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Jisuanji yingyong yanjiu

Analysis and improvement certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol

Jian Shu

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This paper studied two-party authenticated agreement protocol in the certificateless public setting.Analyzed the security of Liu-xu's certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocol,and it was shown that the scheme did not achieve strong security.The scheme was vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attack and leakage of ephemeral secrets attack.The reason why the attack can work was analyzed and proposed an improved scheme to remove the attack.It is not hard to devise certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols that look secure,but making the proofs word is not always so simple.

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This paper studied two-party authenticated agreement protocol in the certificateless public setting.Analyzed the security of Liu-xu's certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocol,and it was shown that the scheme did not achieve strong security.The scheme was vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attack and leakage of ephemeral secrets attack.The reason why the attack can work was analyzed and proposed an improved scheme to remove the attack.It is not hard to devise certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols that look secure,but making the proofs word is not always so simple.
Based on signcryption scheme,Liu-Xu proposed an efficient and strong secure two-party key agreement protocol,which worked in an elliptic curve group.Security analysis showed that the scheme did not achieve strong security.The protocol,however,was susceptible to leakage of ephemeral secrets attack,and couldn't provide perfect forward security.Accor-dingly,the current paper demonstrated the vulnerability of Liu-Xu's protocol against such attacks due to redundancy of the exchange messages,and then presented an improved protocol in order to resolve such problems.
Recently, two certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocols were proposed, and both protocols were claimed they can meet the desirable security properties including forward security, key compromise impersonation resistance and so on. Through cryptanalysis, we show that one neither meets forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance nor resists an attack by an adversary who knows all users' secret values, and the other cannot resist key compromise impersonation attack. Finally, we propose improved protocols to make up two original protocols' security weaknesses, respectively. Further security analysis shows that our improved protocols can remove such security weaknesses.
This paper analyzed a bilinear pairing-free certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Kim et al. The protocol did not satisfy an important security feature that was the basic impersonation attack under public key replacement attack. As well as,it mounted a specific attack on the protocol. Then an improved certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol was presented in order to satisfy the missing security property. The analysis shows that the improved protocol can efficiently withstand public key replacement attack and satisfy some necessary security properties.
A few of certificateless key agreement schemes have been proposed in recent years,all of them need pairing operations,what's more,most of them are vulnerable to the key compromise impersonation attack and resistance to leakage of ephemeral keys.The provably secure certificateless key agreement protocol was proposed by Lippold in 2009,but their protocol suffered from computation burden.In order to solve the above-mentioned problem,this paper proposed a new pairing-free certificateless two party key agreement scheme (CL-KA) and presened its security properties.The new scheme was secure as long as each party had at least one uncompromised secret.Thus,the new scheme was secure even if the key generation centre learned the ephemeral secrets of both parties.The new scheme achieves efficiency in computational cost when compared with Lippold's protocol.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al. proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack -- key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes,such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.