol cannot withstand the key-compromise impersonation attack and that Tan et al.’s, Lim et al.’s and two protocols of Holbl et al. are insecure against the impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. Next, we prove that one protocol of Holbl et al. is vulnerable to the insider attack, one to the unknown key-share attack, one protocol allows an adversary to compute the private key of any user and one protocol allows her to compute the shared session key. We also show that Selvi et. al.'s deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme is universally forgeable, i.e., anyone is able to easily generate valid signatures on any messages of his choice having on average twelve genuine digital signatures. In the end, we introduce a new deterministic identity-based signature scheme and formally prove its security in the random oracle model. The scheme is a major improvement of the signature scheme proposed by Selvi et. al. and offers the same tight security reduction to the underlying gap Diffie-Hellman problem. Because the newly proposed scheme is deterministic it allows partial aggregation, i.e., all the signatures from the same signer can be aggregated into one single short signature.
The security of a provably secure identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in the standard model was analyzed,and it was found that the protocol used in escrowless mode has security flaws.When the private key generator(PKG) is controlled or attacked,all of the session keys can be obtained.To resist this attack,the identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol was improved.This new protocol was proven to be secure in the standard model and has the property of not needing session key escrow.